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Abstract
In the orthodox literature on financial development it is widely argued that liberalisation 
of the financial sector by abolishing interest rate ceilings, refraining from directed credit 
programmes and removing capital controls would lead to the deepening of the financial 
sector, and as a consequence, to economic growth. In the late 1980-90s post-socialist 
economies embarked on liberalising their financial sectors. Fast formation of 
competitive financial markets free of government intervention was intended to ensure 
successful transition from centrally planned system towards a market economy.
While most of the transition economies had made significant progress in 
liberalising their economies by the second half of the 1990s, the Belarusian authorities, 
anticipating the social and consequently political costs of economic liberalisation, 
abandoned this strategy and in 1996 reintroduced a pervasive state control over the 
economy, placing repression of the financial sector in the centre of the economic policy­
making.
This thesis examines the financial development of Belarus in 1991-2002 within 
the financial repression paradigm based on the works of McKinnon (1973) and Shaw 
(1973). The case of Belarus is particularly intriguing because despite undertaking no 
transformation per se, and achieving no macroeconomic stability, Belarus has 
nevertheless demonstrated macroeconomic growth from 1997 onwards comparable to 
that in the Central European transition countries regarded as successful. By examining 
whether financial controls imposed on financial sector in Belarus in 1996-2000 
facilitated financial deepening and analysing the consequences of the inflationary 
financing of enterprises for the Belarusian economy this study seeks to answer if 
Belarus’ financial policy in the late 1990s can be regarded as efficient and the 
Belarusian alternative approach to transition can claim to be successful.
The study reveals that the Belarusian experience of financial repression had an 
overall negative effect on financial development, resulting in shallow finance and 
financial intermediaries playing a passive role in the development process over the 
period of investigation. The Belarusian financial policy has proven inefficient and 
unable to target long-run growth objectives.
Preface
Belarus is a small country and is not of much interest from the point of view of playing 
any major role in shaping the world political economy. It is not a naturally resource-rich 
country like, for example, Russia; its population is four times smaller than Ukraine’s; its 
GDP makes only a minimal contribution to the total world economy; and it presents 
little strategic threat to the international community. Few ordinary people living in the 
West know about Belarus. Many view it as a part of Russia. Others recognise it only 
when it comes to the point of discussing the worst heritage of Soviet times -  Chernobyl 
-  or for its being governed by ‘the last dictator of Europe’ -  Alexander Lukashenko. 
Yet interest in Belarus has grown recently among economists, puzzled by high rates of 
economic growth in a country that, unlike the majority of the former Soviet economies, 
did not follow the conventional transition path and hardly reformed the economy.
So, what inspired me to write about the Belarusian case of transition? The main 
inspiration came from my controversial feelings about the way ‘transition’ went in my 
country, and this personal experience led me to a desire to examine the process more 
objectively. The views expressed in the thesis support neither the orthodox approach to 
transition, at least the way in which it started and the way in which transition proceeded 
in many former Soviet Union countries (FSU), nor the political-cum-economic strategy 
pursued by the Belarusian government in the second half of the 1990s. My 
disagreement with the first stems from my family’s first experience of the early years of 
transition and extends to the social costs it incurred across the region. In one day, my 
parents lost so much, starting from their savings, for which my father had worked hard 
all his life, which were eroded by hyperinflation. He dreamt of buying a car one day to 
travel around with his family. That day he could only afford to buy five ice creams. He 
lost more than money: he lost trust in the state and he lost hope for the future. All his 
life he used to work in a plant, and despite the fact that he was very talented in building 
construction and interior design, he could not start his own business in the time of 
transition. To do that it was necessary to have either capital or connections with the 
dominant political elite (nomenklatura). It was also difficult to find a job in this area, as 
nobody wanted to employ a man of middle age when a generation of young 
entrepreneurs with a new way of thinking was growing. No institutional infrastructure 
was created at that period to help people such as my father overcome these transitional 
problems. People were put second in this transition process. As Stiglitz (2002, p. 187)
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contended, ‘the Fund’s [IMF] vision was too narrow -  it focused only on the 
economics’. Not earlier than a decade after transition began the international advisers 
and policy-makers have started admitting their mistakes and anticipating that the 
transition from communism goes beyond privatisation, liberalization, and 
decentralisation; it requires a creation of markets and the institutional infrastructure (e.g. 
legal and regulatory frameworks, trade unions and social safety nets) (Stiglitz 2002). 
Although Belarus chose not to pursue the strategy advised by the IMF in the second half 
of the 1990s, its ‘transition’1 path could hardly be regarded as a better alternative, as in 
the end it will incur greater social costs than is currently anticipated. The Belarusian 
strategy turned out to be nothing more than an attempt to create some illusions of 
Wonderland, or of temporary prosperity against the background of a sharp fall in output 
and increase in poverty in the neighbouring Ukraine and Russia which had embarked on 
radical transformations of their economies. The Belarusian authorities failed to combine 
its short-term needs with long-term growth objectives. The present research unveils the 
inefficiency of Belarus’ development strategy and shows that if transition had to be 
done in a different way it should not be pursued in the way in which it has been in 
Belarus, where in the end the Belarusian strategy of development aimed to serve the 
needs of a political elite, but not the needs of society.
I would like to thank a number of people for their help and support provided 
during the years of this research. Foremost amongst them are my mother, Dr. Tamara 
Korosteleva, who has always been an example of a great courage and purposefulness for 
me; my sister, Dr. Elena Korosteleva-Polglase, who encouraged me to embark on this 
challenging, but interesting journey of writing a thesis, provided with valuable advice 
through it, and who also helped me with obtaining a financial funding to assist this 
study at the early stage of the thesis; and my husband, Pavel Kuryan, without whose 
love, support and valuable comments this research would never become possible. My 
particular thanks are due to Dr Colin Lawson, my primary supervisor, who in the first 
place expressed an interest in doing research on Belarus, and who provided an 
invaluable advice and support in the course of this study. I am also very grateful to Dr 
Susan Johnson and Dr Andrew Abbott, my two other supervisors, for Susan’s very 
valuable comments and ideas and Andrew’s help and support in discovering the world 
of econometrics. My thanks go also to Dr Peter Dawson for providing me with helpful
1 Here, inverted commas mean that the transition from communism to a market economy in Belarus has 
not begun yet as such.
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advice on the use of econometric techniques in the earlier stage of my thesis. I also 
appreciate the assistance of Sergei Perapechka, Sergei Novik and Valentin Gavrilov, 
former and current officials of the National Bank of the Republic of Belarus in helping 
with obtaining the data for this research. My thanks go also to Giles Polglase and Dr 
Derek Hutcheson for proofreading some chapters of my thesis, and to Prof. Stephen 
White for his support during the final year of my thesis.
I would also like to acknowledge the financial support of Bath University that 
came in the form of a university research scholarship, and the UK Universities’ ORS 
award.
This thesis is dedicated to the memory of my father, Alexander Korostelev, 
whom I infinitely and deeply love, and to all members of my family whose support was 
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Chapter 1 When Time Goes Backwards, or Explaining Financial 
Policy-making in Belarus: An Introduction
For more than a decade scholars have been discussing the issues of transition 
economies. For some of the Central and Eastern European (CEE) and Former Soviet 
Union (FSU) countries these issues are no longer topical and they have become history. 
However, in the majority of FSU economies, transition continues and a retrospective 
view of their economic development aids the explanation of why they have either 
succeeded, stalled or failed over the period and draw some imperative lessons for the 
future.
The present research examines the financial development of Belarus over the 
past decade with a particular focus on 1996-2000, when functioning of the financial 
sector was restrained through pervasive controls introduced by the government in the 
form of interest rate ceilings, directed credit and preferential loans schemes, high 
reserve requirements, multiple exchange rates policy and capital controls. The case of 
Belarus is of particular interest, as despite undertaking no economic restructuring the 
Belarusian economy has grown by 7 per cent on average since 1997.
While explanations of this ‘miracle’ abound1, no empirical work has been 
undertaken on the role of the financial system in economic growth, particularly on the 
effects of pervasive government intervention in the financial system. Monetary 
stimulation of investment activity through low interest rates and directed credit and 
preferential loans schemes has been argued to contribute to the revival of growth in the 
late 1990s to a significant extent (Bakanova 2003 and Daneiko 2003). Thus, in the first 
place, the financial policy was expected to exert a positive impact on growth through 
financial deepening, increasing the share of savings to be allocated to investment, but 
has it proven to be so?
Chapter 1 starts from examining the political economy of transition to give an 
insight in what determined the choice of different transition pathways across the region. 
Section 1.2 provides an overview of the thesis and outlines the research questions that 
the present study seeks to address. The discussion of the methodological issues in 
section 1.3 follows the research’s outline. The chapter concludes by looking at the 
contribution of this study to the debates on financial repression.
1 See, for example, Pinigin 1999, Badei 1999, Usoskii 1999, Bakanova 2003 and Daneiko 2003 etc.
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1.1 Political Economy of Transition
The fall of the Berlin Wall in late 1989 marked the beginning of transition of socialist 
countries to a market economy. The near simultaneity of regime changes often 
contributed to the perception that the former Soviet republics and the countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe by and large fit a common model of post-socialist 
transition, in which differences mainly lie in the degree or sequencing of market- 
oriented reforms. The reality of transition has proven more complex than it was viewed 
at the beginning. Policy sequencing and the degree of reforms seem not to be the only 
factors to explain why some transition economies succeeded and others failed. Country- 
specific factors, such as cultural and historical preconditions and institutional 
developments, in particular in political systems, have been recognised as playing no less 
a substantial role in defining the success of transition than the policy design.
To recall from history, since 1947 Europe was divided into two antagonistic 
blocs: on the one hand, the West with the USA at the helm, on the other hand - the East 
with the Soviet Union’s lead. The aspirations of Yugoslavia to get rid of Soviet control 
and preserve its status of non-aligned state could have given impetus to the leaders of 
other communist states to follow its own way in building socialism. This forced the 
Soviet leadership to tighten political control over the satellite-states through the 
repressive measures of 1949-52. ‘Political integration’ in the Soviet block was 
accompanied by an economic integration. Created in 1949 the Council for Mutual 
Economic Assistance aimed to deepen an economic co-operation between the Soviet 
Union and its satellites by depriving them of economic independence. Thus, the radical 
change of the late 1980s in Central and Eastern Europe was as much a political ambition 
of these countries’ new leaders as it was a rejection of state socialist ideology and a 
nationalist reaction to Soviet domination. Public participation and support in politico- 
economic restructuring was fundamental to the CEECs’ achievements in carrying out 
reforms. An equally important factor was the aspiration of countries’ leaders and people 
to join the European Union. On 16 December 1991 Poland, Hungary and 
Czechoslovakia, designated as the most advanced in their progress toward building 
democracy and market economies, signed the so-called Europe Agreements, thus 
becoming ‘associated’ with the EC. What united them was their geopolitical position in 
Central Europe, their eagerness to return ‘back to Europe’, in line with their ‘complete
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break with their communist past’, through undergoing a fast economic restructuring 
(Lavigne 1999, pp. 99-100, p. 119).
Belarus was different in making its radical choice after the dismantling of the 
USSR. Gaining independence in 1991 was not the result of a Belarusian societal protest 
against Soviet domination, and an aspiration for national self-identification. As such in 
pre-transition Belarus Belarusian national identity did not exist. It had been eroded by a 
policy of Belarus’ russification starting from 1795, extermination of the Belarusian elite 
in the Stalin epoch, the Nazi occupation and, finally, by a second wave of Sovetisation 
taking place after the Second World War. Moreover, Belarusians like most of the 
nations of the Former Soviet Union, had little understanding of market economy values, 
as, unlike CEE countries, Soviet domination lasted for nearly seven decades, and the 
first major political and economic reforms did not start until 1986 .
Thus the Belarusians were not ready for a political-cum-economic radical 
transformation of their society. Their first experience of transition was facing rocketing 
prices, which lead to the erosion of their savings and real incomes, and layoffs, all of 
which was happening against the background of enrichment of the dominant political 
, elites, represented by the remnants of the Communist Party - the so-called 
nomenklatura. All this turned the majority of Belarusians into opponents of market 
reforms rather than its supporters, pushing them to elect the populist Lukashenko, who 
came as an outsider and whose election platform was focused on fighting corruption and 
Belarus-Russia unification. As Denizer et al. (1998, p.9) argues, ‘reforms are more 
likely to occur when political outsiders challenge the authority of incumbents’. Indeed, 
the beginning of Lukashenko’s presidency, 1994-1995, was marked by some 
fragmented market reforms, including domestic financial market liberalisation. 
However, the reforms were rather attributed to the liberal economic policy pursued by 
the government headed by Prime-Minister Chigyr and the sensible policy of 
Bogdankevich, a chief of the National Bank of Belarus in 1994-95.
Political oppression began in 1995, when Lukashenko’s attempts to extend his 
presidential powers brought him into conflict with the parliament (Supreme Soviet) and 
Constitutional Court. Further, a referendum in November 1996 allowed the amendment 
of the constitution in terms of extending the presidential term and the replacement of the
2 In 1986 the Soviet leader Mikhail S. Gorbachev launched the campaign known as Perestroika, involving 
political and economic restructuring of the Soviet Union, that allowed for more flexibility and freedom in 
decision-making.
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parliament with a ‘smaller and wholly subordinate National Assembly’ that altogether 
‘paved the way for the establishment of an increasingly authoritarian regime’ (White 
and Korosteleva-Polglase 2005, p.l).
In turn, economic policy was turned into the tool of assuring the political 
viability of the dominant political elite in the sense of avoiding some of the more direct 
negative social costs of transition. The introduced mechanism of a repressed economy 
gave an impression of continuity that was useful to the authorities (Korosteleva 2004). 
Thus administrative reallocation of resources and administrative interest rates control 
were supposed to maintain state-owned enterprises afloat and boost output through 
stimulation of aggregate demand. Timely wage payments, bans on layoffs and periodic 
increases in nominal wages were to target the social sector and, therefore, to assure 
Lukashenko’s electoral support. Finally, creation of rent-seeking mechanisms through 
licensing of certain economic activities, rationing access to cheap natural resources, 
introduction of restrictions on foreign exchange and multiple exchange rates policy 
aimed at satisfying the interests of the political elite. Repression of the financial sector 
was placed in the centre of this economic policy to make financial intermediaries serve 
the government needs.
1.2 An Overview of the Study and Research Questions
The present research aims at analysing the effects of financial restraints on financial 
development in Belarus with their further implications for economic growth. Did 
financial controls imposed on the financial sector in Belarus in 1996-2000 lead to 
financial deepening? This is one of the main research questions that the present study 
seeks to address.
First, we provide a deep insight into Belarusian financial policy-making over the 
period of interest to see if  the set of policies and controls introduced can be regarded as 
financial repression according to its classical definition.
Second, we estimate the impact of financial restraints on financial deepening 
with further inferences drawn for the Belarusian economic growth pattern of the late 
1990s.
Third, recognising inflation tax as complementarity of financial repression 
regarding both as implicit forms of taxation of the financial system, we examine how 
Belarus benefited from inflationary financing of the economy. Since inflation tax is a
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tax, there exists a point at which it is optimised under a certain rate of money growth - 
the revenue-maximizing rate. Then, the productivity of the tax can be analysed by 
comparing the actual revenue from inflation tax with the revenue that could be raised if 
the quantity of money had risen at a constant rate. An important implication of 
inflationary financing is that when prices rise in greater proportion than the quantity of 
money it results in real cash balances decline. In turn it results in finance shallowness 
with the consequent negative implications for economic growth. Can the monetary 
policy in Belarus in 1995-2000 be regarded as effective? What were the overall 
consequences of the inflationary financing of enterprises for the Belarusian economy? 
They are the two other questions that we are going to address in the thesis. The analysis 
of the effect of inflation on seignorage revenue helps us to draw conclusions on the 
effectiveness of monetary policy in Belarus in 1995-2002 and on the consequences of 
inflationary financing for the Belarusian economy.
The study concludes by setting the findings into a wider context. It is necessary 
to ask whether Belarus’ financial policy can be regarded as efficient and the Belarusian 
approach to transition can claim to be successful.
The research proceeds along with two main strands of the literature, discussed in 
full detail in chapter 2. The first one goes back to the McKinnon and Shaw paradigm 
(1973), known as financial repression (FR). Following it FR can be defined as a set of 
policies and controls, primarily in a form of interest rate ceilings, requirements for 
banks to hold government bonds or finance government budget deficits, directed credit 
schemes to support ‘selective’ industries, high reserve requirements, and 
administratively regulated foreign exchange rates, imposed by governments on the 
financial sector, that restrain financial intermediaries’ activities. The policies of FR are 
also accompanied by the introduction of capital control restrictions to prevent access by 
borrowers to foreign markets, as well as preventing domestic money holders from 
switching from savings in banks to purchases of foreign assets. The distortions from 
financial repression, particularly interest rate ceilings, discourage saving, reduce an 
average productivity of capital through the replacement of high-yielding with low-retum 
investments which altogether hinder economic growth. Thus, raising interest rates to 
equilibrium levels and freeing foreign exchange rates, reducing reserve requirements, 
eliminating priority lending, or in general, introducing Financial Liberalization (FL), 
were regarded as a growth-enhancing policy. The latter gave rise to the conventional 
transition approach, advocated by the IMF and the World Bank, for economies in which
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financial systems inherited from a planned economy were regarded as inefficient and 
restrained.
The second strand of literature addresses market imperfections in transition 
economies. Information asymmetries and problems of uncertainty typical of transition 
economies rendered emerging financial markets in many of them inefficient and prone 
to failure. Thus government intervention in the financial market through imposed 
financial controls was proposed to address market failures. Furthermore, ‘optimal’ 
financial repression was advocated to enhance economic growth through improving 
efficiency of capital allocation, by lowering the cost of capital and providing directed 
credits to enterprises with high technological potential (Stiglitz 1982, 1985, 1990, 
1994).
The phenomenon of financial repression has been widely studied with 
application to developing counties, which were believed at times to pursue strategies 
resulting in ‘shallow finance’. Chapter 3 provides an overview of empirical studies on 
financial repression. In their majority researchers conclude that financial repression
exerts a negative effect on financial development and consequently on economic
growth. However, in their studies of financial repression in India and South Korea 
Dematriades and Luintel (1996, 1997, 2001) conclude that different degrees of 
repression as well as cross-country institutional differences can lead to contrasting 
results - on the one hand, resulting in financial disintermediation in the case of India, 
and, on the other hand, positively affecting economic growth through addressing market 
failures in the case of South Korea.
Can FR theory be applied to study financial development in transition
economies? This question is addressed in chapter 4. On the one hand, the issue of 
transition is more complex than simply the liberalisation of the financial sector, as it 
involves the transformation of the whole economy. Therefore, first, we review the role 
of financial systems under planning to identify how the legacies of a planned economy 
could shape the transition process. Second, financial development strategies in
transition economies are examined to see if any commonalities can be found between 
transition economies and developing countries, to provide a justification for applying 
the McKinnon-Shaw framework to studying financial sectors in transition economies, 
and, in particular, to the case study of Belarus.
Chapter 5 presents the case study of financial repression in Belarus. First, it 
explains the rationale behind introducing a FR in Belarus. Second, it focuses on 1996-
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2000, to see if that period can be dubbed as financial repression. Drawing on the 
implications of the policy of financial restraints we also hypothesise the effects it may 
have had on financial development in Belarus.
The latter are tested in chapters 6 and 7. To evaluate the effects of financial 
repression on financial deepening in chapter 6 we adapt the monobank model utilised by 
Demetriades and Luintel (1997) in their case study of India. The model is adjusted for 
special features of financial development in Belarus. The examination of the 
consequences of inflationary financing in Belarus in chapter 7 proceeds along with 
Cagan’s (1956) seminal work on monetary dynamics of hyperinflation. The main 
research findings are summarised in chapter 8.
1.3 Methodology
1.3.1 Research Design
A range of various qualitative and quantitative techniques was used to undertake this 
research. A literature review led to the adoption of a theoretical framework, and the 
development and testing of hypotheses.
The literature review involved two stages. At the first stage, transition literature 
review, with a particular focus on financial sector restructuring was undertaken. This 
allowed familiarisation with the topical issues of transition in finance, and the 
identification of the main problems that transition economies encounter in the process 
of financial sector restructuring. The nature of transition in Belarus is the same as 
everywhere in the post-communist world. Therefore, in the second stage of the literature 
survey a theoretical framework was developed that focused primarily on an overview of 
the major theories of financial development over the past century, with the purpose of 
identifying the appropriate one to be used for transition economies. A review of 
empirical studies lets one formulate the main research questions.
At the third stage of research I started collecting the evidence that could help 
answer these research questions. It involved two field trips to Belarus in December- 
March 2002 and March 2003. The first field trip was a pilot study. It aimed to test 
whether the theory could be applicable to the case study of Belarus and to finalise the 
main ideas. This stage included collecting secondary data, primarily derived from local 
economic newspapers and journals, and from working papers/country reports of the
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IMF, World Bank, EBRD and TACIS. After revealing some specific tendencies in the 
developments of the banking sector and financial markets of Belarus, I started testing 
them through a range of field interviews with people belonging to the bank elite 
(including both state-owned and commercial banks), high ranking officials (Ministry of 
Finance and National Bank of Belarus), parliamentarians, opposition parties’ elite and 
the business elite. This allowed me to gather information on both official and alternative 
views. The questions were unstructured and the interviews provided an insight in the 
Belarusian economic policy-making, and on understanding of the rationales underlying 
official decisions. The data collected in the course of interviews was a mixture of 
qualitative and quantitative material.
Thereafter, I started collecting the primary data to provide the evidence 
supporting my hypotheses. The primary data were mainly collected during the second 
field trip to Minsk. They were primarily obtained from the National Bank of Belarus, 
the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Statistics, and Belarusian banks’ statistics. 
Moreover, for drafting chapter 5 I relied not only on the National Bank data, that was 
very limited in terms of records held on financial restraints, but primarily on the data 
obtained from the Belarusian legal database ‘Consultant Plyus’. It involved examining 
all letters and telegrams of the NBB, presidential decrees, and bank code etc, issued 
over the period from 1991 to 2002. Furthermore, some secondary data was obtained 
from the IMF (International Monetary Statistics), EBRD transition reports, Belarusian 
Economic Trends’ statistics (TACIS) and, finally, the Research Centre of the Institute 
of Privatisation and Management (Minsk) were used to fill the gaps of missing primary 
data, to undertake a comparative analysis, or in the cases when we required to check the 
reliability of the primary data (discussed below).
At the final stage I processed the data by utilising various econometric and 
statistical software, such as Microfit 4.0, Eview 3.0 and SPSS 11.0. A range of time- 
series econometric techniques, starting from estimation of Two-Stage Least Squares 
technique and finishing with estimation of non-linear regressions, and undertaking of 
factor analysis, was used to draft chapters 6 and 7.
1.3.2 Data Limitations
It is very important to discuss some problems that we faced in undertaking the research. 
The first one is data availability, and the second one is data reliability.
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The first is concerned with some monetary statistics on Belarus between 1991- 
1995, that are not available primarily because of the ‘youth’ of monetary statistics in 
Belarus and some specifics of the credit-monetary system before 1994 (discussed in 
chapter 5). The first official monetary survey was published in 1995. This explains why 
the sample for undertaking an analysis of the effects of FR policy starts from May 1995. 
Due to the absence of information on barter operations, I was not able to capture the 
problem of demonetisation of the economy while evaluating the effects of financial 
restraints on the financial development of Belarus (see chapter 6). Second, I experienced 
some difficulties in gathering the information regarding the use of directed credits 
schemes and interest rate ceilings. It appears to be confidential and therefore not 
accessible for public use. Some alternative methods were utilised in the thesis to 
overcome these limitations (discussed in chapter 5).
The major problem that I encountered was data reliability. To overcome the 
sample size constraints I had to use monthly data. The monthly GDP series, used in the 
present work, was provided by the Ministry of Statistics and Analysis (MSA) of 
Belarus. The data are compiled according to the System of National Accounts 
implemented in 1993. The aggregate GDP data are collected from the production 
accounts that lead to some statistical discrepancy between the aggregate GDP and its 
value obtained from expenditure flows. It is not common for any economies around the 
world to produce GDP series on a monthly basis, since it involves a laborious compiling 
process. Belarus might be the only country that produces GDP on a monthly basis. That 
is why it is reasonable to check how reliable the official monthly GDP data is. So, we 
perform an exercise aimed to check the reliability of the monthly GDP data, described 
in full details in appendix F.
Finally, chapters 6 and 7 provide detailed discussions of the methodology and 
data utilised in them.
In conclusion, it is important to stress the novelty of the research and its contribution to 
the literature on financial repression.
First of all, most of the existing empirical studies on the phenomenon of 
financial repression focus on developing countries and only a few are available with a 
reference to transition economies (e.g. Desai 1995, de Melo and Denizer 1997, Denizer 
et al. 1998). The latter are mainly cross-section studies (de Melo and Denizer 1997 and
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Denizer et al. 1998)3. Furthermore, only de Melo and Denizer’s work (1997) examines 
the relationship between the effectiveness4 and market orientation of monetary policy in 
transition economies5, while Desai (1995) and Denizer et al. (1998) focus on 
investigating the political economy of financial repression in the region. Therefore, the 
present research is the first time-series study that applies the financial repression 
framework to examining an impact of financial restraints on financial development in 
transition economies. The findings drawn on the basis of this study will contribute to the 
literature on financial repression by adding a case from transition countries.
Second, most of the studies on financial repression focus on the impact of 
interest rate controls on financial development more than other instruments. Although 
empirical evidence evaluating the effect of non-interest controls (e.g. reserve 
requirements and directed credits) exists (see Agarwala 1983; Brock 1989; Roubini and 
Sala-i-Martin 1992, 1995; Demetriades and Luintel 1996, 1997, 2001)6. The present 
research provides a comprehensive approach to studying the phenomenon of financial 
repression, which allows the impact of inflation tax (as an instrument complementing 
FR) to be embraced into the analysis along with interest and non-interest controls.
Third, it has been argued that inflationary financing and state stimulation of 
demand through the aforementioned financial repressionist policies contributed to the 
revival of the Belarusian economy in the late 1990s. However, no empirical evidence 
exists to support this argument. By analysing the effects of financial restraints on 
financial deepening the present research allows drawing some inferences for the role of 
the financial policy in the Belarusian economic growth pattern of the late 1990s.
Fourth, the data series utilised for the present research are treated 
comprehensively and uniquely. While examining data for stationarity along with the 
traditional Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test I have utilised some other not so 
widely used techniques (Perron 1989, Baneijee et al 1992 and Zivot and Andrews 1992)
3 They all focus on the early period of transition (1989-1995) that can be explained by the fact that some 
financial repressionist policies (in particular, interest rate controls and directed credits) were mostly 
present in transition economies at the beginning of transformation and in the pre-transition period, but in 
the second half of the 1990s the majority of transition economies made significant progress in liberalising 
their economies (see chapter 4).
4 The effectiveness of monetary policy is proxied by financial depth and the inflation rate.
5 It is measured as an annual country index for the Market Orientation of Monetary Policy Instruments 
which is computed on the basis of classifying transition economies by their market orientation in the use 
of direct (directed credit, credit ceilings and interest rate controls) and indirect (reserve requirements, 
refinance/discount facilities, government and central bank bills and bonds) monetary instruments (de 
Melo and Denizer 1997) For further discussion of their work see chapter 4.
6 For further discussion see chapter 3.
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that allow for structural breaks in series that are very typical of transition economies. 
None of the empirical studies on Belarus mentioned in chapter 7 utilise these techniques 
while testing for the presence of a unit root in series. However, the application of these 
techniques is very important, as it can lead to different results from those of the ADF 
test, and correspondingly can determine the use of different estimators.
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Chapter 2 Literature Review of Financial Development: 
Theoretical Arguments
The proposition that financial development and economic growth have close 
relationships is widely accepted. Indeed, the perception of these relationships is usually 
such that the financial sector plays a crucial role in the growth process through 
allocating savings towards investment projects, and so increasing the rate of capital 
accumulation and altering the rate of technological innovation. Both are regarded as 
fundamental for long-term economic growth. Moreover, financial intermediaries 
contribute to economic development by performing other functions such as facilitating 
risk amelioration in the presence of the problems created by information and transaction 
frictions, monitoring managers and exerting corporate control, and, facilitating the 
exchange of goods and services1.
Acknowledging this positive link between financial and economic development, 
the role of the financial system becomes central in transition economies moving from a 
planned economy to a market system. The issue of financial development particularly 
arrests our attention due to the fact that the financial system, which transition economies 
of the post-communist camp inherited from the planned economy, was significantly 
divergent from that in a market economy, and widely regarded as a one underdeveloped 
and inefficient in the orthodox literature. While the role of finance under a planned 
economy was rather passive, for finance served as a monetary counterpart of an 
enterprise’s output and input, it is assumed to gain a ‘new’ growth-enhancing role in a 
market system.
In this regard before embarking on any analysis of the developments in the 
financial sector of transition economies it is very important to address the following 
questions: ‘How important will be the role of financial markets in the economic growth 
process on the way from one mode of economic operation to another?’ ‘What are the 
vital elements of the ‘new’ financial system and what functions will it be performing?’ 
‘What major changes will it be undergoing in a transitory period?’ ‘Will the ‘scenario’ 
of this transformation fit into any major concepts of financial development elaborated 
over the past century?’ ‘What potential problems can arise in the process of this 
transformation?’
1 On the functional approach to understanding the finance-growth relationships see Levine (1997).
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To answer these questions it will be imperative first to make a historical 
excursus in the far and recent past and overview some main dominant theories on 
financial development developed over the years.
Chapter 2 proceeds by, firstly, examining whether and how financial systems 
facilitate the process of economic development. Secondly, it provides a review of some 
prevailing theories of financial development with a view of their further application to 
examining financial restructuring in transition economies. In particular, we focus on the 
McKinnon-Shaw paradigm of financial repression, developed for examining financial 
systems in developing countries. Thirdly, we turn to the second major strand of 
literature, which challenges McKinnon and Shaw’s theory, by addressing market 
imperfections in developing countries. Our main aim is to build an appropriate 
theoretical framework for analysing developments in financial sectors in transition 
economies based on these two major strands of literature.
2.1 Introductory Overview of the Main Theoretical Concepts of Financial 
Development and Economic Growth
The questions concerning financial development and economic growth are as old as 
they are new. There are continuous debates on the role of finance in economic 
development and the fact that financial systems have become more sophisticated and 
more essential in shaping the development of global capitalism. Historically, 
Schumpeter (1911) argued that the services provided by financial intermediaries 
promote technological change through financing the invention of new products or new 
production techniques, and as a result economic growth occurs. Hicks (1969) also 
believed that it was not technological innovation alone that ignited economic growth in 
eighteenth century England. According to Hicks some products had been invented much 
earlier -  before they became mass-produced. Thus, it was large injections of investment 
that triggered the Industrial Revolution in England. Indeed, as Levine (1997) argues, 
high-return projects require large long-term investments that link together liquidity and 
economic development.
‘...If  the financial system does not augment the liquidity of long-term
investments, less investment is likely to occur in the high return projects....
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Because the industrial revolution required large commitments of capital for long 
periods, the industrial revolution may not have occurred without this liquidity 
transformation’ (Levine (1997, p.692).
The literature on the finance-growth nexus is very controversial, and the main point of 
disagreement between economists is on the nature of causality. Two questions may be 
asked: ‘Does finance matter for economic development?’ and ‘If it does what is the 
direction of causality in the finance-growth pattern?’
Many economists (e.g. Schumpeter 1911, Hicks 1959, Gurley and Shaw 1955, 
Gerschenkron 1962) saw financial development as a cause of economic growth. In turn, 
McKinnon2 (1973) and Shaw (1973) particularly stressed an important role for a 
‘liberalised’ financial system in economic development, arguing that interest rate 
ceilings, directed credit programmes, capital controls, altogether termed as ‘financial 
repression’, inhibit financial development and consequently growth (to be expanded 
below). Later, this argument became a mantra for the IMF and the World Bank, which 
have strongly advised a policy of financial liberalisation for developing countries. In 
turn, Tobin’s neoclassical model3 in terms of advocating the use of interest-rate ceilings, 
or loose monetary policy generating moderate inflation (by that setting an inflation tax) 
to stimulate the rate of economic growth, literally argued in favour of financial 
repression (see also Denizer et al. 1998, p.3). McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) 
questioned the applicability of this approach to developing countries arguing that these 
distortions of the financial market ‘crowd out high-yielding investments’, create 
disincentives to save, and generally inhibit financial sector development. They 
developed their own concept of financial repression that we will be dealing with in the 
next section.
2 While McKinnon (1988) acknowledged the positive association between a higher rate of financial 
growth and economic growth, his concern about the direction of causation remained unresolved.
3 Tobin’s Portfolio Allocation model (1965), based on a typical aggregative nonmonetary model of 
economic development, aimed at linking together the financial sector and the real economy by 
introducing monetary assets into the model. He treats money as a durable asset meaning that economic 
units allocate their wealth between ‘money’ and ‘productive capital’. Thus, in a Tobin type portfolio 
choice model, if the return on money falls compared to return on capital, households reallocate their 
wealth towards capital, increasing the ratio of capital to money in their portfolios. Sequentially, this raises 
the capital/labour ratio, raises labour productivity, and triggers higher economic growth. In turn, a 
reduction in the return on money can be achieved in two ways, namely by “the institutionally determined 
rate of interest on money” or in other words by reducing deposit rates of interest, or by increasing the 
growth rate of money stock leading to higher inflation.
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Gurley and Shaw (1955) contend that finance and particular financial 
institutions are acknowledged as playing a crucial role in economic development. In 
their debt-intermediation model, they stress particularly an important role that 
accumulation of debt plays in the growth process. Besides self-financing (retained 
earnings) they also distinguish two other types of financing spending units with deficits 
budgets, namely direct and indirect financing. These are both external types of 
financing. Direct financing involves the issue of the instruments such as equities and 
bonds by deficit spending units. Indirect debt is comprised of loanable funds, and 
financial intermediaries are believed to play the central role in facilitating the flow of 
these funds between economic agents with a surplus of money and agents with a deficit, 
by borrowing loanable funds from units that were in surplus and issuing indirect 
securities in exchange. Gurley and Shaw (1955, p.518) note:
‘Economic development is retarded if only self-finance and direct finance are 
accessible, if  financial intermediaries do not evolve.. .Institutionalisation of saving 
and investment quickens the growth rate of debt relative to the growth rates of 
income and wealth’.
Opposed to viewing financial development as a cause of economic growth Robinson 
(1952, p.52) believes that it is economic development that generates demand for 
financial services noting, ‘by and large, it seems to be the case that where enterprise 
leads, finance follows’. His approach to treating finance is what Patrick later termed as 
‘demand-following’. This view is supported by post-Keynesian economists (e.g. Lavoie 
1984, Pollin 1991, Arestis and Chick 1995) who following the theory of endogenous 
money argue that money supply is both driven by bank lending and determined by the 
demand for bank loans. It implies that an expansion of production, or the behaviour of 
private economic agents determines the demand for credit, or in other words increases 
financial intermediation.
Other well-known economists are sceptical regarding the finance-growth 
relationship. Modigliani and Miller (1958) have an extremely polar view on the role of 
finance in economic development process - advocating the neutrality of money - better 
known as the neo-liberals’ postulate ‘Money does not matter’. Kuznets (1955) argues, 
‘.. .financial markets begin to grow as the economy approaches the intermediate stage of 
the growth and develop once the economy becomes mature’. Lucas (1988, p.6) states
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that the role of finance in economic growth is ‘badly overstressed’, while Chandavarkar 
(1992, p. 134) says, ‘...none of the pioneers of development economics...even lists 
finance as a factor in development’4.
Patrick’s (1966) work on the causal nature of the relationships between financial 
development and growth in underdeveloped countries was the first that clearly 
addressed the difficulty of establishing the direction of causality between finance and 
growth, and made an attempt to summarise the previous discussions on this issue. 
Patrick dubs finance as, ‘...a demand-following and supply-leading phenomena’. By 
regarding finance as a demand-following phenomenon Patrick advocates that the, 
‘financial system somehow accommodates...growth of real per capita output’ (1966, 
p. 174). By that Patrick means that financial development occurs in response to the 
demand for financial services by enterprises. It implies the greater the growth, the 
greater will be the demand for external funds, or in other words for financial 
intermediation, since firms are unlikely to finance this expansion only from retained 
profits. In these considerations he sees the role of finance as passive in the development 
process. Moreover, Patrick asserts that the underdevelopment of some countries and 
their correspondingly ineffective growth patterns can be explained by an inadequate 
demand-following response by the financial system. Following the ’supply-leading’ 
approach, finance may induce economic growth, but it does not imply that finance 
appears to be a precondition for ‘self-sustained’ economic growth. Patrick argues that 
the main function of ‘supply-leading’ finance is to reallocate resources from ‘traditional 
(non-growth)’ sectors to ‘modem sectors’ (growth-led) and in these considerations he 
finds a similarity between the role of ‘supply-leading’ finance and the role of finance 
within the Schumpeterian concept of innovation financing. Finally, he puts forward a 
hypothesis o f ‘supply-leading and demand-following finance’ as follows:
‘Before sustained modem industrial growth gets underway, supply-leading may 
be able to induce real innovation-type investment. As the process of real growth 
occurs, the supply-leading impetus gradually becomes less important, and the 
demand-following financial response becomes dominant’. (Patrick, 1966, p. 177).
4 For review of this literature see King and Levine 1993a, Levine 1997 and Luintel and Khan 1999.
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Interest in finance-growth causality was revived in the late 1980s when longer lengths 
of pre-war and post-war datasets allowed further empirical study of this topic. Recent 
econometric studies have revealed very controversial results that do not in fact shed 
much light on the nature of causality. For example, King and Levine (1993b), 
presenting cross-country evidence consistent with Schumpeter’s view that the financial 
system can promote economic growth conclude that ‘Schumpeter might be right’. 
Further, Levine’s (1997) findings based on cross-section study of 49 countries over the 
period of 1976-1993 strongly support a positive relationship between the functioning of 
the financial system and long-run economic growth. Although Levine agrees that the 
results obtained ‘...do not imply that finance is everywhere and always exogenous to 
economic growth’, he still maintains the idea that ‘financial systems are a fundamental 
feature of the process of economic development’ (1997, p.690). In turn, the time-series 
study of Demetriades and Hussein (1996) for 16 countries5 provides little support for 
the idea of finance causing economic growth, but rather they find greater evidence in 
favour of a bi-directional relationship6 or reverse causation. Moreover, their findings 
reveal the limitations of cross-section country studies based on the assumption of 
countries’ homogeneity, while in fact causality patterns vary across countries. The latter 
is supported by Arestis and Demetriades’ study (1996) which argues that country 
specific factors such as institutional characteristics and financial sector policies are 
likely to influence the causal nature of finance-growth relationship7.
2.2 The McKinnon-Shaw ‘Financial Repression and Liberalisation’ 
Paradigm
In 1973 the literature on financial development was enriched with the publication of two 
independent works by McKinnon and Shaw, focusing on the analysis of developing 
economies pursuing a ‘financial repression’ development strategy that results in 
‘shallow’ finance. It was the first time that the concept of ‘financial repression’ (FR),
5 The countries were selected based on a criterion of being not highly developed in 1960 following the 
World Bank definition, and having at least 27 continuous annual observations.
6 For similar findings see Luintel and Khan 1999.
7 A vast body o f empirical literature on the relationship between financial development and economic 
growth has been published so far. It is not possible to cover all the studies in the present work. For further 
references see for example Demetriades and Andrianova (2003) and Levine and Zervos (1998). The 
literature on financial repression and economic growth will be examined separately as we proceed further.
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better known as the ‘McKinnon-Shaw’ paradigm, was introduced. At the time the 
theory gained much attention and has since become widely used not only as a 
theoretical framework for studying financial sectors and their role in the economic 
growth process in developing economies, but also in the form of practical 
recommendations by the IMF and the World Bank to governments of less developed 
countries (LDC), urging them to liberalise their financial sectors.
Before proceeding, we should address the questions of, ‘What is meant by the 
term ‘financial repression’?5 and, ‘What are the implications of this policy?’
Following the McKinnon-Shaw framework ‘financial repression’ can be defined 
as a set of ‘ill-conceived’ policies and controls, primarily in the forms of interest rates 
ceilings, requirements for banks to hold government bonds and/or finance government 
budget deficits, directed credit schemes to support ‘selective’ industries, high reserve 
requirements, administratively regulated foreign exchange rates, imposed by 
governments on financial sector, that restrain financial intermediaries’ activities. In turn, 
interest rates ceilings may lead to credit rationing by commercial banks due to the 
excess demand over supply in the market for loanable funds. The policies of FR are also 
accompanied by the introduction of capital control restrictions to prevent access by 
potential borrowers to foreign markets, as well as preventing domestic money holders 
from switching from savings in banks to purchases of foreign assets.
In general, FR and its instruments can be regarded as a form of taxation of the 
financial sector.
McKinnon and Shaw challenge a policy of financial repression, arguing that the 
distortions from financial repression, particularly interest rates ceilings, discourage 
saving, reduce the average productivity of capital through the replacement of high- 
yielding with low-retum investments, and the creation of preference towards capital 
intensive projects, leading to negative an employment effect, all of which hinder 
economic growth. As Shaw (1973, p.5) notes, ‘...in all cases this strategy has stopped 
or gravely retarded the development process’. Consequently, they advocate abolishing 
distortions of ‘financial prices’ through raising interest rates to their equilibrium level 
and freeing foreign exchange rates, reducing reserve requirements, eliminating priority 
lending, or in general, introducing Financial Liberalization (FL) regarded as growth- 
enhancing policy.
Different reasons for the use of FR can be identified, starting from religious 
beliefs (e.g. the prohibition of ‘riba’(usury) in Islam) and concluding with the political
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motives behind it. Fry (1995, p.20) states, ‘many developing countries appear to have 
slipped into financial repression inadvertently. The original policy was aimed not at 
indiscriminate repression but rather financial restriction’. Financial restriction measures 
were usually enacted to protect domestic institutions from competition from foreign 
companies, and as such were part of an, ‘inward-oriented’ development strategy. 
Indeed, maintaining interest rates below equilibrium level aimed to promote growth in 
selective industries through targeted lending. An overvalued exchange rate made 
imports relatively more expensive than domestically produced goods, to promote the 
latter in the market. Controls on capital prevented inward flows of foreign capital and 
ensured an increase in domestic investment (see Petrick, 1998).
In practice, financial repression often has fiscal implications. It implies that 
implicit forms of taxation, such as FR or higher rates of inflation can be used to offset 
growing budget deficits. Low interest rates provide cheap credit to governments to 
finance budget deficits. A policy of low interest rates usually goes together with the 
imposition of high reserve requirements on commercial banks and or requirements for 
banks to hold government bonds, or to lend money to government to finance budget 
deficits that all together provide cheap and sufficient credit to governments. Budget 
deficits can also be financed through higher rates of inflation. So far we have not 
touched upon the issue of inflationary financing, and why it should be considered in 
conjunction with the concept of FR. In fact, in the literature on financial repression, 
along with the concept of FR itself, important attention is drawn to the concepts of 
seigniorage (S) and inflation tax (IT). They are usually considered together with FR as 
its complementarities, although it is very hard to draw a clear distinction between 
defining IT and S either as instruments of FR or its complementarities. As Fry (1995, 
p.22) notes, ‘typically, it seems, financial repression is the unintended consequence of 
low, fixed nominal interest rates combined with high and rising inflation’. We will deal 
with the concepts of seigniorage and inflation tax and their interrelation with FR in 
chapter 7.
Now, we will turn to more detailed examination of the McKinnon-Shaw model 
of financial repression and look at its implications. Figure 2.1 gives its graphical 
presentation.
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I 0 I, Saving, Investment
Figure 2.1: Saving and investment under interest rate ceilings within the McKinnon and
o
Shaw framework
where S - Saving function, at a rate of economic growth, y; S=f{y, r}, ‘a positive 
function of the real interest rate’ (see McKinnon 1973, p.67; Shaw 1973, p.73, 
77-78).
r 0 - real interest rate consistent with administratively controlled level of nominal 
interest rate (fixed below equilibrium rate, r e)
I -  Investment function, I=f{r}
From figure 2.1 one can see that re is the ‘financial price’ at which the market 
for loanable funds clears, or in other words an equilibrium real interest rate where S=I. 
Assuming that the government sets a ceiling on the interest rate, we get a real interest 
rate, r 0, consistent with this administratively controlled level of nominal interest rate,
lower then the equilibrium interest rate. The imposed interest rate ceiling will induce a 
fall in the level of saving, given a positive relationship between saving and the real 
interest rate, implying an excess (I , -10) in demand for loanable funds over supply. In
8 This figure is a modified version o f the diagram derived in Fry (1995, p. 24).
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fact, an excessive demand for loans means that only some investment projects can be 
financed. This can potentially lead to credit rationing unless an excess demand is not 
accommodated by authorities through monetary emission. The latter, by virtue of its 
inflationary nature, can even further jeopardise the situation and trigger an inflationary 
spiral.
If the interest rate ceiling is only applied to savers, but not borrowers, then 
borrowers still pay and the spread, (r, - r 0), goes to the banking system. In this case it
can hardly be regarded as a tax on the financial sector and can even have some positive 
effects on financial development as will be later shown in the example of South Korea. 
In fact, in most repressed economies both loan rate ceilings and deposit rate ceilings 
were usually applied, and the consequences of these distortions were detrimental.
With a loan rate ceiling imposed, financial institutions cannot charge a risk 
premium that makes them risk averse.
This itself may ration out a large proportion of potentially high-yielding 
investments’, and as a result reduce ‘the average efficiency of investment’ (Fry, 
1995, p. 25).
Thus, abolishing interest rate ceilings (considered as a return to savers) will be an 
essential measure in increasing saving, and hence inducing a higher level and 
productivity of investment. In a broader sense, it means that financial liberalisation is a 
key to financial deepening, and as result enhance economic growth
McKinnon (1993) highlights the importance of fiscal discipline for successful 
liberalisation, noting that large government budget deficits are incompatible with 
financial liberalisation.
What is interesting to note about McKinnon-Shaw’s model is the fact that we 
refer to it as a single paradigm, although two different approaches are used in 
constructing the model of financial development, and only on making some 
assumptions they can be regarded as complementing each other and be generalised in a 
single model.
McKinnon developed an outside money model in which the accumulation of 
large amounts of real money balances is necessary before self-financed investment can 
be effective.
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Thus, the first distinctive feature of McKinnon’s model is the fact that it is based 
on outside money assuming that economic agents cannot borrow to finance their 
investment spending decisions. It follows from the following two assumptions that 
McKinnon states:
•  all economic units are confined to self-finance;
•  indivisibilities exist in investment activities.
This means that potential investors must accumulate money balances prior to 
their investment (see Fry 1995, p. 27). In other words, the more attractive to hold real 
money balances - that is the higher the return on real money balances (real deposit rate 
of interest), the higher is the incentive to invest.
Therefore, he puts forward a hypothesis of complementarity9 between money 
and productive capital that can be formulated as follows. Productive investment, and 
therefore capital accumulation, occurs because a large real money stock makes greater 
amounts of deposits available to economic agents.
The complementarity between money and productive capital can be traced from 
McKinnon’s money demand function, expressed as:
' f ( T '
Y
= f ± - , Y , d - x '  (2.1)
\
where M - real money balances
v  r  /
y  - ratio of investment to output 
Y - real GDP
d - n e - real deposit rate (d is the nominal deposit rate and n e is expected 
inflation)
Thus, the complementarity between money and physical capital implies that 
investment is a positive function of the return to physical capital and the return on real 
money balances (real deposit rate):
L = f ( r , d - n ‘ ), (2.2)
where r - the average return on investment
9 Fry (1978) tested McKinnon’s hypothesis of complementarity for 10 Asian countries. His findings reject 
the complementarity between money and productive capital and suggest that higher money balances are 
likely to be held for consumption rather than investment. However, Vogel and Buzer (1976) find a strong 
complementary relationship in their study of Latin American countries.
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Therefore, the complementarity can be expressed in the form of partial 
derivatives:
implying ‘the higher the real deposit interest rate, the greater is the incentive to 
invest (see Fry 1995, p.27).
In turn, Shaw constructed a debt-intermediation model based on inside money, 
or in other words allowing for the accumulation of deposits to serve as an external 
source for financing a firm’s investment projects. This reflects his pioneering joint work 
with Gurley (1955) on the role of financial intermediaries, through which firms are able 
to accumulate debt to finance investment, in accelerating economic growth. Shaw’s 
money demand function can be summarised as follows.
d - n e - real deposit rate (d is the nominal deposit rate and n e is expected 
inflation)
t - time trend capturing a technological improvement in the monetary 
mechanism (see Shaw 1973, p. 62)11.
According to Shaw, money demand is positively related to income, the rate of 
return on money (real deposit rate) and time trend. While regarding accumulation of 
money as one form of saving12, he argues that the real return to money along with real 
yields on all other forms of wealth are positively associated with saving and financial 
deepening. Thus, ‘growth in real monetary and other finance is associated with 
intermediation that unifies segmented capital markets and raises accessible rates of
10 In his debt-intermediation view (DIV) Shaw assumes a variety of opportunity costs due to the 
segmentation of capital markets (see Shaw 1973, p.62).
11 See also Fry 1995, p.29 for the model interpretation.
12 Money is ‘a substitute for saving through self-finance of physical investment, purchase of primary 
securities or acquisition of non-monetary indirect financial assets’ (Shaw 1973, p.61).
(2.3)
(2.4)
where —  - real money balances
\ P  )
Y - real GDP
r - a vector of opportunity costs10
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return to wealth’ (Shaw 1973, p.71) as opposed to the neo-classical proposition of the 
inverse relationship between money deepening and capital deepening.
After having compared both McKinnon’s and Shaw’s models one can clearly 
distinguish between them, and this has led to some disputes between economists about 
the compatibility of the models. Molho (1986) offers his interpretation of McKinnon’s 
hypothesis of complementarity in a way that allows model compatibility. He argues that 
although in their approaches McKinnon and Shaw have different views of the capital 
accumulation process, - in the first case deposits encourage self-financed investment 
(borrowing constraints are assumed), while in the second case deposits accumulation is 
seen as a source of expansion of bank lending activities towards firms’ investment 
projects, - they still ‘complement each other because most projects are financed in part 
with own funds and in part with borrowings’, (see Molho 1986, p.l 11).
Indeed, in this regard both views seem complementary to each other, although it 
is still questionable whether Molho’s interpretation can be accepted as McKinnon’s own 
perception of complementarity (see Fry 1995, p.29). Anyway, both models imply a 
negative effect of financial repression on financial development in less developed 
countries, resulting in ‘shallow’ finance and therefore inhibiting economic growth. They 
both advocate a policy of financial liberalisation that can accelerate economic growth 
through increasing investment and its productivity.
Their policy recommendations gain much support from the empirical study of 
financial reforms in Taiwan (early 1950s) and Korea (mid-1960s) (see Fry 1995, p.23). 
The more recent empirical literature on financial repression (Roubini and Sala-i-Martin 
1992, 1995, Giovannini and De Melo 1993, Fry 1995, Demetriades and Luintel 2001) in 
the main concludes that FR has a negative impact on economic welfare and also 
advocates financial liberalisation. However, the financial repression literature also 
encounters a great deal of criticism (see Stiglitz and Weiss 1981, Diaz-Alejandro 1985, 
Stiglitz 2000 and Demetriades and Luintel 2001) recently raised due to the experience 
of some unsuccessful liberalization episodes in Latin America, Asia and Russia (see 
chapter 3 for the review of empirical literature on financial repression). The next section 
provides a discussion of some critical views built upon the McKinnon-Shaw financial 
repression paradigm.
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2.3 Critics of the Theory of Financial Liberalisation
2.3.1 Overview of the Main Theoretical Views Opposed to the McKinnon- 
Shaw Paradigm
As financial liberalization has spread further in emerging economies, it has given rise to 
much criticism. Traditionally, there can be distinguished different schools within both 
the orthodox and heterodox economics, and also some well-known individuals 
criticizing the theory of Financial Liberalization on a variety of grounds.
In the early 1980s the neostructuralist school (Taylor 1983 and Buffie 1984) 
advocated negative effects of financial liberalization as opposed to the effects described 
by McKinnon and Shaw. Their criticism is based on the assumptions of the price level’s 
determination by fixed markups over costs of factors of production (including capital 
costs, i.e. the interest rate) and the high dependence of developing countries on the 
import of raw materials and capital equipment. They argue that a rise in interest rates 
will push the costs of production up. Moreover, they continue that a consequent 
devaluation13 will make imports more expensive that will increase the costs further 
inhibiting economic growth. Their major contribution to the criticism of the McKinnon 
-Shaw school is in highlighting the important role of noninstitutional finance or curb 
market14 finance that is absent in the McKinnon-Shaw model. They treat curb market 
loans and banks loans as complementarity, and thus allow the former to enter the money 
demand function as an alternative to holding money. Moreover, they find curb markets 
more efficient in intermediating between savers and investors compared to banks. In 
their models it is the demand and supply of loanable funds in noninstitutional markets 
that determine the price of capital, i.e. the interest rate (see Fry 1995, pp. 109- 111).
Among the other critics Fry (1995) distinguishes the following groups.
The first one is represented by Kalecki (1971) and by Akyiiz (1991) who argue 
that higher interest rates will lead to a sectoral redistribution of saving in favour of 
householders. This may induce a fall in corporate saving, to the extent exceeding the 
rise in households saving and in the end resulting in a fall in investment and 
consequently in the rate of economic growth. A second group (see, for example, Jappelli
13 As a matter of fact, in an open economy higher real interest rates lead to an appreciation of the real 
exchange rate, implying a deterioration of export position of a country.
14 Curb market denotes unofficial financial market
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and Pagano 1994) notes that financial liberalization will relax the access of households 
to consumer credit and offer high returns on a variety of financial assets that can divert 
households’ funds from saving and decrease the overall saving ratio. Others provide 
similar argumentation as the neostructuralists advocating that higher borrowing costs 
increase production costs, lower real wages and reduce aggregate demand (see for 
example, Arestis and Demetriades 1993)15.
What is interesting to note is the fact that despite financial liberalization 
encompassing a set of measures, the central emphasis in the policy prescriptions of 
financial liberalization was placed on freeing interest rates to allow them to be 
determined through market forces. The rationale behind this was the proposition of 
market clearing and the assumption of equilibrium to be achieved in the market for 
loanable funds, in the absence of interest rate ceilings. Meanwhile, a problem of 
uncertainty (due to asymmetric information) typical of less developed countries appears 
to be a potential obstacle preventing markets from clearing. Allowing for the 
assumption of the presence of asymmetric information in markets, doubts the 
proposition of market clearing and questions the FL theory that abolishing interest rate 
ceilings will be necessarily positive.
The following section discusses the literature that criticizes FL theory on the 
above grounds and on the basis of the argument of market failures prevailing in 
financial markets.
2.3.2 The Literature on Information Asymmetries, Uncertainty and 
Incentives
2.3.2.1 Introducing the Problem o f ‘Adverse Selectionf
This literature goes back to Akerlof s study (1970) ‘The market for lemons’, which 
though not directly related to financial markets, has some important implications for all 
markets. In fact, Akerlof s work laid the basis for the literature addressing a problem of 
imperfect information and uncertainty, and the first highlighted a problem of ‘adverse 
selection’ (to be expanded on below).
15 For a more detailed review of this literature see Fry (1995 pp. 109-131). For a review of Post- 
Keynesian Critique of Financial Liberalisation see Petrick (1998).
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His model is constructed using on the automobile market as an example, and 
distinguishing between good cars and bad cars. The latter are called as ‘lemons’. He 
argues that there is an asymmetry in information, with the sellers, having a better 
knowledge of product quality, tending to misrepresent the information to the buyers and 
sell bad cars for the price of good cars. In turn, the buyers have their own perceptions of 
average product quality, and thus the price that they are willing to pay undervalues 
‘good’ cars and overvalues ‘bad’ cars. Thus, sellers of low-quality goods (‘bad’ cars) 
gain a ‘premium price at the expense of the sellers of high-quality goods (‘good’ cars)’ 
(see Petrick 1998, p.29). As a result the sellers of good-quality products tend to leave 
the market, not willing to be paid such a low price. It leads to the fall in a market price 
as the buyers formulate new perceptions of the average quality of product with regard 
what is left in the market. The sellers of ‘bad’ cars continue to crowd out the sellers of 
‘good’ cars from the market until the price will drop to such extent that only low-quality 
sellers stay in the market. This was dubbed as a problem of ‘adverse selection’.
Akerlof emphasised that this problem is particularly typical of underdeveloped 
countries where uncertainty is present and the variation in quality of products is on 
average greater than in developed countries. He stresses, ‘Credit markets in 
underdeveloped countries often strongly reflect the operation of the Lemons Principles’ 
(1970 p. 497).
The implication for financial markets of the Akerlof s theory can be 
summarised as follows. In a situation of uncertainty when lenders do not have full 
information about the riskiness of borrowers’ projects it is difficult for them to 
distinguish between Tow risk’ borrowers and ‘high risk’ borrowers. In turn, borrowers 
have an incentive to present to lenders information on investment projects they are 
planning to undertake in the best possible light, even if they (borrowers) expect a high 
probability of default on a loan. In fact, it can potentially lead to the problem of ‘adverse 
selection’ described in Akerlof s study. Literally, it implies that Tow-risk’ borrowers 
along with ‘high-risk’ borrowers will be incurring higher borrowing costs due to the 
‘risk premium’ added on top of the interest rate, which could have been the one 
regarded as a true market price if  there were perfect information in the market. Not 
willing to overpay, Tow-risk’ borrowers will gradually withdraw from the market. 
‘High-risk’ borrowers will continue bidding for loans pushing the ‘risk premium’ up. 
Literally, it will imply higher risks for lenders, as the probability of default increases.
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(Demetriades and Andrianova 2003, p. 12). They get involved in speculative lending and 
operations with securities, being tempted by very high interest rates promising large 
profits and quick returns. If borrowers happen to default, banks do not incur the full 
costs in this case, providing they are bailed out by the government. If banks do fail, 
depositors may avoid losses if they are protected by deposit insurance. If this is the case 
depositors have no incentive to monitor banks, although it is fair to note that they are 
also lack information with which to monitor banks. Bank shareholders may not have 
any incentive to monitor bank managers either, because they do not have much to lose 
providing they own little capital that is at stake. As Demetriades and Andrianova (2003 
p. 12, derived from Llewellyn 1999) argue, ‘bank shareholders may even benefit from 
gambling behaviour by the managers, if they have little capital at stake...In such 
circumstances it may be in their interests to instruct banks managers to gamble (with 
taxpayer’s money) -  this is sometimes known as ‘gambling for resurrection’.
As a possible solution for smoothing the effects of information imperfections 
Stiglitz advocates government intervention. Stiglitz (1994, p.20) believes that, ‘there 
exist forms of government intervention that will not only make these markets function 
better but will also improve the performance of the economy’. However, it is not always 
that government intervention can be efficient in addressing market failures. As Stiglitz 
(1994, p.32) notes, ‘some interventions motivated by, say, pressures from special 
interest groups actually impede the functioning of markets and redirect the allocation of 
capital in ways that cannot easily be related to any correction of a market failure’. That 
is why it is very important to ensure the creation of the ‘right’ and properly working 
market institutions in the first place. Proceeding further, Stiglitz (1994, pp.39-42) 
argues that generally financial repression can improve efficiency of capital allocation 
through lowering the cost of capital that will increase firms equity and providing 
directed credits to enterprises with high technological potential.
Fry (1997) expresses his disagreement with Stiglitz’s arguments on the 
following grounds. He says that lower interest rates will not necessarily lead to greater 
capital efficiency because firms with lower-yielding projects are likely to bid for loans. 
Moreover, the marginal cost of capital may even increase because the capital rationing 
problem that is likely to occur may trigger borrowers to turn to curb markets where the 
estimated cost of capital will be higher. Arestis and Demetriades (1997, p.796) 
conclude, ‘market failure does not necessarily imply government success’.
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This question of government intervention versus free markets continues to raise 
many debates among economists. It is not an easy issue to deal with. We will get back 
to it in the next chapter, where examination of episodes of financial repression in 
developing countries will help us shed some light on the effect of government 
intervention in financial sector functioning.
In summary, before embarking on any analysis of developments in financial sectors of 
transition economies, it is very important to elaborate a theoretical framework within 
which we can proceed with our analysis.
What is particularly intriguing about transition economies is that they have 
undertaken economic transformation from a planned economy, where finance played a 
passive role, to a market economy, where financial sectors are believed to play growth- 
enhancing role. Therefore, it places the financial sector in the centre of the transition 
process, assuming its crucial role in inducing growth in transition economies through 
capital accumulation and rising productivity of investment.
The literature review on financial development and finance-growth nexus in 
chapter 2 has identified ‘financial repression’ theory, better known as the ‘McKinnon- 
Shaw’ paradigm’, that can be used as a core theoretical framework for analysing 
developments in financial sectors in transition economies.
Developed in the mid of 1970s, it has since become widely used not only as a 
theoretical framework for studying financial sectors in developing economies, but also 
in the form of practical recommendations by the IMF and the World Bank to 
governments of less developed countries and later to transition economies, urging them 
to liberalise their financial sectors. Indeed, as it will be developed further in chapter 4, 
the policies suggested to transition economies by the experts of the IMF and the World 
Bank, stem from the conventional view that the financial system inherited from the 
planned economy was inefficient and restrained.
The financial repression literature also encounters a great deal of criticism, 
raised particularly recently due to the experience of some unsuccessful liberalisation 
episodes in Latin America, Asia and Russia. Most of the failures were attributed to the 
presence of information asymmetries and uncertainty in financial markets, bringing to 
the surface a problem of adverse selection and moral hazard. The latter became typical 
of many less developed countries and transition economies as they proceeded with 
financial liberalisation. Therefore, it is also important, when analysing developments in
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financial sectors of transition economies within ‘McKinnon-Shaw’ framework to 
address these problems.
The next chapter will present us with an overview of empirical studies on 
financial repression, suggesting some mixed results of the impact of financial repression 
on financial development and economic growth.
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Chapter 3: Empirical Studies on Financial Repression
It is widely argued that countries with better developed financial systems, namely with a 
denser banking system, and more active securities markets, grow faster than those 
where financial sectors are inhibited. As outlined in chapter 2, in the 1970s the 
mainstream economic literature on financial development regarded the financial 
systems of less developed countries as financially repressed.
Typically, interest rate ceilings, selective credit schemes and high reserve 
requirements were common instruments of Financial Repression across many 
developing countries. A majority of researchers studying a FR phenomenon conclude 
that financial restraints have a rather negative impact on financial deepening and 
economic growth. It is widely argued that liberalisation of the financial sector by 
abolishing interest rate ceilings, refraining from directed credit programmes and 
removing capital controls would lead to the deepening of the financial sector, and as a 
consequence, to economic growth. In the late 1970-80s many developing countries 
embarked on liberalising their economies, including financial sectors. Later, this 
‘financial liberalisation’ panacea spread to transition economies. Recommended by the 
IMF and the World Bank to the Eastern European countries and the Former Soviet 
Union, it was intended to ensure a successful transition from centrally planned system 
towards a market economy.
Financial Liberalisation Theory has ignited a lot of controversial debates. Case 
studies of less developed countries (see sections 3.2 and 4.3) show that after attempts to 
undertake financial liberalisation, some countries faced detrimental consequences of FL, 
and reintroduced some elements of financial control. A reasonable question is to ask 
why some countries managed to succeed whereas others failed. Although it is a topic 
for further research, our study of FR would be incomplete if we did not touch upon this 
issue. By studying the experience of developing countries in terms of FR and their first 
attempts of reforming financial sectors it is possible to identify what went wrong in 
developing countries and what could be the ‘optimum’ way of liberalising economies. 
Should this be gradual with a steady withdrawal of government intervention preserving 
some partial financial control over years of reform until the necessary institutions are 
established and the development process is on its right track - free from the influence of 
the rent-seeking groups or political lobbies? Or should it be rather rapid, leading to a
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‘large destruction of the old order before economic resources can be efficiently 
redeployed’ (McKinnon 1993), as happened in majority of socialist transition 
economies in the late 1980s and early 1990s? One can argue that perhaps the ‘optimum’ 
way as such does not exist since every country is unique and there is no way that ‘one 
size can fit all’. However, it is also true that individual experience can be less costly if 
one learns from the mistakes of others. Indeed, some valuable lessons for transition 
economies can be drawn from the experience of developing countries in their attempts 
to move from financial repression to reforming financial sectors.
The present chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.1 presents an overview of 
the empirical literature examining the financial repression paradigm. Section 3.2 focuses 
more on recent empirical studies where such issues as information asymmetries leading 
to market failures are taken into account, and some consequences of financial 
liberalisation in developing countries are sketched.
3.1 Consequences of Financial Repression: Facing the Evidence
The phenomenon of financial repression has been widely studied with application to 
developing countries, which were believed at times to pursue development strategies 
resulting in ‘shallow finance’.
As a result of the failure of the traditional nineteenth-century orthodox approach 
foreseeing free trade in both domestic and foreign markets, and a later growth of the 
Keynesian approach emphasising the need for official intervention in the aftermath of 
the Great Depression, a policy of pervasive government intervention in domestic 
economies became widespread in less-developed countries (LDCs) after World War II. 
Moreover, evidence of success of the above policy in centrally planned economies of 
Central and Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, demonstrating impressive economic 
growth in the 1950-1960s, appeared as more proof for governments in LDCs in favour 
of the strategy of strengthening state control over domestic economies in the form of 
introduced price controls, policies inhibiting development of financial markets, 
protectionism in foreign trade and pervasive subsidies in domestic trade (see McKinnon 
1993)'.
1 In fact, some of the developing countries such as Nicaragua in 1980s and India in 1970-80s were under 
great political influence from the Soviet Union. During this period the mode of operation of their 
economies bears close resemblance to a planned economy of a Soviet type.
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Drawing on examples of financially-repressed countries in Latin America and in 
parts of Asia, distortions in financial markets appeared in the form of interest rate 
ceilings, quite often resulting in negative or low positive real interest rates; directed 
credit subsidies; and high reserve requirements. Directed credit subsidies were usually 
selective, targeting (as a rule) loss-making state-owned industrial or agricultural 
enterprises and being channelled through bank agencies at much lower than equilibrium 
interest rates. Even with the rate of inflation often far exceeding the nominal interest 
rate these directed credits could be treated as a gift. The consequences of directed credit 
subsidies policy quite often were detrimental. Thus, for example, credit expansion 
towards agriculture in Nicaragua from 1980 to 1991 triggered an inflation spiral and the 
consequent devaluation of the Cordoba made agricultural debts, denominated in 
national currency, virtually costless. The later attempts to index debts failed, leading to 
pervasive nonrepayment. As McKinnon (1993, p. 46) argues, ‘moral hazard in bank 
lending had become so pronounced that farmers treated credit as a welfare payment 
rather than as a commercial transaction’.
According to Fry (1995, p.5) the proportion of domestic credit to central 
governments averaged 52.6 per cent in 91 developing countries over the period 1978- 
1987 compared to only 18.1 per cent in the 19 industrial countries. Proceeding further, 
official reserve requirements across financially-repressed countries were very high, for 
example, averaging over 30 per cent in Latin America countries versus less than 10 per 
cent in industrial countries in 1971-802. By regarding banks’ reserves as part of the 
monetary base and therefore as a base for inflation tax these high rates of reserve 
requirements in Latin America ensured 4-5 times higher gains from seigniorage 
compared to the industrial countries (see McKinnon 1993, p.56). Altogether financial 
restraints with high inflation were believed to reduce the attractiveness of domestic 
monetary assets leading to a gradual demonetisation of the economy and replacement of 
domestic monetary assets with ‘socially costly’ inflation hedges. With real yields on 
deposits becoming negative under high and unstable inflation, enterprises preferred to 
accumulate inventories that resulted in the fall of the average efficiency of investment.
Since financial systems in developing countries are dominated by commercial 
banks, in most cases the imposition of financial restraints on financial sectors outlined 
above became possible by nationalising the banking sector and limiting the
2 Here, Latin America encompasses Chile, Uruguay, Mexico, Columbia and Brazil, whereas the United 
States, West Germany and United Kingdom represent industrial countries.
37
Julia A. Korosteleva (2006) Chapter 3
independence of central banks in these countries by making them subordinate to 
governments. This was typically the case in India, Latin America and South Korea (see 
section 3.2).
As mentioned in chapter 2, in practice, financial repression often has fiscal 
implications, meaning that governments’ failure to satisfy the budget constraint with 
conventional tax revenue can be offset by introducing implicit tax in a form of FR. The 
evidence suggests that the revenue from FR can be substantial. Giovannini and De Melo 
(1993, p.959) show that the unweighted cross-country average of government revenue 
from financial repression accounts for 9 per cent of government revenue. Their 
estimates suggest that the revenue varies significantly across different developing 
countries. While it is close to zero in Indonesia, it reaches nearly 3 per cent in India, and 
6 per cent in Mexico, where it accounts for as much as 40 per cent of Mexican 
government revenue. The revenue gained by the government from inflation tax Fry 
(1993, p. 11) shows that for a sample of 26 developing countries on average in 1984 it 
amounted to 2.8 per cent, and that, in turn, represented over 17 per cent of the 
governments’ current revenue.
An enormous literature exists on FR and its effects on financial development 
(selectively discussed below). As mentioned in chapter 2 most researchers argue about 
the negative effect of FR on financial development and consequently on economic 
growth.
One of the earliest studies estimating the effect of financial repression is Lanyj 
and Saracoglu (1983). Their cross-section study covers a sample of 21 developing 
countries for the period 1971-80. They divide them into three groups depending on a 
scale of real interest rates, giving a value of 1 to countries with positive interest rates, a 
value of 0 to countries with moderately negative real interest rates and finally a value of 
-1 to countries with substantially negative real interest rate. Lanyj and Saracoglu found 
a positive and statistically significant relationship between the interest rate dummy 
variable and the rates of economic growth, suggesting that negative real interest rates 
rather inhibit economic growth.
Drawing upon an IMF study of interest-rate policies in developing countries in 
1974-85 and on a similar nature, Gelb’s (1989) work on developing countries over the 
1965-85 period, McKinnon (1993, p. 18) concludes that real positive rates of interest are 
positively associated with output. A World Bank (1989, pp.30-32) study, based on 
Lanyj and Saracoglu’s methodology, suggest similar results: countries with severely
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negative real interest rates (below 10 per cent on average over the period 1974-85) had 
experienced lower economic growth compared to those with positive real interest rates. 
This conclusion is also supported by Fry’s findings from several pooled time-series and 
cross-country studies for Asian economies for the 1960s and 1970s, implying that ‘a 
one percentage point increase in the real deposit rate of interest towards its competitive 
ffee-market equilibrium level is associated with a rise in the rate of economic growth of 
about one half a percentage point’ (Fry 1988, p. 152). At the same time, the World 
Bank’s (1989, p.32) and Gelb’s (1989, p.20) estimates of the coefficient of economic 
growth with regard to real interest rate for developing countries suggest that it ranges 
between 0.2-0.26.
All these studies focus only on interest rate policies and the way they affect 
economic development, while other instruments of FR seem to be neglected. Indeed, in 
analyses of the impact of FR on financial development and economic growth the 
majority of studies are focused on the impact of interest rate ceilings. This goes back to 
McKinnon and Shaw (1973) who placed the main focus on deposit rate ceiling as one of 
the main instrument of FR with further extension to the first generation financial 
repression models (Kapur 1976, Mathieson 1980 and Galbis 1977). Fry (1995) 
concludes that a deposit interest rate fixed by the government below its market 
equilibrium level is placed in the centre of first generation studies of financial 
repression, and he notes that regarding the competitive ffee-market equilibrium deposit 
rate as the growth-maximizing rate is what these models have in common.
Empirical evidence providing evaluation of the effect of reserve requirements, 
directed credit schemes and inflation tax, as an instrument complementing FR, is not as 
vast, although it exists (see Agarwala 1983; Roubini and Sala-i-Martin 1992, 1995; 
Demetriades and Luintel 1996, 1997, 2001; Brock 1989). They either studied an impact 
of individual financial repression policies on financial development/economic growth or 
their joint impact through a summary index of financial repression.
Thus, Roubini and Sala-i-Martin (1992) while expanding the Barro (1991) 
regression by introducing a number of measures of the financial repression found that 
relationship between financial repression and economic growth appeared to be 
statistically significant and negative. Moreover, they discovered that the dummy 
variable introduced in the original Barro regression for Latin America to capture an 
impact of unobserved variable on economic growth and being significant, loses its
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statistical significance when a financial repression variable is introduced into the 
regression, suggesting that a higher degree of financial repression can be the reason 
behind the lower rates of economic growth in Latin America. Moreover, they found 
that only a strong degree of financial repression (when real interest rates were less than 
minus 5 per cent) was associated with significantly lower economic growth (around 1.1 
per cent of per capita growth per year) (Roubini and Sala-i-Martin 1992, p.25). Finally, 
their theoretical model also suggests that countries with higher degree of financial 
repression will witness higher rates of inflation. Their findings imply that a 10 per cent 
inflation rate per year is associated with lower per capita growth rate of 0.5 per cent per 
year. Rousseau and Wachel’s (2002) study of inflation effects on growth covering 84 
countries over the 1960-1995 period shows that financial deepening stops accelerating 
economic growth when inflation exceeds the 13 to 25 per cent threshold.
In their later study Roubini and Sala-i-Martin (1995) claim that negative 
correlation between inflation and economic growth is spurious, as both of them are 
caused by financial repression policies. In formulating this argument they depart from 
the proposition that the financial sector is the source of easy resources for the public 
budget. Therefore, in countries with inefficient tax systems, governments are more 
likely to resort to financial repression policies in order to gain this public income. They 
model this income as inflation tax (IT), regarding interest rate ceilings and high reserve 
requirements as part of the overall IT and seigniorage (Roubini and Sala-i-Martin 1995, 
p.277; for studies of the similar nature also see Brock 1989 and de Gregorio 1992). 
They argue further that it is financial repression that triggers increases in real money 
demand4 and, therefore, higher rates of inflation as a consequence of monetary growth. 
In turn, higher inflation causes a reduction in savings, aggregate investment and 
economic growth.
3 This result was robust when particularly the two measures of financial repression were used one at a 
time: a dummy variable used as a proxy to capture restrictions on interest rates (derived on a basis of 
Agarwala’s study (1983) to be expanded in chapter 6) and a composite index of distortions in financial 
markets (also derived from Agarwala (1983) as weighted average of different distortion measures). 
However, when reserve ratio was used as a measure of financial repression, although it appeared to 
significant in explaining economic growth, but not sufficient to drive away the regional dummy.
4 In their work money demand is a positive function of consumption and a negative function of nominal 
interest rate (opportunity cost) and of the level of financial development of the economy for all levels of 
interest rate. Financial development lowers the transaction costs of transforming non-liquid into liquid 
assets and, therefore, the more developed financial economies, the lower marginal benefit of holding 
money. At macroeconomic level it means that savings are rather allocated to more efficiency units of 
physical capital in financially developed economies (see Roubini and Sala-i-Martin 1995).
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Demetriades and Luintel (1996, 1997, 2001) found that financial repression 
(proxied by the composite index of various financial repression policies) had effects on 
financial depth that were additional to those of real interest rate (see section 3.3 for a 
detailed description of their studies).
Proceeding further, it will be instructive to look at some studies considering the 
transmission channels of the effect of financial repression (primarily through the real 
interest rate) on economic growth. There were identified two main channels through 
which these effects occur. While the early studies (see Kapur 1976 and Mathieson 1980) 
showed that the effect of repressed financial conditions on economic growth mainly 
occurred through the reduction in the level of savings and correspondingly in the 
quantity of investment in the economy, the later empirical studies (primarily, 
endogenous growth literature) presented the evidence of FR having its major impact 
through reducing the quality of investment (deteriorating the productivity of 
investment) (see, for example, King and Levine 1993a, Roubini and Sala-i-Martin 1992, 
and Gelb 1989).
Thus, Gelb (1989), while analysing growth rates across thirty-four countries, 
investigated whether economic growth occurs due to increased amount of investment 
available to the economy (measured by the ratio of investment (aggregate saving) to 
GDP, or due to higher productivity of this investment, measured by the incremental 
output-capital ratio. His findings suggest that the efficiency effect exceeded the 
investment effect by four times, meaning that higher positive interest rates mainly 
influenced economic growth through increased investment efficiency rather than 
through increased investment (see McKinnon 1993, p.22). A World Bank study (1989, 
pp.30-32) also shows that the investment ratio in countries with positive real interest 
rates had been only 17 per cent higher than in countries with negative real interest rates, 
whereas the average capital efficiency (measured by incremental capital/output ratio) in 
the former four times had exceeded that in the latter. Therefore, as Fry (1997, p.762) 
suggests, ‘financial repression exerts its main impact on the quality rather than quantity 
of investment’.
An increase in transactions costs was named among other ways through which 
financial undevelopment may effect economic growth (see, for example, Roubini and 
Sala-i-Martin 1992 and Blackburn and Hung 1998). In financially developed economies 
financial intermediaries perform the monitoring task that removes the costly necessity 
for each investor to monitor the project. In turn, it reduces transaction costs and allows a
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larger share of savings to be allocated to investments. Examining the transmission 
channels of financial development on economic growth in transition economies Koivu 
(2002) finds that financial development accelerates economic growth mainly through 
reduction in bank margins and a decrease in the proportion of non-performing loans 
(denotes the quality of information in a baking sector) - both regarded as qualitative 
measures of financial development. In turn, lower margins (consequently transaction 
costs) increase the share of savings allocated to investment, although she fails then to 
find any significant relationship between the size of banking sector measured by the 
volume of loans allocated to private enterprises and economic growth. It can suggest 
financial policies exert their effect rather on productivity of investment. Oddly, perhaps, 
but there appears to be an inverse relationship between bank credit to private sector and 
growth. Koivu speculates that it well may be that the quality of credit stock is 
negatively related to its size. Indeed, her sample covers the period 1993-2000, when 
many transition economies, particularly of the FSU region, continued allocating bank 
loans to inefficient ‘priority’ sectors of the economy’.5 Evaluating an impact of financial 
depth on growth in transition economies of Southeast Europe Mehl and Winkler (2003) 
also fail to find any significant effect. They attribute it to the failure of the reforms of 
the first half of the 1990s to prevent inflationary finance and financial crises in the 
countries of this region that ultimately contributed to large output losses (see chapter 4).
Finally, it should be noted that high reserve requirements decrease the fraction 
of savings going to investment, as they increase the spread between lending and 
borrowing rates. (Fry 1995) Bencivenga and Smith (1992) argue that governments in 
developing countries resort to financial repression (in particular, high reserve 
requirements and interest rate ceilings) in order to gain from inflation tax. In countries 
where the government deficit is large, governments are more likely to monetise a 
deficit. Therefore, to increase the gains from inflation tax they ‘engage’ in financial 
repression by this ‘augmenting’ demand for money. As Bencivenga and Smith (1992, p. 
767) put it ‘...developing countries face a trade-off in the use of reserve requirements 
and interest rate ceiling: output losses from the use of such instruments must be 
weighted against benefits derived from more efficient use of the inflation tax’. Thus 
their study addresses the question of the ‘optimal extent of financial repression’ in a
5 A typical feature of transition economies is that distinction between ‘private’ and ‘public’ was often 
blurred, as many public enterprises although were turned into joint-stock companies, but state ownership 
was dominant in them; other (usually large) state enterprises or state directly became the main owners of 
these ‘privatised’ companies (for a discussion see chapter 5).
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developing economy forced to rely on the inflation tax for financing a sustained deficit. 
The authors’ model takes the form of a general equilibrium model in which liquidity 
provision by banks determines output and inflation. They embed the Diamond-Dybvig 
model (1983) of intermediation in an overlapping generations model with production, 
capital accumulation, and outside money; a monetised government deficit is also 
introduced6. Their model also provides some sort of reconciliation between the 
McKinnon-Shaw and ‘new structuralist’ views (see chapter 2). Recalling the latter, it 
was argued that financial liberalisation of the sort advised by McKinnon and Shaw 
draws resources from the informal sector to an organised banking system. However, to 
the extent that the latter is ‘subject to reserve requirements not present in the informal 
sector, and to the extent that the funds absorbed by these requirements are not used to 
finance investment, this may result in no increase in capital formation, and no 
expansionary effects on output’ (Bencivenga and Smith (1992, p.237). Indeed, 
Bencivenga and Smith find evidence supporting this argument. Nevertheless, they 
contend that financial liberalisation is still ‘welfare improving, as the intermediated 
sector provides superior risk sharing’ (ibid).
In summary, ‘repressionist’ policies in the financial sector have an overall 
negative effect on financial development as well as inhibit economic growth mainly 
through deceasing the average productivity of capital. As many empirical studies 
suggest countries with a higher degree of liberalisation in financial markets, when 
maintaining higher real interest rates on bank deposits and loans, demonstrate greater 
financial growth than those that are heavily financially repressed.
3.2 Discussing the Rationale for Government Intervention
It would be too premature, based on the main findings from the empirical works 
reviewed in the previous section, to stop our discussion at this point, concluding that 
financial restraints unequivocally hamper financial development and advocate financial 
liberalisation as an alternative policy to promote financial development and economic 
growth.
It is imperative to recall some recent time-series studies by Demetriades and 
Luintel (1996, 1997, 2001) estimating an impact of financial repression in India and
6 For technical details of the model see Bencivenga and Smith (1992).
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South Korea on financial development and economic growth in these countries. These 
works are particularly interesting because, first of all, Demetriades and Lunitel consider 
the implications of financial restraints in an imperfectly competitive banking industry, 
and secondly, they come up with contrasting findings, for the first time suggesting that 
the effects of financial repression can be mixed.
In their examination of the Indian and South Korean experience of FR they find 
that in the first case FR had a strong negative impact on financial development, while in 
the second case financial restraints are found to have a large positive effect on financial 
development.
Both countries exercised all the variety of financial restraints described above. 
India introduced control over its financial sector in the early 1960s in the form of 
lending rate ceilings, directed credits and concessionary lending rates for ‘strategic’ 
enterprises, and followed this with nationalisation of the banking sector in 1969 and 
1980. It started gradually liberalising its financial market only in the late 1980s. The 
South Korean banking sector control also took place in the early 1960s through the 
nationalisation of the banking sector. The South Korean experience of financial 
repression is particularly intriguing as it coincided with the period of rapid economic 
growth in this country .
Basing on the works of Courakis (1984) and Stiglitz (1994), Demetriades and 
Luintel (1996, 2001) hypothesize that financial restraints may have effects on financial 
development not only through the interest rate effect as per conventional McKinnon and 
Shaw theory, but also depending on a market structure. They assume the presence of 
imperfect information, and consequently imperfectly competitive behaviour in banking 
in developing countries. Thus they contend that in many developing countries the 
banking industry is dominated by a small number of banks and collusive behaviour is 
not uncommon. Indeed, ‘asymmetric information in loan markets is in fact sufficient to 
generate some degree of market power for lenders who would then be able to act as if 
they where monopolists in relation to the pool of potential borrowers that are attached to 
them through long-term bank-customer relations’ (Demetriades and Luintel 2001, p. 
463. See also Stiglitz 1994). Thus, Demetriades and Luintel, put forward an argument 
about the inverse relationship between the degree of state control over the banking 
system and the ability of the banking system to operate as a profit-maximizing cartel.
7 For more details on developments in the financial sector in India see Demetriades and Luintel (1996, 
1997), and on the South Korean case of financial repression see Demetriades and Luintel (2001).
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Consequently, they assume that this relationship implies a positive association of the 
degree of state control in the form of a lending rate ceiling, with a level of financial 
development. Thus, providing time-series evidence from South Korea, Demetriades and 
Luintel find that mild repression of loan rates, with a lending rate ceiling (ij) above the 
competitive market rate (ic), but below the monopolistic profit-maximizing rate, 
increases the volume of loans and deposits. At the same time they find that if severe 
repression takes place, meaning that the lending rate ceiling fe) is lower than the 
competitive market rate, then it will lead to a negative impact of interest rate ceilings on 
financial development as their evidence suggests in the Indian case. The above can be 







Figure 3.1: The monobank model: lending rate ceiling
To conclude, the above evidence suggests that FR policy does not necessarily have 
negative effects on financial development, as McKinnon and Shaw suggest. Different 
degree of the severity of repression as well as institutional differences in the structure of 
the banking sector varying from country to country can lead to contrasting results as it 
has been just seen on examples of India and South Korea. As Demetriades and Luintel 
(1997, p. 318) conclude, positive effects of financial repression in the last instance can 
be attributed to the success of addressing market failure.
8 The figure is adapted from Demetriades and Luintel (2001, p.464) Note: im is a lending interest rate at 
which the monobank maximises profit. Lm is a volume o f  loans granted at this interest rate. Lj and L2 are 
volumes o f  loans granted at i] and i2 interest rates (for their description see text above). MC stands for 
marginal costs. D denotes demand curve and MR is marginal revenue.
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Next, we will look at some interesting results obtained by De Gregorio and 
Guidotti (1995). They hypothesised that the relationship between economic growth and 
real interest rate has inverted U -shape form. According to them,
‘Very low (and negative) real interest rates tend to cause financial disintermediation 
and hence tend to reduce growth, as implied by McKinnon-Shaw hypothesis.. .On the 
other hand, very high real interest rates that do not reflect improved efficiency of 
investment, but rather a lack of credibility of economic policy or various forms of 
country risk, are likely to result in a lower level of investment as well as a 
concentration in excessively risky projects’ (De Gregorio and Guidotti 1995, pp. 437).
Later, Fry (1997, p.755-770), after undertaking a pooled time-series analysis regressing 
the annual rate of economic growth against the real rate of interest for 85 developing 
countries for the period 1971-95, obtained the results supporting De Gregorio and 
Guidotti’s argument. Indeed, the studied relationships have an inverted U-shape form. 
He also found that ‘growth is maximised when the real interest rate lies within the 
normal or non-pathological range of, say, -5 to +15 per cent’ (Fry 1997, p.764). Fry 
extended his empirical study to estimating a simultaneous-equation system trying to 
identify how financial conditions, in part excessively high interest rates at the outset of 
financial liberalisation in some developing countries, affected saving and investment 
ratios, and export and output growth rates9. He concluded that excessively high interest 
rates had just as devastating an impact as financial repression (see Fry 1997, p.765). A 
problem of unjustified high interest rates jeopardises in the presence of information 
asymmetries that is typically the case of developing countries, and as a result may lead 
to excessively risky lending strategies and an increase in bad debts10. In other words, 
this exacerbates a problem of ‘moral hazard and gambling behaviour in the banking 
system, thereby increasing the riskiness of banks’ portfolios...and the probability of 
financial crises’ (see Arestis et al 2002, p.l 11). In the next chapter, we will demonstrate 
a practical implication of the above finding while considering an experience of socialist 
transition economies in reforming their financial sectors.
9 In this exercise Fry use the data from 16 developing countries, namely Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Egypt, 
India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Turkey 
and Venezuela, for the period 1970-88. The value of real interest rate in this sample ranges from -83 per 
cent to 221 per cent (Fry 1997, p.765-767).
10 See, for example, McKinnon and Pill (1997).
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Meantime, it is interesting to note that some empirical evidence of implementing 
financial liberalisation policy in many developing countries starting from the 1970s 
reveal quite controversial outcomes from what was predicted by the financial repression 
literature. Real interest rates soared to unprecedented levels, exacerbating moral hazard 
problems. Excessive risk lending became widespread and speculation flourished. As 
Demetriades and Andrianova (2003, p. 11) note, ‘instead of better, more developed, 
financial system there were failed banks that had to be rescued by the government’. 
‘Good-bye financial repression, hello financial crash’ is how Diaz-Alejandro (1985) 
briefly summarizes the Latin American experiments with financial liberalisation since 
the mid 1970s. According to him, financial reforms, ‘aimed to ending financial 
repression’, led to massive bankruptcies, sharp falls in domestic savings, and by 1983 
the reintroduction of pervasive government control or massive nationalisations of 
private institutions (Diaz-Alejandro 1985, p.l). Indeed, Chile’s experience of financial 
liberalisation, started from the privatisation of most banks in the mid 1970s, followed by 
the removal of interest rates ceilings and the relaxation of restrictions over convertibility 
and capital movements in the early 1980s. It finished with pervasive government rescue 
operations of banks and the exertion of government supervision and control over them 
in 1983 to prevent a further breakdown of the financial system. Following the official 
estimates, non-performing banking assets increased from 11 per cent of their capital and 
reserves at the end of 1980 to 113 per cent in May 1983 (Arellano 1983, p. 192, quoted 
in Diaz-Alejandro 1985, p .ll). Typical scenarios of financial liberalisation in Latin 
America (LA) were liberalisation of domestic banking markets with real interest rates 
soaring (on average over 30 per cent in LA) and causing an ‘overborrowing syndrome’. 
High government debt-to GNP ratios were not unusual among Latin American countries 
creating a large threat of debt crisis. As McKinnon (1993, p.6) notes, ‘in many LDCs, 
people now anticipate that the government will default on its domestic bonds-as in 
March 1990 with Brazilian government’s freeze of 80 per cent of its outstanding 
liabilities in the hands of Brazilian firms and households’. This undermined government 
credibility made non-inflationary domestic deficit financing impossible, pushing 
authorities to switch to monetary emission, the consequences of which were an 
inflationary spiral.
While analysing what went wrong, many economists agree on incorrect 
sequencing of reforms and some adverse preconditions such as large fiscal deficits and 
high inflation (see, for example, McKinnon (1993), Villanueva and Mirakhor (1990)
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and Fry (1997). Thus, McKinnon argues that fiscal control in part of balancing 
government budget and phasing out quasi-budget operations, as well as price 
stabilisation and hardening of enterprise budget constraints should precede FL. Only 
where these conditions are met, can governments consider the further opening up of 
capital markets to international markets. Otherwise, the premature elimination of 
exchange controls on foreign capital flows can lead to detrimental conditions, causing 
unprecedented capital inflows and risky increases in foreign indebtedness. There is no 
need to rush and it is better to ensure gradual withdrawal of interventionist policies to 
avoid a financial crash. Finally, as Fry (1997, p.768) concludes, ‘Unless the government 
is committed to fiscal reform in conjunction with financial liberalisation, financial 
repression may be the lesser of two evils’.
In summary, in the present chapter the key empirical studies on financial repression 
were reviewed. The majority of researchers studying the FR phenomenon agree that 
financial restraints have a negative impact on financial deepening and inhibit economic 
growth, mainly through deceasing the average productivity of capital. As many 
empirical studies suggest, countries with a higher degree of liberalisation in financial 
markets, when maintaining higher real interest rates on bank deposits and loans, 
demonstrate greater financial growth than those, that are heavily financially repressed.
At the same time more recent evidence from several time-series studies 
suggests that the effect of financial repression may depend on market structure, policy 
sequencing and institutional environment. For example, financial restraints imposed on 
a financial sector with an imperfectly competitive banking industry can lead to mixed 
results much depending on the severity of the financial repression.
The presence of information asymmetries in developing countries and transition 
economies is also likely to affect the results of reforms in financial sectors in their 
attempts to end financial repression. If moral hazard and adverse selection problems 
exacerbate, anticipated outcomes of ‘financial liberalisation’ policy, dubbed as paving 
the way to financial deepening and economic prosperity, could be easily reversed and 
spillover into a financial crash and the reintroduction of state control over the economy. 
Unless the right preconditions for financial reform are created, ‘financial repression may 
be the lesser of two evils’.
Admitting the fact that the empirical studies presented in this chapter focus 
rather on developing countries, it is necessary to justify using the ‘McKinnon-Shaw’
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framework to analyse the financial policies of previously socialist economies. This issue 
is addressed in the next chapter through reviewing financial policies in transition 
economies and identifying the commonalities that can exist between developing 
countries and transition economies in their experience of financial development.
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Chapter 4 Challenging Transition: Financial Sector
Restructuring
The present chapter examines financial sector restructuring in transition economies in 
the context of both the conventional transition approach and the path-dependency 
approach. The latter identifies the legacies inherited from the Soviet economy and the 
ways they can shape a transition process.
Section 4.1 examines the distinctive features of the operation of finance in a 
centrally planned economy. This is required to realise the nature and scale of the 
ongoing transformation in the financial sector, to define the possible legacies inherited 
from the past and their influence on transition process. On the whole, transition 
economies inherited an underdeveloped financial system from a planned economy with 
money and institution vacuum, and ineffective credit system being its main legacies 
creating potential constraints for financial restructuring.
Section 4.2 reviews the initial shocks which all transition economies faced at the 
beginning of transformation, and, based on the response to these shocks and the 
progress of liberalising their economies, draws the patterns of transition. Section 4.3 
looks closely at the process of bank reform and the creation of financial markets. The 
chapter concludes with a summary of the similarities of financial policy-making in both 
transition economies and developing countries, which seeks to justify the use of the 
financial repression framework for examining the case study of Belarus.
4.1 Money and Credit under a Planned Economy
Opposed to the market economy a coordination mechanism in a centrally planned 
system was based on the central plan, the core of which was the drafting of ‘material 
balances’ (Lavigne 1999)1. Material balances or production targets were specified in 
physical units identifying sources of supply and uses for individual products or products 
groups (sectors of the economy). Along with the central production plan authorities 
determined a financial plan specifying financial targets which served as the monetary 
counterparts of enterprise’s output and input and thus that provided the planner control
1 A balance identified sources of supply and uses for certain products or products groups. By the 1960s 
the Soviet economy had become more complex and diversified leading to an increase in the amount of 
planned items that made it increasingly difficult to control plan implementation (Lavigne 1999, p. 11).
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over enterprise operations. In accordance with the financial plan2, to support the 
production plan enterprises were allocated financial resources through accessing their 
endowments (‘own funds’), redistribution of surplus3 in the form of state subsidies and 
credit supply to finance gaps in funds. This money did not go into the sphere of open 
monetary exchange but worked as non-cash clearance between enterprises. Here we 
define one of the distinctive features of a planned economy - that is a separation of 
money supply into two circuits4. Private5 or cash money which was used between the 
household sector and the state sector including both government and state-owned 
enterprises. Enterprise or non-cash money was used in settling transactions between 
enterprises themselves and partly between enterprises and government. Both private and 
enterprise money were not interchangeable with the latter being exchange for currency 
exclusively through payroll withdrawals. The rationale behind separation of money 
flows was to avoid excess demand (Garvy 1977, p.76). Therefore, money played a 
different role than in an economy that depended on a money circuit. While money was 
passive in a production circuit and as an instrument of monetary policy, it still remained 
active in the private sector despite its restrictive function performance (see below).
Payments to households were in the form of wages from state-owned enterprises 
and transfer payments from the government. In turn the purchase of consumer goods by 
households, payment of taxes, or deposits in the state savings bank were the way of 
returning currency issued to households in a form of payroll withdrawals, to the state 
sector. Private money had similar characteristics to those of money in a market 
economy, that is it served as a store of value, a medium of exchange and a unit of 
account, at least concerning monetary relations between individual persons and the state 
sector. At the same time ownership of money did not give an absolute command over 
resources, as individuals were still bound to purchase only consumer goods, the type, 
supply and price of which were determined by the planning authorities (Petrick 1998, p. 
49).6
2 The financial plan was comprised of the credit and the investment plans.
3 Surpluses were usually accumulated in large industrial enterprises and were transferred to the budget 
with a purpose o f further reallocation of these resources among enterprises running a deficit as well as 
direct government expenditures (De Melo et al 1997).
4 See, for example, Garvy 1977 and Zwass 1979.
5 This definition is used by Zwass (1979, p. 9) to denote household money. Garvy (1977, p.76) defines 
this money as ‘currency money’ and uses term ‘deposit money’ to denote enterprise money.
6 There were a few other flows of private money. Also included in the cash circuit are payments within 
the household sector. In truth, in some countries farming and some small enterprises were kept in private 
ownership as well. Households engaged in farming or in small business could also use private money to
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As stated above enterprise (deposit) money was used to settle all the transactions 
between state units, i.e. both between enterprises, and enterprises and the state. 
According to Garvy (1977, p.38) this money existed as a unit of account and was 
viewed by many Soviet monetary economists, who denied the monetary nature of 
deposits, as a clearing fund. The deposits of enterprises were not freely usable and were 
controlled through branch ministries. The managers (directors) of enterprises could not 
independently dispose the retained profits. Therefore, meeting a production target was 
almost the only ‘incentive’ for an enterprise to run a surplus. In the late 1970-90s a 
deficit was common enough. For any surplus money, aside from a set amount retained 
as a ‘development fund’ within the enterprise for financing its capital investment, was 
either taken back into the state budget or reallocated to enterprises with a deficit (Petrick 
1998, p. 50)7. Credit supply to enterprises, also treated as ‘planning funding’, along with 
the state subsidies (enterprises’ surpluses) served to finance the gaps in funding 
enterprises’ fixed and working assets to ensure their economic activity. While in a 
market system credit is assumed to stimulate economic activity as it provides the means 
for the development of enterprises’ activity under conditions of competition - for 
example through use of market interest rate -  a mechanism of effective allocation of 
funds, - in a planned economy it mostly had a long-term negative effect, taking into 
account the centralised mode of resource allocation with the resulting ‘soft budget 
constraint’8.
The banking system in a centrally planned economy was primarily represented 
by the Monobank or Gosbank as it was defined in the Former Soviet Union, which was 
state-owned and operated as both a central bank and monopoly commercial bank. The 
Monobank was designed to serve only enterprises while providing them with short-term 
loans for working capital needs. Since one of the main Monobank functions was to
buy capital goods (means of production) from the state. In addition, some transactions between 
enterprises could consist of cash payments. However this took place within carefully delineated 
guidelines and only involved very small sums of cash. As such, this was not an important monetary flow 
(ibid).
Only in the course of the 1987-88 reforms were enterprises granted greater autonomy in the allocation of 
their internally generated funds, in particular, in the payment o f wages and bonuses (IMF et al. 1990).
8 A centrally planned economy allocated its capital administratively, without resort to rates of return or 
other measures of profitability. According to the Marx's labour theory of value, capital was regarded as a 
free factor of production and was allocated to enterprises as an interest free grant. Only since the late 
1960s an interest like criteria for allocating investments within administrative units, that implicitly 
introduced rates of return and other capital profitability criteria into the investment decision, began to be 
used. However investment allocation, according to the principle of priority, remained dominant, which 
made efficiency indexes insignificant in making investment decisions. Investment funds were 
continuously determined administratively in the investment plan, which in turn followed the output plan 
of the economy. For more details see Barkovski (1976).
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control enterprise plan fulfilment, extension of short-term loans during the production 
period was a principal monitoring device. There was also need to draw attention to the 
fact that while dealing with short-term credits Monobank had no experience in 
providing long-term investment credits. The latter, usually provided by the Investment 
bank, bear more resemblance to subsidies rather than loans. The Monobank also 
monitored payments to the population since enterprises, besides having non-cash 
accounts for enterprise transactions with bank, drew on cash accounts for wage 
payments. While Monobank served the industrial sector, the state-owned Savings bank 
was a monopolist in serving households. In some countries a confederation of co­
operative banks collected deposits for agriculture cooperatives. Despite this, the 
overwhelming majority of household savings (80-85 per cent on average) was collected 
by the Savings bank. The bank was required to transfer excess funds (money collected 
from deposits and not used for consumer loans, or for countries where consumer loans 
were not allowed) into the Monobank (Petrick 1998)9.
Finally one can question how the balance between money supply and output was 
offset to ensure price stability. One of the main goal for an effective monetary policy is 
to keep the level of aggregate expenditure in an economy broadly consistent with 
production capacity; in words of Benjamin Cohen (2001, p. 198), ‘ ...to guide the ship o f  
state between Scylla o f rampant inflation and the Charybdis o f prolonged recession.’ 
While monetary policy in a market economy is carried out through the use of money, 
exchange rate and interest rates as market instruments, there is an obvious lack of them 
in a planned economy. The value of the good was determined not by supply and 
demand as in a market economy but rather by plan. Thus the overall cost of production 
was centrally determined by the state and it was distorted. The equality between the 
wage payments and consumption goods valued at administratively-fixed prices was a 
key condition for the equilibrium of the system (De Melo and Denizer 1997). However, 
from the early 1980s this mechanism could no longer assure macroeconomic stability 
Some imbalances became apparent, such as the fact that incomes were growing faster 
than production. By the end 1970s the limits of continued rapid mobilisation of capital 
and labour had been reached and rigidities in the system hindered the increases in 
productivity needed to sustain output, triggering a decline in economic growth from 8 
per cent in the second of the 1960s to 3 per cent in the first half of the 1980s (IMF et al
9 For an interesting discussion of the banking system in a planned economy see also Podolski (1973), 
Zwass (1979), Garvy (1977) and Kuschpeta (1978).
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1990, p.3). The economic slowdown started in such branches of the FSU economy as 
light and food industries, agriculture and services which were labelled as less important 
ones in comparison with heavy industry and thus were given less priority in terms of 
centralised resources distribution, that made them lack of the necessary financing, and 
gradually led to a slowdown in their production growth. During different periods of 
time the authorities used different ways to offset a growing discrepancy between a 
consumer demand and supply. For example, whereas during 1930-50s in the Soviet 
Union there were popular so-called ‘corrective methods’ such as non-monetary forms of 
remuneration in agriculture, the use of unremunerated labour force in the GULAG 
system and so on, in the 1960s it was done mainly through manipulating relative prices, 
and in the 1970s - by a relatively increase in inflow of imported goods (Zhukov 1993). 
All these measures aimed at absorbing an overhang in the population’s cash on hand to 
bring their consumption in line with a production capacity and prevent suppressed 
inflation10 turning into open inflation. This problem was further aggravated when in 
early 1980s enterprises in the Centrally Planned Economies (CPE) were given more 
freedom with their profits, including a permission to retain part of the profits to pay 
bonuses to workers that raised wages above sustainable level consistent with price 
stability and production growth. In turn it resulted in the problem of the consumer 
goods’ scarcity becoming more obvious and as a result the introduction of rationing 
cards. The only reasonable way to offset this growing gap was a general rise in price 
level. However, the authorities stressed the choice of continuing the practice of granting 
subsidies to enterprises to support them and thus generated inflationary pressures11 and 
goods shortages (IMF et al. 1990).
By summarising the above we can identify the following legacies inherited from 
the Soviet system that, to a greater extent, gave rise to the view that market reforms in 
line with the ‘Washington consensus’ were needed and which have inspired the 
transition process (see, for example, Lavigne 1999).
1. De Melo and Deniser (1997) reported relatively high ratios of M2 (regarded 
as broad money) to GDP, averaging around 42 per cent in pre-transition period (1989- 
1991) in socialist countries. By the end of the 1980s rapid monetary growth in a
10 Increase of ‘unwanted savings’ in the savings banks could be used as one of the indicator of a repressed 
inflation (Lavigne 1999, p.61).
11 Increases in subsidies along with the decline in the value of foreign trade (as a result of a sharp decline 
in world oil prices in 1986) were the major reasons of fiscal performance worsening; the fiscal deficit 
monetized by the Monobank rose from around 2.5 per cent of GDP in 1985 to more than 8.5 per cent of 
GDP by 1987 (IMF et al 1990).
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situation of unchanged administered prices resulted in mounting excess liquidity, two 
thirds of which was accounted for by household holdings of cash and deposits (IMF et 
al. 1990). Therefore, to absorb the monetary overhang the experts of the IMF and World 
Bank advocated price liberalisation (IMF et al 1990). Along with price liberalisation, 
curbing the ensuing inflation appeared to be another main challenge for macroeconomic 
policy. This required cutting government expenditure and tightening the monetary and 
credit emission. Liberalisation of interest rates was required to increase the 
attractiveness of bank deposits in order to direct households’ cash into savings.
Therefore, the relatively high financial ratios mentioned above did not indicate 
financial development, as they do in market economies; they were rather reflecting this 
macroeconomic disequilibrium (De Melo and Denizer 1997). The abolition of the plan 
should have led, in fact, to a monetary vacuum, particularly as far as the enterprise 
circuit was concerned. The proclaimed price liberalisation eliminated the monetary 
overhang ‘much more quickly than anticipated through price hikes’ (Lavigne 1999, 
p. 117), and wiped out households’ savings -  the primary source of credit expansion to 
enterprises in transition to a market economy. It also eroded the real value of 
enterprises’ deposits. Thus, the authorities did not have much room for manoeuvre at 
the early stage of transition other than to continue a practice of ‘soft budget 
constraints’12.
2. Besides a money vacuum, transition economies also inherited an institutional 
vacuum as a result of sharp differences in the role and basic principles of functioning of 
financial systems under planned and market economies. The financial institutions of the 
Soviet system had no experience of effective allocation of resources; for example, 
ranking the projects by risk and return, or monitoring their borrowers etc. The capital 
market was completely absent under socialism due to the state-dominated ownership 
and the absence of financial instruments typical of a market economy. Thus, recession 
during the early period transition could be partly explained by the inadequate supply- 
side response in terms of an underdeveloped financial system. Banking reform and the 
creation of capital markets were viewed as one of the main building blocks of 
stabilisation-cum-transformation process. Moreover, enterprises’ restructuring and 
privatisation were seen as the necessary complementarities of financial sector reform.
12 The concept of soft budget constraint was first introduced by Janos Komai (1986) who argued that in 
socialist economies the financial constraint on the enterprise is ex ante ‘soft’, meaning that the socialist 
firm is not concerned with negative profit in the future, since it can expect to get financial subsidies in the 
future in case of economic failure.
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3. Due to the imprudent and ineffective practice of enterprise financing under 
socialism, when the extension of credit followed government directives and was not 
governed by profit considerations, the banks of the Soviet system inherited a significant 
amount of non-performing loans. According to an estimate from the EBRD, bad debts 
amounted to 60 per cent of the balance sheets of the eastern banks at the beginning of 
the transition (Lavigne 1999, p. 188). Moreover the amount of bad debts continued to 
grow during the early stages of transition due to the continuing practice of banks to lend 
to affiliated enterprises13 or, under official pressure, to loss-making state-owned 
enterprises to keep them afloat. On the one hand, macroeconomic stabilisation, banks’ 
privatisation and restructuring accompanied by enterprise and legal reforms were the 
way to address this problem. On the other, the problem of non-performing loans in 
banks’ portfolios could potentially manifest into a problem of moral hazard and adverse 
selection, were it to be dealt in a very radical way without taking extra precautions (to 
be discussed in section 4.3).
In summary, despite socialist economies differing substantially in their initial 
conditions, such as the level of income, the nature and extent of economic distortions 
and the level of institutional development14, transition from a planned economy to a 
market economy can still be considered as a common process if it is put in the context 
of the above-mentioned legacies inherited from the Soviet system (De Melo et el. 1997). 
Thus, stabilisation programmes envisaging price liberalisation, cuts in government 
spending, controls over nominal wages increases, foreign trade liberalisation (through 
achieving current account convertibility and devaluing the domestic currency to the 
market rate) and accompanied by structural reforms (privatisation, bank and financial 
sector reforms, tax reform etc.) appeared to shape transition of CEE and FSU countries 
from a planned economy to a market economy. In principle, ‘these packages applied the 
methods already experimented with in developing countries’ (Lavigne 1999, p. 113). 
The differences in transformation experiences across the countries lay mainly in 
sequencing and the speed of the suggested measures, or in other words in their choice 
between ‘Big-Bang’ (‘Shock therapy’) and gradualism approach15 with an emphasis in
13 Banks, which were created from the commercial departments of the Monobank, were segmented by the 
industrial sector, or rather by clients, taking into account that the manufacturing sector inherited from the 
Soviet system was characterized by a high degree of vertical industry integration and reliance on very 
large plants. For more details see the following section.
14 For a discussion of the importance of initial conditions and other country-specific factors in the 
transition experience see De Melo et al. 1995.
15 ‘Shock therapy’ (ST) envisaged radical transformation of the economy following neo-classical vision
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the choice preference stressed on rapid reform by the IMF and World Bank experts (De 
Melo et al. 1997, p.63). Therefore, fast formation of competitive markets free of 
government intervention became the mantra of the conventional transition approach.
4.2 Drawing on the Patterns of Transition
The initial shock for all transition economies was the collapse of the administrative 
planned system itself. It predetermined the transformational recession in socialist 
countries marked by initial fall in output. The collapse of the CMEA resulting in the 
breakdown of trade agreements, the elimination of subsidies, the increase in prices of 
imported energy and gas and general inefficiency and partial obsolescence of capital 
stock inherited from the Soviet system laid the basis for the downward trend of output 
in post-communist countries. Price liberalization caused a strong upward inflationary 
pressure. The latter was challenged by tight monetary policy envisaging reduction in 
central bank credit and liberalization of interest rates. Consequently, the following 
decrease in aggregate demand further aggravated output fall16. Thus, at the early stage 
of transition post-communist economies faced the main trade-off between a policy of 
maintaining output and employment, on the one hand, and stabilisation policy, on the 
other hand (see, for example, de Melo et al. 1997, de Melo and Denizer 1997). The 
latter envisaged economic liberalisation (as discussed earlier) and promised output 
recovery, although a deeper recession entailing high social costs was inevitable to 
precede the growth trend. The choice of either policy was determined politically (to be 
discussed further).
Countries that were strongly committed to driving towards the free market -  
most of the CEE countries and the Baltic countries -  followed the conventional 
transition approach and introduced deflationary policies with high positive interest rates 
and a tightening of money emission as the major anchors of stabilisation policies. They 
were also faster in liberalising foreign trade and capital account.
and was views as ‘a kind of insurance against any temptation to look for a ‘third way’ (any version of 
‘market socialism’) ’ (Lavigne 1999, p.l 19). This pattern of transition was characterized by a sharp initial 
fall in output and living standards and thereafter recovery and growth followed. The gradualist line of 
thought mainly stressed that ST could not be applied to structural transformation, as the latter takes longer 
time. The second argument was that beneficial outcomes attributed to ST might have been obtained at a 
lesser social cost (ibid, p. 120).
16 See Calvo and Coricelli (1993).
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Other countries, notably the majority of states of the former Soviet Union 
(FSU), were slower in responding to the challenges of transition. Many of them, such as 
Belarus, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan were lagging behind, but performed better in 
terms of output decline at the very beginning of the 1990s. They chose a policy of 
maintaining output and employment through providing lax credits and subsidies to 
state-enterprises, a negative real interest rate policy and repressed inflation. The 
liberalisation of foreign trade and privatisation occurred at a slow pace. The viability of 
this policy-making was possible due to the excessive government intervention in the 
economy.
In their study of the impact of economic liberalisation on stabilisation and 
economic growth de Melo et al. (1997) distinguish four groups of countries by their 
response to market reforms. The degree of reforming is measured by a ‘Cumulative 
Liberalisation Index’ (CLI), composed of three weighted components: liberalisation of 
internal markets (liberalisation of domestic prices and abolition of state trading 
monopolies); liberalisation of external markets, including a free foreign trade regime, 
elimination of all trade controls but ‘low-to-moderate’ import duties and current account 
accountability; and liberalisation of private-sector entry, encompassing privatisation of 
small-scale and large-scale enterprises and banking reform. All transition economies 
were grouped as follows: Groupl - “advanced reformers” (CLI >3); Group 2 -  “high 
intermediate reformers” (2<CLI<3); Group 3 -  “low intermediate reformers” 
(1.3<CLI<2); and Group 4 -  “slow reformers” (CLI < 1.3) (ibid, pp. 23-24). De Melo et 
al. (1997) argue that there exist positive relationships between the degree of economic 
liberalisation, stabilisation and economic growth. Table 4.1 shows variations of 
liberalisation-growth-inflation patterns across the region in 1989-1994.
De Melo’s et al. (1997) findings suggest that liberalisation appears to be an 
essential engine of growth; it accelerates economy revival mainly through structural 
change of the economy, expanding formerly repressed activities such as domestic trade, 
financial services and exports to market economies, while entailing the contraction of 
‘overbuilt’ sectors, namely industry and agriculture. They estimate that ‘on 
average.. .the expansion of repressed sectors begins to offset the contraction of overbuilt 
sectors after about three years of reform’ (de Melo and Gelb 1997, p.76, quoted in 
Lavigne 1999, p. 159).
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Slovenia 4.16 0.82 26 3.0 84
Poland 4.14 0.84 34 4.2 88
Hungary 4.11 0.84 21 0.0 81
Czech Republic 3.61 0.90 16 0.0 81
Slovak Republic 3.47 0.86 19 0.4 79




Estonia 2.93 0.85 69 0.9 69
Bulgaria 2.90 0.68 81 -1.4 73
Lithuania 2.72 0.79 231 -7.3 44
Latvia 2.45 0.71 73 -4.4 60
Albania 2.30 0.70 57 9.5 74
Romania 2.29 0.66 194 2.2 69
Average 2.55 0.72 124 .03 67
Low intermediate 
reformers
Russia 1.92 0.63 558 -13.5 57
Kyrgyz Republic 1.81 0.68 744 -13.2 61
Moldova 1.62 0.53 558 -17.0 53
Kazakstan 1.31 0.37 1,870 -18.5 57
Average 1.67 0.55 933 -15.6 57
Slow reformers
Uzbekistan 1.11 0.37 640 -2.5 89
Belarus 1.07 0.35 1,694 -16.6 73
Ukraine 0.80 0.20 2,789 -18.6 56
Turkmenistan 0.63 0.19 2,751 -15.0 69
Average 0.90 0.27 1,968 -13.2 72
17Table 4.1: Liberalisation, growth, and inflation, 1989-94
Moreover, they identify quasifiscal deficits18 and monetary expansion as the main spurs 
to inflation. Thus, they conclude that despite initial sharp decline in output ‘advanced
17 De Melo et al. (1997, p. 28). Here it should be noted that the advanced reformers were the earliest 
starters in the process of liberalization. The first economic reforms in these countries began in the 1960s, 
while in the FSU countries they did not start until 1986.
18 De Melo et al. (1997, p.53) define quasifiscal expenditures as ‘implicit subsidies resulting from the 
provision of credit to banks and firms at highly negative real interest rates’, ‘implicit subsidies in 
connection with foreign exchange guarantee schemes’ and ‘extrabudgetary financing for debt writeoffs’.
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reformers’ managed either to stabilize their economies or even accelerate economic 
growth in 1993-94, while ‘slow reformers’ continued experiencing transition recession 
in 1993-94, although Uzbekistan appeared to diverge from the main pattern19.
According to de Melo and Denizer (1997) the countries, classified earlier as 
‘slow reformers’, were also more reluctant in switching to the use of market-oriented 
instruments in their monetary policy. Unlike the previous study here de Melo and 
Denizer use broader classification, distinguishing only two groups of transition 
countries depending on their general response to market reforms. The first group, called 
a ‘fast response’ group, includes most of the CEE countries, the Baltics, the Kyrgyz 
Republic and Moldova. These countries introduced relatively tight monetary policy to 
accompany stabilisation. Their patterns of transition experience vary across the group 
mostly in terms of the choice of nominal anchors of stabilisation20. The second group is 
termed as ‘slow response’ group and it includes most of the non-Baltic FSU countries, 
FYR Macedonia and Romania. De Melo and Denizer (1997, p.6) attribute the slow 
response of these countries partly to the institutional arrangements preserved in these 
countries at the beginning of transition.
Thus, after the dissolution of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991 nine CIS 
countries including Belarus stayed in the rouble zone aiming at benefiting as free-riders 
from credit expansion within the rouble zone and getting cheap energy resources. 
However, the split of money circuits, and the inability of the national governments to 
print money21, that was the privilege of the central bank of Russia, restrained their credit 
expansion to some extent. The consequences of that were the introduction of coupons in 
some of these countries printing of which could partially supplement the ‘missing’ cash 
in roubles, and the appearance of the premium between cash traded over non-cash. The 
latter according to the findings of Gros and Steinherr (1995) could exceed 30-50 per 
cent and serve as an indicator of the degree to which credit expansion outside Russia 
has been larger than in Russia. Later on, the restrictions on credit expansion led to the 
collapse of the rouble zone and the introduction of the national currencies in its former 
country-members.
19 See Zettelmeyer’s (1998) study on the Uzbek growth puzzle.
20 Thus, for example, while Poland, Czechoslovakia and Estonia adopted stabilization programmes based 
on fixed exchange rate regimes after relatively devaluating their currencies, other CEEs, Moldova and 
Kyrgyz Republic relied on money supply as the main nominal anchor (de Melo and Denizer 1997, p. 5). 
See also Lavigne (1999, p. 130-31).
21 The banking system requires the central bank to increase the monetary base for credit expansion by the 
former.
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Following de Melo and Denizer (1997) there can be distinguished six 
instruments that can affect monetary developments. They are grouped as direct (set in a 
form of regulation) and indirect (market-based) instruments. Directed credit, credit 
ceilings and interest rate controls are related to the first group of instruments; reserve 
requirements, refinance/discount facilities, government and central bank bills and bonds 
are regarded as indirect instruments. Financial depth is associated with abolition of 
credit ceilings, the developments of markets for government papers and the use of 
market-oriented refinancing window, while directed credit is defined as a spur to 
inflation in transition economies.
De Melo and Denizer (1997) use the following criteria to classify each 
instrument as market-oriented or not.
For direct instruments: Market-orientation is defined by low reliance on the 
three direct instruments: (a) central bank directed credit less than 25 per cent of total 
credit; (b) an absence of bank-by-bank credit ceilings (some of which may have been 
replaced by an overall ceiling on central bank net domestic assets); and (c) an absence 
of restrictions on deposit and loan rates (de Melo and Denizer 1997, p. 10).
For indirect instruments: Market-orientation is defined by the introduction and 
use of market-oriented forms of indirect instruments, namely: (a) maximum reserve 
requirements equal to 12 per cent or less; (b) a refinance window with auction or non- 
preferential rates and/or rediscount/Lombard facilities; and (c) government or central 
bank securities used for monetary operations or actively traded in a secondary market 
(ibid, p. 10).
Table 4.2 groups transition economies into four groups depending on their 
degree of market orientation in the context of monetary instruments use. ‘High’ market 
orientation means that these countries use 5 or 6 instruments classified as market- 
oriented; ‘substantial’, ‘moderate’ and ‘low’ respectively show the use of 4, 3 and 1-2 
instruments regarded as market-oriented.
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High Substantial Moderate Low
Bulgaria Croatia Albania Armenia*









Table 4.2: Market orientation o f monetary instruments at end-199422
Following their findings 1) during the early phase of transition, all CEE and FSU 
countries seem to have relied on at least one and often all three direct instruments in the 
implementation of monetary policy. Thus, nearly all ‘fast response* countries except 
from Hungary and Poland exercised a policy of directed credits as late as 1990 and, 
particularly, Czech Republic and Bulgaria had ceilings officially enforced by authorities 
on commercial bank credits. 2) By the late 1994 some countries (mostly FSU) had 
retained interest rate controls and had reserve ratios set in excess of 12 per cent. 3)‘Fast 
response’ countries seem to have switched more quickly from direct to indirect 
instruments. By 1995 refinancing of commercial banks in these countries was mainly 
carried through the rediscount or Lombard mechanisms. However, in many FSU 
countries loans were still granted at preferential rates to direct them to priority sectors of 
the economy (ibid, p. 12). As late as 1994 the Belarusian National Bank continued the 
supply of directed credits at subsidised rates, although a positive shift in government 
policy was an introduction of credit auctions in April 1994 as a way of refinancing 
commercial banks. Moreover, interest rate controls were reintroduced (after being 
cancelled in 1991) in the form of time deposit floors and margin controls that, in fact, 
had a positive impact on economic development, as it addressed market failures (to be 
discussed further). Turkmenistan seems to have had a greater progress by 1994-96 in 
relying on market-oriented monetary instruments than Belarus and Uzbekistan. Reserve
22 The table is adapted from de Melo and Denizer (1997). An asterisk denotes countries stabilizing 
relatively slowly.
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requirements were unified for all types of deposits at 11 per cent, as well as market 
allocation of credit resources (through auctions) was declared in January 1996. 
However, directed credit schemes and caps on deposit and lending interest rates were 
kept. Moreover, Turkmenistan did not advance much in developing a market of 
government securities, when in Belarus both government bonds and commercial banks’ 
bills were introduced into circulation, although on a primary market only. Finally, in 
terms of the use of monetary instruments Uzbekistan was the least market-oriented out 
of the three countries. Refinancing auctions were introduced in August 1993, but they 
were used on a limited scale. In May 1994 reserve requirements were increased up to 30 
per cent on deposits less than three years; loans to banks continued to be subsidized by 
the Ministry of Finance, while subsidized Central Bank loans discontinued.
Finally, it will be interesting to turn to some studies attempting to provide an 
explanation of what determined countries’ choice of either transition patterns.
As mentioned in chapters 2 and 3, a public finance motive was named as one of 
the typical reasons lying behind the introduction of financial repression in developing 
countries. That can also be regarded as a reason why governments resort to inflationary 
financing, namely inflation tax (chapter 7). The idea is that revenue losses from direct 
taxes can be offset by introducing implicit forms of taxation through FR or inflation tax. 
However, relatively low figures of budget deficit varying between 0.2 per cent and 3 per 
cent of GDP in some transition economies that experienced financial repression at some 
time (for example, Belarus and Turkmenistan) question the applicability of this theory 
to explaining rationale for introducing FR in these countries. In fact, in transition 
economies, at least at the early stages of transformation or in some countries even at 
present, the distinction between public and private is blurred23, which implies that along 
with a budget deficit it is common to have a quasi-budget deficit. This, for example, 
explains the phenomenon of low budget deficit in some transition economies when one 
would assume it to be much higher. In the countries with a high share of state- 
ownership, with slow pace of reforms and a high degree of state interference into 
economic activity the quasi-budget activities in the form of supplying ‘planned funds’, 
or directed credits and preferential loans to state-owned enterprises (SOE), have become 
very common practice.
23 Thus, for example, the private sector in Belarus includes mixed ownership with the state share often in 
excess of 50 per cent (for more details of the peculiarities of privatisation in Belarus see chapter 5).
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However, Denizer et al. (1998, p.5) question the applicability of the public- 
finance approach to post-Communist transition economies, arguing that this approach 
fails to explain ‘why different governments facing similar budgetary constraints might 
choose to regulate their financial systems differently’. In turn, they contend that 
institutional differences among political systems are what provide an insight to 
understanding the variations in financial policy-making across different countries. By 
examining the dispersion and concentration of political power in governments on 
financial policy, they find that legislatures with greater proportional representation of 
Communists, with less party competition and government opposition are more likely to 
resort to repressive controls in financial sectors. However, the greater parliamentary 
polarization and fragmentation, the higher support for financial liberalisation. In their 
work, de Melo et al. (1997) find that index of political freedom is positively and highly 
correlated with a degree of liberalisation24. In studying the financial market reform in 
the Czech Republic in 1991-1994 Desai (1995) comes to the conclusion that financial 
repression has political sources. He argues (1995, p. 1),
‘It is in the Czech Republic that reformers, fearing that bankruptcies of the largest 
firms will send unemployment figures soaring and strengthen the hand of the 
opposition, are led to design institutional structures which allocate credit to vital 
industries, which swap bank debt for equity in these firms, and which generally 
enable some government discretion in corporate finance.’
Thus, both financial repression and financial liberalisation represent a certain policy 
choice, which is ‘governed by constraints and incentives facing policy makers’ (Denizer 
et al. 1998, p.5).
4.3 Banking and Financial Markets Reform in Transition Economies
The development of the financial sector was marked by the dismantling of the 
monobank structure, so putting an end to central bank monopoly of credit allocation. By 
splitting the monobank into state-owned commercial banks, a two-tier banking system
24 According to their estimates the Spearman and Pearson correlation coefficients for all 26 CEE and FSU 
countries were equal to .8 and .75 respectively (de Melo et al. 1997, p.59).
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has emerged across the post-socialist region. What was specific to the new financial 
institutions’ establishment in transition economies?
The commonality in developments in financial sectors across countries lies in 
emerging primarily bank-based financial systems. The patterns of financial 
transformation vary depending on the adopted strategies of restructuring bad debts, 
privatisation methods of banks and enterprises, policies toward foreign entry and entry 
of new banks in the banking sector and stock market development.
The following patterns can be traced of newly established banks and their 
distinctive features of operation in the early transition.
1. Sectoral segmentation of banks. Banks, which were created from the 
commercial banking departments of the Monobank, were segmented by industrial sector 
or by geographic region. In the case of the FSU in the same way there emerged 
specialised banks, Promstroibank for financing industry, Agroprombank for financing 
agriculture and Zhilsotsbank for housing construction purposes. Along with them two 
specialised banks that existed in the Soviet Union, the savings bank, servicing 
households, and the foreign trade bank, financing export-import transactions, continued 
their activity.
Sectoral segmentation of banks immediately brought to the surface the problem 
of creditor dependence and limited portfolio diversification, which exposed these banks 
to the failure of their clients, which in their majority were the largest state-owned 
enterprises. The productive sector in a central planning economy was characterised by a 
high degree of vertical integration and reliance on very large plants. Together with the 
problem of mass indebtedness of enterprises, emerging at the eve of transformation and 
jeopardised during its early stage, the segmentation of banks by clients and sectors 
could have triggered a chain of bankruptcies to follow in a domino effect.
Along with sectoral or specialised banks, new banks were also established and 
have mushroomed over time. The majority were established by state-owned enterprises 
that turned direct state ownership into indirect ownership and brought to the surface the 
problem of connected lending. Despite the amount of emergent banks the competition in 
the banking sector across the region remained very low in the early -medium stage of 
transition, which can partly be explained by the patterns of banks’ establishing, making 
the market very segmented. The presence of sectoral and specialised state-owned 
commercial banks (SOCBs) made the banking environment very concentrated with 
around 60-70 per cent of the total banking assets controlled by 5-6 SOCBs. On the other
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hand, other new banks, so-called ‘pocket banks’, were mainly established by enterprises 
to serve the purpose of financing their own activities. Most of them quickly became 
insolvent (see, for example, Rostowski 1995, Berglof and Bolton 2002).
2. At the early stage of banking operation the separation between retail and 
enterprise banking was preserved and this could also be regarded as a Soviet legacy, 
where the process of the collection of savings was distinct from its allocation to 
enterprises. The Savings bank traditionally continued to hold all household deposits, 
and enterprise accounts were divided between these newly-established banks. A 
separation of activities, a huge portfolio of bad debts together with macroeconomic 
instability aggravated the problem of undercapitalisation of the banking system.
Bad debts appeared as one of the issues in continuing debates. Resolving it was 
of particular importance as it potentially could trigger a problem of adverse selection 
and moral hazard. High reserve requirements imposed on banks because of bad loans 
often led them to seek higher profits through increasing spreads between deposit and 
lending rates (Lavigne 1999, p. 187). Due to an adverse selection effect, ‘good 
borrowers’, who deserved to get credit by all means, had to pay higher rates of interest 
on credit. Moreover, in the situation of the absence of an adequate prudent regulatory 
framework, which was the case for most transition economies, the problem of bad debts 
triggered a problem of moral hazard when already insolvent banks continued persuading 
the central banks to obtain credit resources, and raised interest rates to attract 
households’ investment. In these circumstances abolishing interest rates ceilings and 
deposit floors quickly could be regarded as premature (de Melo and Denizer 1997, p.9). 
For example, liberalisation of interest rates (removal of margin controls between 1991 
and 1994) in Belarus triggered some banks, particularly in regional centres, to behave as 
monopolists. The evidence reported by the National Bank of Belarus (NBB)25 suggested 
that banks in pursuit of high profits had tended to decrease as much as possible the 
deposit rate and in turn increase the lending rate. Thus, by setting deposit floors and 
margin controls in 1994 the authorities made an attempt to end this practice. Therefore, 
in the present case deposit floors introduced by the NBB from 1995 played rather a 
positive role in alleviating banks’ attempts to exploit market power.
Commercial banks, particularly in FSU, being tempted by high returns, also 
tended to get involved in speculative operations with selling credit resources in
25 See, for example, NBB telegram ‘On bank interest payments for using clients’ money’, No 20-95 (14 
April 1995).
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interbank markets26 or with government securities than lending to enterprises. The 
Russian case around the dates of the 1998 financial crisis was, perhaps, the worst 
example of manifestation of problems of adverse selection and moral hazard. Under the 
pressure of structural adjustment programmes, the Russian government became 
convinced that bond financing was the only alternative to monetary emission in 
financing the budget deficit. The Ministry of Finance, together with the Russian Central 
bank, were thoroughly issuing and servicing a series of government bonds, attracting 
short-term investors with extraordinarily high yields; the latter - up to 100-200 per cent 
- initially set up many times above the profitability of the real sector. Being tempted by 
high interest rates promising large profits and quick returns, Russian banks get involved 
in operations with securities, by that diverting funds from real sector. Moreover, 
Russian banks were riddled with ‘domestic’ conflicts of interest. Their directors lent 
freely to their friends, to themselves, and to powerful politicians. They misspent their 
depositors’ funds, including those of state agencies. They built up vast structures of bad 
loans, which they carried from year to year, and became increasingly vulnerable27.
There were proposed two possible solutions for wiping out bad debts, either a 
complete write-off of debt or inflation. Thus, Begg and Portes (1991) and Schmieding 
(1991) argued in favour of the first way of solving the problem of bad debts because the 
economic irrationality of the initial allocation of credit under central planning, points to 
the risk of liquidation of economically viable enterprises and of the risk of the 
bankruptcy of a significant number of banks. But this solution potentially had two 
problems: credibility in the future and that the bad debt problem was not only a stock 
problem but a flow problem as well. To a great extent, inflation helped to solve a 
problem of non-performing loans, although it did not solve the flow problem 
(Rostowski 1995, p. 20).
There also existed two more common approaches to resolving a problem of bad 
debts. The first one was the ‘decentralization approach’ when banks themselves dealt 
with enterprise borrowing and lending decisions through internal workout departments. 
This approach was undertaken in Poland. The enacted Law on Financial Restructuring 
of Enterprises and Banks in 1993 authorized banks to conduct financial restructuring of 
indebted enterprises while setting the deadline by which all bad loans had to be
26 See, for example, NBB telegram No 2-96 (26 January 1996) and No 5-96 (14 May 1996).
27 See Gustafson 1999, p. 79, and Komulainen and Korhonen 2000. For a discussion of the role of deposit 
insurance in manifestation of moral hazard problem in CEE and FSU countries see Boot and Wijnbergen 
(1995, pp. 42-57).
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restructured or sold off. Otherwise bankruptcy procedures had to be initiated. The 
restructuring programme was based on debt-for-equity swap schemes which was argued 
as ‘leading to conflicts and concentration in power’ (Fries and Lane 1994, p. 131).
A ‘centralized approach’ meant that banks transferred or sold bad debts to a 
government itself or a government - affiliated institution. As put by Murinde and 
Mullineux (1999, p. 6) this allowed the banks to be free of their inherited debt and 
increased the speed and likelihood of privatisation. On the other hand, critics argued the 
reverse, namely that it created a moral hazard problem in the sense that banks would 
expect to be bailed out again if they made further bad loans -  which they were likely to, 
given their inexperience and the fact that they are operating in the highly uncertain 
environment.
The centralised approach took many forms, leading to a variety of financial 
structures with the development of different instruments. Among them can be listed the 
following: recapitalisation of banks with a further privatisation where financing is likely 
to come from the government/state treasury department and international financial 
institutions, such as the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD); 
through involving bankruptcy procedures and enterprise restructuring, where the latter 
can also be based on equity-for-debt swaps; through selling bad debts at a discount; and 
finally, through swapping bad debts for government bonds. By offering government 
bonds, non-performing assets are replaced with earning assets. However, unless there is 
a functioning secondary market for government bonds, banks would have to hold on to 
the bonds until maturity, which could effectively reduce liquidity in the banking 
sector28.
The problem of bad debts was closely related to the issue of privatisation of 
banks in transition economies. A reasonable question emerged: what should have taken 
priority: resolving of problem of bad debts, that could make banks more attractive for 
potential investors, or the other way round that could protect banks from a new flow of 
bad debts. The patterns of privatisation of the banking sector vary across the region, 
commencing from public offerings through the mass privatisation process as in Czech 
Republic and Russia, and finishing with selling banks to foreign investors ‘case-by- 
case’, as occurred in Hungary. Poland sold its three healthy banks first, and then 
undertook the so-called ‘Enterprise and Bank Financial Restructuring Programme’
28 For more details on this issue see Murinde and Mullineux 1999, p. 8.
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(EBFRP) so as to be able to privatise the next tranche. The Czech Republic seems to 
have privatised its banks before the magnitude of its bad loans problem had manifested.
Lavigne (1999, p. 191) recognises the need for capital markets as a precondition 
for privatisation. The lack of capital markets, even in the countries, which have 
introduced a stock exchange, was indeed obvious, and prevented large-scale 
privatisation through public offerings. On the other hand, it would be reasonable to 
expect the development of stock markets to be driven by the extent and the method of 
privatisation. Between 1992 and 1995, the period of most intense privatisation, turnover 
typically overshot the levels characteristic of other emerging markets. The explanation 
for this unsustainable surge of stock-market activity lay in the structure of privatisation 
in many transition economies. However, as it was noted earlier most mass privatisation 
programmes were not carried out through initial public offerings on the stock market. 
Rather, they were accomplished by voucher privatisations (the former Czechoslovakia 
and in Russia). This method of privatisation implied low initial asset valuations, which 
translated into low market capitalisation. Shares were given to households at a fraction 
of their true costs. The strong link between privatisation and stock market development, 
when market capitalisation tends to increase with the extent of privatisation, was 
confirmed by the EBRD experts on analysing the relationship between stock-market 
capitalisation and the EBRD transition indicator for large-scale privatisation (EBRD 
1998, p. 97). Equity markets in transition economies have been regarded, as shallow by 
international standards with almost no corporate bond market. The bond market has 
been mostly represented by government securities, regarded as a non-monetary source 
of financing budget deficit, and thus highly recommended by the Western experts to use 
as alterative to monetary emission in financing budget deficits. To make this instrument 
attractive government bonds were supported by high interest rates across the region, and 
that in turn increased the domestic debt burden. This financial instrument was also 
attractive for banks from the point of view that government securities did not count 
towards obligatory reserves, they were tax-exempted and at the same time they brought 
high yields. All together this tempted both governments and banks in some countries to 
use it excessively and finally led to this market’s collapse when governments were 
unable to service their debt any more, as it was shown in the case of Russia.
In summary, transition economies appeared to be different from each other in 
their experience of restructuring financial sector, beginning from the adopted strategies
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and finishing with their progress resulting in different economic outcomes29. ‘Fast 
reformers’, demonstrating higher progress and strong commitment towards market 
reforms managed to boast an economic recovery after the initial drastic fall in output. 
However, ‘slow reformers’, in particular those who attempted to maintain output and 
employment rates at the expense of a repressed economy, on average performed well at 
the early stage of transition30, but nevertheless went into transition recession after that. 
However, they managed to avoid any major bank failures. Most of the FSU, and some 
CEE, which embarked on liberalizing their economies, faced with problems of adverse 
selection and moral hazard (in particular, when interest rates liberalization proceeded) 
and underwent banking and currency crises31. A legacy of non-performing loans, 
premature financial liberalization, an early pattern of financial institutes establishment 
based on cross-ownership, insufficient prudential regulation, and ‘large opportunities 
and incentives for fraud’ all seem to have contributed to dramatic bank failures 
(Lavigne 1999, p. 189). So, the question is whether financial repression can mitigate 
economic transformation in post-socialist countries and, therefore, can be regarded as an 
alternative policy accelerating economic growth?
The main purpose of this chapter has been to examine more fully the financial sector 
restructuring in transition economies to establish to what extent they appear to replicate 
policies associated with financial repression. The analysis revealed the following.
Most of the empirical studies on the phenomenon of financial repression 
reviewed so far in chapters 3 and 4 focus on developing countries and only a few are 
available with a reference to transition economies (see section 4.2). Moreover, in the 
conventional literature the term ‘financial repression’ is not generally directly applied to 
transition economies, although, as we have seen in the earlier sections of chapter 4, 
there is no doubt that most of the studies of financial systems in transition proceed along 
‘financial repression’ framework.
29 Appendix A shows the progress of reforming the financial system, both in banking reform and in non­
bank financial institutions and securities markets, in some selected transition economies in 1991-2001. As 
can be seen from tables A. 1 and A.2, Belarus, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan appear to be laggards in the 
financial sector reforms.
30 Thus, real growth (measured as a percentage change) in Belarus was estimated at -9.6% in 1992 
compared to -14.2%, -34.9 and -21.3 % in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania respectively (EBRD 1998, 
p.50).
1 For example, banking crises in Latvia and Lithuania occurred in 1995, Bulgaria, Romania and Czech 
Republic -  1996-97, Russia - 1998. For a discussion of this issue see Keuschnigg 1997, Steinherr 1997 
and EBRD 1998.
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interbank markets26 or with government securities than lending to enterprises. The 
Russian case around the dates of the 1998 financial crisis was, perhaps, the worst 
example of manifestation of problems of adverse selection and moral hazard. Under the 
pressure of structural adjustment programmes, the Russian government became 
convinced that bond financing was the only alternative to monetary emission in 
financing the budget deficit. The Ministry of Finance, together with the Russian Central 
bank, were thoroughly issuing and servicing a series of government bonds, attracting 
short-term investors with extraordinarily high yields; the latter - up to 100-200 per cent 
- initially set up many times above the profitability of the real sector. Being tempted by 
high interest rates promising large profits and quick returns, Russian banks get involved 
in operations with securities, by that diverting funds from real sector. Moreover, 
Russian banks were riddled with ‘domestic’ conflicts of interest. Their directors lent 
freely to their friends, to themselves, and to powerful politicians. They misspent their 
depositors’ funds, including those of state agencies. They built up vast structures of bad 
loans, which they carried from year to year, and became increasingly vulnerable27.
There were proposed two possible solutions for wiping out bad debts, either a 
complete write-off of debt or inflation. Thus, Begg and Portes (1991) and Schmieding 
(1991) argued in favour of the first way of solving the problem of bad debts because the 
economic irrationality of the initial allocation of credit under central planning, points to 
the risk of liquidation of economically viable enterprises and of the risk of the 
bankruptcy of a significant number of banks. But this solution potentially had two 
problems: credibility in the future and that the bad debt problem was not only a stock 
problem but a flow problem as well. To a great extent, inflation helped to solve a 
problem of non-performing loans, although it did not solve the flow problem 
(Rostowski 1995, p. 20).
There also existed two more common approaches to resolving a problem of bad 
debts. The first one was the ‘decentralization approach’ when banks themselves dealt 
with enterprise borrowing and lending decisions through internal workout departments. 
This approach was undertaken in Poland. The enacted Law on Financial Restructuring 
of Enterprises and Banks in 1993 authorized banks to conduct financial restructuring of 
indebted enterprises while setting the deadline by which all bad loans had to be
26 See, for example, NBB telegram No 2-96 (26 January 1996) and No 5-96 (14 May 1996).
27 See Gustafson 1999, p. 79, and Komulainen and Korhonen 2000. For a discussion of the role of deposit 
insurance in manifestation of moral hazard problem in CEE and FSU countries see Boot and Wijnbergen 
(1995, pp. 42-57).
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The policies advocated for transition economies by the IMF and the World Bank 
and together termed as ‘Financial Liberalisation’, stem from the conventional view 
regarding the financial system inherited from a planned economy as inefficient and 
restrained. The majority of transition economies of CEE and the Baltics, and some of 
the FSU, introduced some measures of Financial Liberalisation at a relatively early 
stage of the transformation process. In this regard, despite the fact that some elements 
attributed to financial repression (interest rate ceilings, directed credits, high reserve 
requirements) were present in all transition economies at the beginning of 
transformation and in the pre-transition period, the short length of the dataset and its 
dubious quality limit the empirical analysis of the impact of the existed restraints on 
financial sector’s performance across the region.
However, the McKinnon-Shaw framework can still be applied in studying 
individual cases of transition economies, experienced financial repression, such as, for 
example, Belarus. In fact, on the basis of chapters 3 and 4 some commonalities can be 
identified between developing countries and transition economies in their experience of 
financial development, particularly in the implications of some economic policies.
First of all, in both developing and pre-transition countries financial systems are 
labelled as underdeveloped and inefficient in the mainstream economics literature (see 
for example, McKinnon, 1993). It finds its confirmation in the set of policies prescribed 
to them in a form of financial liberalisation.
Second, financial systems in both groups of countries are dominated by 
commercial banks; capital markets are rather shallow and underdeveloped.
Third, a growing budget deficit was a typical problem in developing countries
• • • • 32(and it remains so in many developing countries), as well as in transition economies . 
Thus, it was common for governments of these countries to use implicit forms of 
taxation through introducing low interest rates, high reserve requirements, requirements 
obliging banks to hold government securities (all attributes of FR as defined in chapter 
2), or to resort to inflationary financing (the tax itself is termed inflation tax) to offset 
revenue losses from direct taxes (see chapter 7).
Fourth, the use of other financial restraints such as administratively fixed 
exchange rate, capital controls was also usually common for both groups of countries to 
complement the above mentioned policies to prevent inflows of foreign capital.
32 As evidence shows, the rates of budget deficit are not so high in transition economies as compared to 
developing countries, but it common for them to have quasi-budget deficit along with budget deficit.
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Fifth, as a rule these countries (mostly FSU countries excluding the Baltic 
countries) are characterised by pervasive government intervention in the economy, 
although it should be admitted that extent of intervention varies from country to 
country.
Sixth, although present in developed economies, information imperfections are 
more typical of developing economies and transition economies. With the presence of a 
great degree of uncertainty in situations of economic liberalisation (transformation) of 
their economies, they become prone to market failures and therefore implementation of 
some neo-liberal polices can lead to very controversial results, as it was seen in sections 
3.2 and in 4.3.
Seventh, some of these countries are lacking of democracy. They are keen on 
introducing financial repression to ensure the survival of dominant political elites. The 
opposite is also true. The political change towards democracy is more likely to trigger 
economic liberalisation33.
All this gives us an impetus to progress analysis of financial development in 
transition economies within FR framework and turn to examining the case study of 
Belarus.
33 For an excellent discussion of political economy of financial policy in developing countries, see 
Lukauskas (1994, pp.67-89), Haggard et al. (1993), Haggard and Webb (1993), Haggard and Kaufman 
(1995).
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Chapter 5 The Origins and Context of Financial Repression in 
Belarus
Chapter 4 reviewed the existence of significant correlation between financial repression 
and political developments in transition economies. The present chapter starts by 
unveiling the origins of financial repression in Belarus. It shows that the political 
institutional change in Belarus in 1996 has spread to the areas of economic activity 
through the complementarity effect. In other words, the authoritarian governance has 
inflicted extensive state intervention into the economy, accompanied by the introduction 
of economic repressionist policies. Thus the decision to introduce financial repression in 
Belarus in the first place was determined politically, to assure the political viability of 
those in power. Section 5.1 concludes by looking at the basis of the Belarusian 
economic model to unveil the main leverages sustaining it.
Acknowledging the positive relationship between financial deepening and 
growth, it urges us to place the analysis of the developments in the financial sector at 
the centre of the analysis of economic policy-making in Belarus. In section 5.2 I present 
the developments in the financial sector in Belarus during 1990s in order to distinguish 
the key features of its evolution over the years of transition and to establish in what way 
the introduction of financial repression may have contributed to the economic recovery 
in Belarus. Analysis of the developments in the financial sector helps us to create a 
comprehensive picture of the degree of FR in Belarus and to formulate some hypotheses 
about its impact on the economic development in Belarus that are further tested in 
chapters 6 and 7.
5.1 Economic Policy and Performance in Belarus: the Context for 
Financial Policy
5.1.1 Politicisation of Economic Policy-making in Belarus
Under the Soviet system Belarus was the ‘industrial assembly plant’ specialising mainly 
on the production of complete goods. The share of industry in GDP in 1990 accounted 
for 49 per cent versus 22 per cent for the share of agriculture and 29 per cent for the 
share of services (Bakanova et al. 2003, p.8). The military-industrial complex accounted 
for more than half of industrial production. The peculiarity of the price-setting
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mechanisms of the FSU resulted in price distortions, which favoured overpricing 
finished goods underpricing raw material and agricultural products, giving Belarus a 
positive trade balance within inter-republican trade. So, despite of the lack of natural 
resources Belarus’ economically favourable position within the Soviet Union allowed it 
to have standard of living well above almost all CIS countries (see, for example, World 
Bank 1997, 2002 and Silitski 2002b).
However, despite the favourable initial conditions, Belarus would nevertheless 
have faced a sharp trade contraction and output decline if it had embarked on radical 
transformation in 1991. Belarus was highly dependent on trade that was a consequence 
of its industrial development. Total and intra-republican trade accounted for 47.3 per 
cent and 41 per cent respectively of Belarus’ GNP. This was one of the highest figures 
across the whole region. Thus, the costs to Belarus of disruption of the trade links with 
other FSU republics due to their reduced demand after the collapse of the SU were 
estimated at 52.9 per cent of the Net Material Product, and this was also viewed as the 
highest amongst the Soviet republics (Bakanova et al 2003, p.9). Moreover, inevitable 
surge in prices of oil and gas after the collapse of the SU would have triggered a further 
output fall taking into account that Belarus was dependent on the FSU for 90 per cent of 
energy and 70 per cent of raw materials (World Bank 2002, p.l).
For further analysis it will be useful to distinguish the following periods of 
economic policy-making in Belarus.
> 1991-1993: ‘Preserving the Status Quo’ Policy
After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Belarusian authorities represented by the 
remnants of the Communist elite, so-called nomenklatura, were neither ready for a 
radical reformation of the country, nor expressed their willingness to do that. They were 
rather keen on preserving ‘the status quo as a substitute for reforming the national 
economy’ (Silitski 2002b, p.226). The strategy of the Belarusian authorities at that time 
was to preserve the arrangements within the single Rouble zone, trade links with Russia 
and also to assure the supply of Russian oil and gas at a price that existed on the 
Russian internal market. This helped Belarus avoid the early sharp transition decline in 
production1 that was typical of the region, and guaranteed a temporary political survival 
for the Belarusian leadership. The initiation of integration discussions with Russia by
1 The output decline in Belarus was recorded as the lowest one among the CIS countries, literally 
accounting for 3 per cent in 1990 and 1.2 per cent in 1991 (Bakanova et al. 2003, p. 15).
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a  >5
Kebich in 1993 was determined by the chosen ‘populist strategy’ (discussed below) 
aiming to win the favour of a population that felt nostalgia for the Soviet Union and 
represented the majority of the electorate in 1994. Moreover, lobbying for this issue 
together with the achieved trade-offs between Russia and Belarus in other areas of 
cooperation4, allowed the Belarusian nomenklatura to avoid reforming the economy due 
to the economic concessions gained from Russia (Korosteleva 2004).
Despite undertaking the measures described above to prevent a sharp decline in 
output, Belarus nonetheless went into a transition recession. Kebich’s government 
responded to it with the macroeconomic expansionary policies aiming to minimize the 
social cost, that is to prevent a decline in real wages and employment. Namely, directed 
credit programmes were to target the output decline; social guarantees and control of 
consumer prices acted as pillars to prevent the decline in income. However, the 
expansionary policies put pressure on inflation, which averaged 2,000 per cent per year 
in 1993-94, and damaged the situation in the real economy, with the output decline 
reaching about 40 per cent for the period 1990-1995. On the eve of the 1994 presidential 
elections Kebich’s government had lost its political standing due to the worsening of the 
macroeconomic situation and declining living standards.
> 1994-1995: Fragmentary Market Reforms
Immediately after Alexander Lukashenko’s accession to power in 1994, there can be 
observed some changes in the economic policy-making in Belarus. This period was 
characterised by the introduction of some steps towards market-oriented reforms. With 
Bogdankevich, a neo-liberal economist, as head of the National Bank of Belarus (NBB) 
1994-95 monetary policy was tightened and real interest rates made positive. However, 
all these observed positive changes in the economic policy-making in 1994-95 were not 
due to the adherence of Lukashenko’s government to market-oriented reforms, but 
rather were due to the inevitability of initiating them in view of the continued worsening 
of macroeconomic situation and the frozen relations between Belarus and Russia. 
Indeed, at the beginning of Lukashenko’s leadership a cooling in Moscow-Belarus 
relations could be observed. Lukashenko appeared on the political scene as an outsider,
2 Kebich was Prime Minister from 1990 to 1994 and a presidential candidate in 1994.
3 Silitski (2002a, p.35) defines the populist strategy as one in which the focus is placed on ‘income 
increases ignoring the risks of inflation and budget deficit, external factors and reaction of economic 
agents on an aggressive anti-market economic policy’.
4 For example, in September 1992 there was signed an agreement on military co-operation of Belarus with Russia, 
which extended the stay of Russian troops in Belarus until 2000.
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and that made Moscow suspicious of him. The prospects of monetary union and 
subsidized energy supplies became doubtful, as Russian officials openly declared that 
the promise of both were made in anticipation of the election of Kebich as President, 
and were conditional on the eventual political unification, which Lukashenko was not 
yet ready to pursue (Silitski 2002b, pp. 229-230). That is why during 1994-95, just after 
his election, Lukashenko seemed to have given up almost all his electoral promises of 
maintaining the price controls and reintegration with Russia, and switched to a more 
radical course of economic transformation through tightening credit-monetary policy, 
cutting subsidies to some state enterprises, and partly liberalising prices. However, a 
further deterioration in the economic situation in Belarus would have undermined his 
popularity and triggered Lukashenko’s turn towards Russia for a political and economic 
support. Although 1994-95 was a kind of watershed between an uneven and chaotic 
Kebich’s policy and, the more system-defined policy of Lukashenko, it can still be 
regarded as a poor attempt to stabilize the economy, because it did not involve any in- 
depth transformation as such. The progress in transition after 1995 became rather slow, 
and this found its reflection in the decline of the average EBRD transition indicators 
from 2.1 in mid-1995 to 1.5 in mid-2000 (Bakanova et al. 2003, p. 16).
> 1996-2000: Economic Repression
1996-2000 was marked by a reversal of the political-cum-economic course and the 
introduction of the elements of the repressed economy. Table 5.1 gives some indication 
of the change in the degree of economic freedom in Belarus since 1996, compared to 
other transition economies. Following the results presented in the table Belarus had the 
worst ranking (with the exception of Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) amongst transition 
economies in 1996-2002. It falls within the category ‘repressed’, whereas its neighbours 
Ukraine and Russia have made some progress in transformation, and, respectively, since 
1996 they have been categorised as ‘mostly unfree’ rather than ‘repressed’.
The strategy pursued by Lukashenko (discussed below) managed to produce 
economic growth from 1997, but its sustainability in the long run could be questioned.
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Hungary 2.2 24 2.4 36 2.4 31 2.9 55 2.9 56 3.1 69 3.0 58
Poland 2.7 44 2.7 50 2.8 52 2.8 50 2.9 54 3.1 71 3.3 75
Slovak Republic 2.8 54 2.9 58 3.2 80 3.4 96 3.3 89 3.2 72 3.1 64
Estonia 1.7 3 1.9 8 2.2 21 2.3 26 2.4 29 2.5 30 2.4 23
Latvia 2.5 36 2.4 38 2.7 44 2.7 47 2.8 49 2.9 53 3.2 69
Lithuania 2.4 30 2.5 39 2.8 52 2.9 56 3.0 63 3.1 70 3.5 84
Belarus 4.2 145 4.1 141 4.2 141 4.2 140 4.2 134 4.0 126 3.5 84
Moldova 3.3 88 3.7 118 3.3 92 3.4 100 3.4 96 3.6 103 3.5 84
Russia 3.7 125 3.8 127 3.8 121 3.6 114 3.5 103 3.8 119 3.7 104
Tajikistan 4.1 142 4.2 143 4.2 140 4.1 138 4.3 138 N/a N/a N/a N/a
Turkmenistan 4.4 149 4.4 147 4.4 148 4.4 147 4.5 145 N/a N/a N/a N/a
Ukraine 3.8 132 3.9 128 3.7 119 4 127 3.8 120 3.8 116 4 122
Uzbekistan 4.3 148 4.6 149 4.5 153 4.6 153 4.7 148 N/a N/a N/a N/a
Table 5.1. Economic Freedom in selected transition economies5
5 O ’Driscoll et al. 2002. Note: OS denotes overall score that is an average o f 10 factors measuring economic freedom. According to the Heritage foundation economic freedom is 
defined as ‘the absence o f  governm ent coercion or constraint on the production, distribution, or consumption o f  goods and services beyond the extent necessary for citizens to 
protect and maintain liberty itse lf  (ibid). The measure o f  economic freedom includes: trade policy, fiscal burden o f government, government intervention in the economy, 
monetary policy, capital flows and foreign investment, banking and finance, wages and prices, property rights, regulation, and informal market activity. Indictors range from 1 to 
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5.1.2 Whither the 'Belarusian miracief?
The case of Belarus is particularly intriguing because despite undertaking no 
transformation per se, and achieving no macroeconomic stability, Belarus has 
nevertheless demonstrated macroeconomic growth from 1997 onwards comparable to 
that in the Central European transition countries regarded as successful in transition. 
Inflationary creation and state stimulation of demand through policies of an 
unprecedented credit expansion, negative interest rates, and administrative price control 
seem to contribute to economic growth from 1997 onwards.
Admitting a decrease in aggregate demand as one of the factors of output 
decline, the government stressed the strategy of state stimulation of demand through 
policies of an unprecedented credit expansion and negative real interest rates as central 
ones in achieving the economic growth. However, it was difficult to implement them 
unless government had a high control over the economy. The state control could be 
easily established through preserving and increasing the state ownership. It became 
possible due to the reversal of privatisation programme6. In 1995 privatisation became 
rather artificial that presupposed turning the state enterprises into joint-stock companies 
with the state share prevailed or being more than 25 per cent that meant preserving the 
state control over the managerial decisions. That was strengthened by the ‘golden share’ 
right introduced by the government in 19977. This granted unlimited right to the state to 
revoke any managerial decisions of joint-stock enterprises with state-hold stakes. The 
slow progress in privatisation in the beginning and its reversal later on explains low 
private sector share of GDP in Belarus, accounting only for 20 per cent compared to 60 
per cent in Ukraine and 70 per cent in Russia (EBRD 2001)8. State control had also to 
be introduced in the financial system. It was literally done through the re-nationalisation 
of the banking system in 1995-1996. Moreover, it required the National bank to be 
subordinated to the government. All these issues will be considered in more details in 
the next section.
Declaring a socially-oriented market economy as a key direction of the 
economic development of Belarus, Lukashenko had all the instruments to manage his
6 Privatisation in Belarus was primarily in a form of management and employee buy-outs (MEBOs) and 
secondary - voucher based (EBRD 2001, p. 120).
7 Presidential Decree ‘On a special right ( ‘golden share’) of the state in share in management of joint- 
stock companies’, No.591 (14 November 1997) (Konsul’tant Plyus: Belarus [CD-Rom] 2002).
8 It should be noted that this figure is likely to be underestimated as it does not account for contribution of 
the shadow economy.
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policy. First of all, due to the set of policies described above the Belarusian economy 
achieved an astounding 11.4 per cent rate of economic growth and in general economic 
performance improved (see table 5.2).
Indicators 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
GDP -7.6 -13 -10.4 2.8 11.4 8.4 3.4 5.8 4.7 5
Industrial
production
-9.9 -19 -11.7 3.5 18.8 12.4 10.3 7.8 5.9 4.5
Agricultural
production
1.5 -14 -4.7 2.4 -5.4 -0.7 -9.3 9.3 1.8 .7
Construction -15 -11 -31 -5 20 25 -8 2 -3 6
Consumer
prices




16 -9 -34.9 13.5 17.5 27.5 -3 13.8 28.1 4
Real wages -6.5 -31 -5 5.1 14.3 18 7.3 12 29.6 7.9
Table 5.2: Selected economic indicators for Belarus, 1993-20029
The grounds for the economic growth were the reintroduction of the mechanism bearing 
a strong resemblance with a planned economy10. State ownership, lax credit, price 
controls and output targets -  they all recognised as the elements of administrative 
planning economy. While the mechanism of resource allocation based on channelling 
the funds from those having a surplus to those having a deficit was typical in the Soviet 
economy, in the Belarusian economy it was realised not only through the directed 
credits supplies to preferential sectors of the economy, but also through such indirect 
instruments as relief from paying some taxes and customs duties by the ‘strategic’ 
sectors of the economy at the expense of increasing tax burden on a private sector, 
licensing of certain economic activities that aimed to crowd out the potential 
competitors from the market, rationing access to cheap natural resources, multiple 
interest rates, multiple exchange rates, restrictions in foreign exchange markets and 
price distortions. It is fair to note that restrictions in foreign exchange markets and price 
distortions were also exercised in a planned economy to large extent. However, what is 
remarkable is that under the Soviet economy all the enterprises were relatively equal in 
terms of their eligibility to subsidies upon the condition of running deficit, while in the 
present system the preferences have been given to strategic state-owned enterprises that
9 Ministry of Statistics and Analysis 2002, 2003.
10 See for example Nuti 1999, Lawson 2002, Bakanova et al. 2003.
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in the end have been supported at the expense of the private sector, the households and 
the financial system.
Lukashenko’s strategy succeeded. The measures introduced facilitated an 
increase in short-term living standards that raised Lukashenko’s popularity among the 
Belarusian people. World Bank (2002, p.4) estimated that at the international yardstick 
of USD 4.3/day ‘only about 10 per cent of the Belarusian population was to be 
considered poor in 1999, compared to 50.3 per cent in Russia or 18.4 per cent in 
Poland’. TACIS 2000a reported that since 1995 the number of people below poverty 
line11 had been steadily declining until 1999 when it surged again in the aftermath of the 
Russian crisis, although still remained relatively low compared to Russia (see the WB 
estimates above). On pursuing the strategy of maintaining full employment, 
Lukashenko banned layoffs in the industrial sector (Silitski 2002a). The system of social 
support was largely based on price control for basic food, housing and communal 
services (all attributes of a planned economy). Moreover the state directed banks to 
provide wage credits to enterprises to assure timely wage payments to employees. 
Periodic increases in nominal wages and subsidies to poor people were also used to 
target the social sector.
The policy of money-led stimulation of the aggregate demand triggered the 













Percentage change over the previous year
1996 2.8 5.7 -1.3 -3.1 -4.1
1997 11.4 11.4 7.1 20 -5.9
1998 8.4 14.1 6 24.5 -4.9
1999 3.4 9.5 5.6 -11.1 -2.4
2000 5.8 8 6.6 -0.9 -3.2
2001 4.7 17.9 1.8 -6.5 -3.6
2002 5 9.3 1.8 3.2 N/A
Table 5.3: GDP by final sales, 1996-200212
11 The Minimum Subsistence Level (MSL) that was used as a proxy for ‘poverty line’ indicator, was set 
at the level of 60 per cent of Minimum Consumer Budget (MCB). As at 2002 30.5 per cent (versus 38.4 
per cent in 1995) of the population was registered with income below the subsistence level (Haiduk et al. 
2004, p. 130).
12 Haiduk et al. 2004, p. 37.
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rescheduling debts and extending the term the real amount of bad debts this is even 
higher than reported.
Years Outstanding credits (end of period) 







Table 5.5: Bad loans as a percent o f total loans30
In summary, assigning the central role in maintaining the Belarusian economic model to 
the banking system, the government halted the reforms in the banking sector and 
declared its intention to reinforce state control over banks. Re-nationalisation of 
specialised banks, subordination of the National Bank to the government, centralisation 
and state monopolisation of the banking system made the latter impotent and turned it 
into a tool of serving the government needs.
5.2.1.2 Capital Markets
Between 1992-94 a base was created to build up the system of capital circulation in 
Belarus, involving both domestic and foreign investors. Thus, the Belarusian Stock 
Exchange was founded in November 1991 and later on, in March 1993, the Minsk 
Interbank Currency Exchange was established. Straight after that the authorities created 
State Securities Inspectorate, which was in charge of setting up the rules in securities 
market, developing legislative base and protecting investors from fraud. However, after 
1995 further development of the capital market slowed, due to the sluggish restructuring 
of the national economy, and the re-introduced pervasive state control over all economic 
activities. The latter resulted in the nationalisation of the Minsk Interbank Currency 
Exchange in April 1996 and the followed unification of currency and stock exchanges 
with the consequent nationalisation of the Belarusian Stock Exchange31 in July 1998.
30 Authors’ calculations on the data provided by the National Bank of the Republic of Belarus (National 
Bank of Belarus 2000a (January), 2000b (January)).
31 As a matter of fact, before 1998 60 per cent of the Belarusian Stock Exchange was in private hands 
(EBRD 1998).
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The latter became subordinated to the State Securities Committee. Moreover, the 
number of official controlling bodies has increased twice since 1995, and that has often 
led to contradictions in the legislative basis for regulating the securities market.
Furthermore, development of the domestic capital market was inhibited by slow 
progress (often even by its reversal) in removing different types of capital and exchange 
rate controls. The latter were imposed on commercial bank borrowing (lending) at 
foreign capital markets, portfolio flows into equity, domestic money and government 
securities markets. Thus, restrictions on commercial bank borrowing were in place from 
December 199232. Restrictions on portfolio inflows/outflows were in place throughout 
the whole period (for chronology see appendix B). Inflow of FDI became very limited 
after the reversal of privatisation programme in 1996-97. In aftermath of the Belarusian 
currency crisis in early 1998, and later in August 1998 financial crisis in Russia, wide- 
ranging controls, including on exchange rates and cross-border payments were re­
introduced in Belarus. It should be noted that even with some fragmentary attempts to 
ease certain restrictions over the period of transition, general macroeconomic instability 
and an unfavourable business climate appeared as de-facto impediments for attracting 
private capital. FDI figures can be used here as an ad-hoc indicator of foreign investors’ 
perception of political-cum-economic climate in Belarus. According to EBRD (2002) 
estimates, the cumulative FDI inflows per capita for the period of 1994-2002 amounted 
only to USD 145. Moreover, contradictory legislation has further aggravated 
functioning of domestic economic agents and has frightened off foreign companies 
expressing any initial interest in dealing with their Belarusian counterparts. From the 
beginning of transition the paradox of the Belarusian economic development lay in the 
authorities’ anticipation of transition process in theory, but not in practice. Thus, for 
example, the early act33 regulating investment activity of the Belarusian economic 
agents abroad seemed to be too radical, untimely and simply bizarre. Allowing 
Belarusian firms to invest in the equity market, trade in securities markets and buy land 
abroad was not an evidence of the authorities’ commitment to market reforms. It was 
rather evidence of their incompetence and limited understanding of the transition 
process.
32 In fact, Resolution of the Council of Ministers of the Republic Belarus No.518 (24 August 1992) 
(Konsul’tant Plyus: Belarus [CD-Rom] 2002) allowed both attracting loans from abroad at the level o f the 
government and guaranteed by the government and at the level of commercial banks on behalf of their 
clients. The latter was excluded from the resolution when it was amended on 31 December 1992.
33 See Resolution of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Belarus ‘On investment activity of the 
Belarusian agents abroad’, No.324 (29 May 1992) (Konsul’tant Plyus: Belams [CD-Rom] 2002).
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The Belarusian financial instruments (see below) appeared to be unable to 
provide investors with adequate return for the high risks borne by them in terms of 
contradictory legislation, low transparency of operations, high uncertainty, and 
inefficient control. The situation was also aggravated by a high level of inflation, 
continued devaluation of national currency, negative (loss-making) or low interest rates, 
and generally by high country and liquidity risks. Therefore the Belarusian capital 
market appeared to be unattractive to both internal and external investors due to a low 
risk-adjusted rate of return. Tables 5.6-5.7 present the structure and the turnout of the 
primary and secondary securities markets in Belarus.
Indicators 1997 1998 1999 2000*
Total face value, bln. BRB 64852 101721 410464 N/a
Vouchers, % 50.21 46.60 11 -
Government Securities (GKO&GDO), % 16.75 23.03 22 22.40
Municipal Bonds, % 0.16 0.34 1 0.34
Corporate Securities, % 26.53 24.4 25 37
Promissory notes, certificates 6.35 5.63 41 40.26
Table 5.6: Structure o f the primary government securities market34
Indicators 1997 1998 1999 2000*
Turnout, trln. BRB 155.54 225.88 1175.32 3820
Vouchers, % 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2
Government Securities (GKO & GDO), % 96.1 93 77 76.34
Municipal Bonds, % 1 1.4 N/a N/a
Corporate Securities, % 0.7 2.9 0.7 0.46
Promissory notes, certificates 2.2 2.7 21.4 23.15
Others - - 0.2 0.03
Table 5.7: Secondary market: turnout35
The securities market was mostly represented by the government securities such as 
treasury bills (GKO’s), which along with credit emission were one of main methods of 
financing the government deficit and were the most liquid financial instrument, and 
long-term liabilities (DGO’s) for up to 3 years. Belarusian banks were highly exposed 
to GKOs because the choice of other financial instruments36, when banks had excess 
liquidity, was limited. GKOs had relatively high nominal yield and they were tax- 
exempted. According to the Belarusian regulations, the yield on GKOs on the primary
34 Novik (2001, p. 26). An asterisk denotes ‘excluding vouchers’.
35 ibid, p. 27. An asterisk denotes ‘includes data for 9 months of 2000’.
36 For example, NBB securities and deposits with NBB
92
Julia A. Korosteleva (2006) Chapter 5
market was strictly pegged to the refinance rate, which in most of the late 1990s was 
negative (see figure 5.5). At the same time they bear less risk than when lending to 
enterprises that often occurred at ‘favourable rates’, which as a rule were half of 
refinancing rate. That is why GKOs were more attractive for banks. Moreover, to some 
extent banks’ exposure to GKOs was attributed to the existing practice of imposed 
mandatory acquisition of GKOs by banks. Thus, ‘commercial banks’ licensed to operate 
in the primary GKOs were each obliged to buy 1 per cent of each GKOs issue (TACIS
' i n
2000a). Finally, since 1997 the allocation of loans amongst banks at auctions has de- 
facto been replaced with new instruments of banks’ refinancing, one of each was the use
TO
of ‘repo’ operations . That has triggered some revitalisation of GKOs since 1997. 
However, it should be noted that in comparison to its neighbours, Ukraine and Russia, 
the volumes of GKOs issued in Belarus have remained low. As of the end of 2000 
capitalisation of government securities market at face value accounted only for 1 per 
cent of GDP (Novik, 2001, p.30). Figure 5.2 shows the capacity of the government 












—♦— Total face  value of p laced is s u e s  ■  Total real value  of placed is su es  (D ecem ber  1997=100)
Figure 5.2: Government securities market (GKO & GDO)39
37 Its share in refinancing has reduced drastically since 1995 and in relative terms remained very little, 
accounting, for example, in December 1999 only around 3 per cent (TACIS 2000a).
38 ‘Repo’ operations are meant to be a form o f loan to commercial banks (CBs) upon the N B B ’s purchase 
o f  government securities from CBs with a promise by the latter to buy these securities back after some 
specified period.
The figure is drawn on the data derived from Novik 2001, p.29.
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As one can see both volumes of placed issues at face value and in real terms exhibit an 
upward trend till August 1998, afterwards they drive apart with the latter decreasing. As 
of the end of 2000 the total volume of government securities (GKO and GDO) in real 
terms was accounted only 30 per cent of its level in August 1998. This downward trend 
can be primarily attributed to the consequences of financial crisis in Russia at the end of 
August.
Other securities include municipal bonds, used to raise funds for housing 
construction. The first issue of municipal bonds was launched in 1993. The authorities 
failed to raise the planned funds. TACIS (1997) reported that ‘out of 2250 bonds, only 
41 were sold, whilst the remainder were given to the NBB as the collateral for the 
USD1 mln. loan’. The second attempt of issuing Minsk Housing Bond Loan with a 
maturity of 32 months was undertaken in 1996 and in spite of low coupon rate equal to 
1/18 of the refinancing rate, it proved to be more successful than the first attempted, 
raising nearly BRB 480 billion. Afterwards, the government started to promote it further 
in the regions. However, it should be noted that the future of the Municipal Bond 
scheme is not so optimistic due to ‘low transparency of the issues, lack of unbiased 
information and insufficient guarantees for potential investors’ (see TACIS 1997, 
2000a). With the low paying capacity of the population in Belarus, apartments have 
turned out to be a very illiquid asset. Moreover, because normally potential investors get 
only a ‘certain amount of square meters’ (not a whole apartment) as collateral, it will be 
particularly hard for them to sell these ‘certain amount of square meters’ if it comes to 
the point of turning collateral into cash.
Corporate securities -  mostly shares in privatised enterprises- are weakly 
developed. The Head of the Department of Foreign Exchange Operations in 
Belarusbank commented that ‘the corporate market is rather dead. It amounts to around 
3-4 transactions per month’ 40. Following the estimates of TACIS (2000a) total number 
of transactions of corporate securities at the Belarusian Currency Stock Exchange 
(BCSE) was 114 in 1998 and only 36 for 11 months of 1999. Their share’s stability in 
total volume of the issued securities in Belarus in 1997-1999 (see table 5.6) is only 
attributed to the constant revaluation of fixed capital of enterprises that in turn increases 
the stock’s face value. The increase in the share of corporate securities in 2000 occurred 
due to the new requirement for banks to increase their statutory funds (see above). Slow
40 Interview with the Head of the Department of Foreign Exchange Operations in Belarusbank, conducted 
on 6 February 2002 during fieldwork in Minsk.
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progress in the development of a corporate securities market can be explained by a 
number of reasons, one of which is that privatisation as such did not happen, and that 
potentially excluded any possibilities of the existence of a private securities market. 
However, at the same it has given more room for manoeuvre to the government, for 
increasing its gains from seigniorage.
To summarise, we can conclude that the capital market in Belarus is very 
shallow and can barely be considered as playing any role at all in enterprises’ financing. 
Belarus in comparison with most of the other transition economies has achieved little 
progress in both reforming its banking sector and developing its capital markets. Its 
pattern of financial development is solely bank-based, while in other transition 
economies the role of capital markets in financing enterprise activities has been 
increasing over the years of transition. Moreover, banking activity itself is highly 
restrained by the government and therefore lacks autonomy and manoeuvre that was 
typical of many developing countries that at times pursued financial repressionist 
policies.
5.2.2 Financial Developments
5.2.2.1 The History of Monetary and Credit Policy in the 1990s
The key issue for the Belarusian authorities at the beginning of transition was to 
preserve the rouble zone that replaced the Soviet system and was supposed to help in 
creating a common economic space throughout the CIS. The Central Bank of Russia 
had a monopoly on currency emission within the rouble zone but the central banks of 
other CIS countries were allowed to issue credits to enterprises, or to cover budget 
deficits. This created massive opportunities for free-riding on Russia’s efforts at 
economic reform, and was a system of transfers from Russia to other states. The 
governments and national banks of smaller Soviet republics could afford an 
uncontrolled emission of money as inflation effects were spread widely throughout the 
post-Soviet space. Its free rider status allowed the Belarusian government to print 
enough money to pay wages and credit state companies and collective farms (kolkhozy) 
while suffering only a small inflationary impact. The effect of these policies was a large 
transfer of wealth from Russia to Belarus, equivalent to 13 per cent of its GDP in 1992
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and 8 per cent of its GDP in the first seven months of 1993 prior to the final break up of 
the rouble zone41.
At the same time, as Russia attempted to restrict the supply of money in early 
1992, the deficit between cash and non-cash money in Belarus began to increase42. In 
May 1992 the shortage of cash money triggered the introduction of Rouble supplement, 
the Belarusian Rouble, known as ‘ zaichik', or hare, because of the hare depicted on the 
first rouble banknote. The value of banknotes was rising with rising size of animals. 
Starting with a squirrel equal to fifty kopeck, it ended with a buffalo equivalent to a 
thousand roubles. Someone has made a good joke on this account. ‘With hyperinflation 
Belarusians began to run out of big animals. Even the blue whale was not big enough, 
so they started to print pictures of official buildings’.
Non-cash zaichik was converted at a rate 1 to 5 against non-cash Russian 
Roubles, whereas the banknotes were exchanged at a rate 1 to 10. These variations in 
rates created favourable conditions for highly profitable speculative activity. One cycle 
of converting non-cash Russian rouble credit into non-cash zaichik then into zaichik 
banknotes (at par) and trading the latter for cash Russian roubles (at a rate 1 to 10), 
which in the end were exchanged in Moscow for 1.3 times as many non-cash Russian 
roubles, produced a 50-70 per cent profit (Conway 1995, p.49).
The economic impact of the rouble zone on Russia meant that it could not be 
maintained forever. Russian monetary reform in July 1993 and inflationary pressures on 
the exchange rate parity between zaichik and the Russian rouble put the end to the 
rouble zone and forced Belarus to announce the Belarusian rouble as the only legitimate 
means of payments in 1994 (Lisovskaia and Korosteleva 2002). As a consequence of 
the policy of money emission levels of hyperinflation rocketed from 1,560 per cent in 
1992 to 2,221 per cent in 1994.
Some efforts were made from 1995 to control inflation and stiffen monetary 
policy. The policy of positive real interest rates was declared. Indeed as one can trace 
from figure 5.6 (section 5.2.2.2) positive real rates were set in 1995 and maintained till 
September 1996, which at the same time were accompanied by a sharp fall in money 
growth in 1995. Moreover, by the end of 1994 a fixed exchange rate appeared to be the 
anchor of stabilisation policy. These measures were very effective in terms of curbing
41 Silitski 2002b, p.225.
42 Belarus became experiencing the shortages in the spring of 1992 and later in May and June of 1993. 
Shortages gave a rise to a premium in the informal trade of cash for non-cash balances. According to 
Conway (1995, p.29) ‘obnalichka’ dealers charged a 30 per cent fee to convert bank credits into cash.
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inflation, which was brought down from 4-digit rate in 1994 to 2-digit rate in 1996. 
However, as one may note, monetary policy tightening was the main instrument for 
curbing inflation. Indeed, the correlation between rouble money growth and inflation is 
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Figure 5.3: Inflation and percentage change in broad rouble money (M2)43
In fact, they seem to go in line until the middle of 1996, afterwards there can be 
observed a time lag between them. Indeed, after performing the simple correlation 
analysis, inflation appears to be more highly correlated with the second lagged value of 
M2. By mid-1995 most prices had been liberalised, and that explained the clearer 
pattern between the two trends in 1995-beginnning of 1996. Afterwards, inflation 
became largely underestimated due to the re-imposed price controls. However, under 
increasing pressure of inflationary expectations on the market BRB/USD exchange rate, 
the authorities could not keep prices under control and had to periodically adjust them. 
This, in fact, explains how a time lag occurred between rouble monetary growth and 
inflation after 1995. At the end of 1998 M2 increased only by 30 per cent while 
inflation rocketed to 70 per cent in the fourth quarter of 1998. The latter can be 
explained by the adverse impact of the financial crisis in Russia in August 1998. The 
Belarusian rouble (valued at the market BRB/USD exchange rate) was devalued by 
more than 350 per cent in September-December 1998 (see figure 5.8). Moreover, in
43 Authors’ calculations on the data provided by the National Bank o f the Republic o f  Belarus (National 
Bank o f  Belarus 2000a (January), 2000b (January), 2001,2002, 2003).
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light of the Russian financial market collapse, the Belarusian authorities trying to 
prevent speculations, introduced restrictions on payments in BRB, particularly in terms 
of transactions on correspondent accounts of non-resident banks (see appendix B) that 
created an additional pressure on the foreign exchange market triggering a further 
increase in the excess demand for foreign currency and the growing gap between the 
official and market exchange rates.
Proceeding further an examination of rouble money growth it is interesting to 
see if there can be observed any seasonal patterns in M2 behaviour. An in depth 
analysis of the behaviour of M2 is in figure 5.4, where 3-month average M2 growth is 
plotted. There is a sharp fall in M2 growth by the beginning of 1996, and that once 
again confirms the declared monetary policy tightening in 1995. During 1996-97 some 
seasonal trend similarities in M2 behaviour can be recognised during certain periods. 
M2 surges by the second quarter achieving peak values in the mid-year and slows down 
in October-December, which is in line with the expansion of directed credits granted to 
the main subsidised sector of economy, agriculture, for sowing in spring and for 








Figure 5.4: M2, percentage change (2-months average)
Another peculiarity in figure 5.4 can be observed after 1997, when a gradual upward 
shift of the graph heralds a more intensive monetary-credit expansion policy. 
Reintroduction of a stricter monetary policy at the end of 2000 leads to a significant 
decrease in M2 by the beginning of 2001. However, further follows its increase at the 
mid of the year, that can be explained by the preparations for 2001 president election 
campaign, and the expansionist policy of the government with this regard.
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As observed from the graph, the deflationary policy, which began at the 
beginning of 1995, did not last long. The deterioration of the real sector of the economy, 
as a consequence of the tougher credit-monetary policy, led the Belarusian authorities to 
loosen monetary policy once more. The inability of the government to maintain its 
exchange rate commitments, because of insufficient foreign exchange reserves, led to 
devaluation of the Belarusian Rouble. From 1996 the country has turned back to 
implementing measures typical of a repressed economy, which are defined in the next 
section.
5.2.2.2 Financial Restraints
In section 5.1 a brief introduction to the Belarusian economic model of the late 1990s 
was given. The present section will focus on each government policy comprising the 
Belarusian model within the financial sector dimension in more details.
The main ideas which laid the basis for Belarusian economic development in the 
late 1990s, can be summarised as follows:
I. By disregarding the inflationary nature of money growth, the Belarusian 
authorities stressed the importance of revitalising the practice of lax credits to economic 
agents that were believed to facilitate increase in output, as the decline in it, according 
to them, was solely attributable to enterprises’ shortage of money.
II. The NBB resorted to the policy of high reserve requirements in order to target 
excess liquidity as a result of expansionary monetary-credit policy. Moreover, higher 
reserve requirements could potentially increase the government’s gains from 
seigniorage. In fact, there are two ways to increase seigniorage: either through increase 
in monetary growth rate or through increase in real monetary base (see chapter 7). 
Along with currency in circulation banks’ reserves appear to be a component of 
monetary base, and therefore, a potential source for extracting seigniorage under the 
policy of high reserve requirements.
Ill Recognising the negative effect of high nominal interest rates on real sector 
developments (recall chapter 4) the government advocated introduction of the 
mechanism of administratively controlled interest rates that could make bank resources 
more accessible to enterprises.
IV. By seeing speculation as a driving force behind the BRB depreciation, the 
Belarusian authorities believed in their ability to ensure the BRB’s stability by setting
99
Julia A. Korosteleva (2006) Chapter 5
the nominal exchange rate administratively and by restricting the access of non-critical 
importers to the foreign exchange market44.
These ideas resulted in the implementation of four main repressionist policies, 
namely, directed credits and preferential loans policy with a view to advancing 
administrative reallocation of credit resources in favour of the branches of economy 
regarded by the Belarusian authorities as priorities; high reserve requirements; a policy 
of negative real interest rates; and a policy of multiple exchange rates, which all 
together were placed at the centre of the Belarusian strategy of economic development.
Directed credits policy
Although directed credits were continuously exercised from the beginning of transition, 
they were first officially defined in 1998 in the ‘Main requirements for banks to use 
directed credits’45. Directed credits were accordingly defined as loans designed for 
mainly supporting the agricultural sector46 and house construction. The traditional way 
of channelling these credits was through the SF banks, which were government agents 
in servicing social-cum-economic oriented programmes. Particularly, Belarusbank was 
mainly used in financing housing construction, and Agroprombank serviced the 
agricultural sector. The loans were channelled within open credit lines at interest rates 
varying between 2 per cent pa and 50 per cent of refinancing rate pa (for details see 
below).
The aforementioned document envisaged also the use of bank-agents or ‘system- 
forming’ banks in serving other governmental programs of ‘high priority’ on 
‘favourable terms’47 at the expense of banks’ own/attracted capital. However, in terms 
of constant liquidity problems of the banking system as a result of their financing of 
low-yield or virtually loss-making projects the NBB had to provide them with the 
necessary resources. Thus, financing with the use of banks’ resources still to a great 
extent remained inflationary with the only difference that current banks’ loans were 
financed by the followed (lagged) NBB emission. Moreover, this crediting practice was 
believed to hinder long-run economic growth as it diverted scarce credit resources from 
effective users, and to undermine banks’ financial stability.
44 Rusakevich 2002.
45 NBB Resolution No.6.2 (11 February 1998) (Konsul’tant Plyus: Belarus [CD-Rom] 2002).
46 Loans for agricultural sector were usually issued for the purposes of forming state grain reserves; 
purchase and delivery of agricultural products, financing sowing/harvesting campaigns.
47 The term ‘on favourable terms’ means that the lending interest rate was only half of the refinancing 
rate.
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SF banks which are equipped with a public deposit insurance, small and medium-sized 
commercial banks (SMCBs) had to look for their own niches to work. Many of them 
have been claimed to service the shadow economy.28 Foreign currency transactions and 
short-term lending on inter-bank market are other typical niches of SMCBs.
Domestic credit provided by the banking sector to the economy accounted for 
only 21 per cent of GDP in 2003, far below many CEE countries. A loose monetary- 
credit policy, aiming to keep real sector afloat, drained bank financial resources because 
many loans were never repaid and inflation eroded the real value of bank deposits and 
capital, thus leading to serious liquidity problems and undercapitalization of the banking 
sector. Priority financing of loss-making state-owned enterprises triggered problems of 
adverse selection and moral hazard. Thus, access to credit by ‘good borrowers’, who 
deserved to get it by all means and were ready to pay a competitive interest rate, was 
restrained by liquidity constraints and low capitalization of the banking sector. At the 
same time, state-owned enterprises, adhering to the idea that they are too big for the 
state to let them sink, took bank loans for granted, often failing to repay them and 
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I 1 Bank credits as a % of GDP ♦ Percentage change in bank credits to economy
Figure 5.1: Bank credits as a percent o f  GDP29
The sustained policy of soft budget constraints and directed credits has aggravated the 
problem of bad debts and undermined solvency of the Belarusian banking sector. 
Overall, bad debts accounted for 11-19 per cent o f total banks’ credits (table 5.5) in 
1995-2000 whereas according to the international standards their amount should not 
exceed 5 per cent. Since the Belarusian banks frequently exercise such practices as
28 Belaruskaya Gazeta, No.8 [324], 25 February 2002, p.8.
29 A uthors’ calculations on the data provided by the National Bank o f  the Republic o f  Belarus (National
Bank o f  Belarus 2000a (January), 2000b (January), 2001, 2002, 2003).
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There exists evidence that many of the issued loans were not repaid on time and 
were always prolonged, often even without accruing interest during the period of loan 
prolongation. Thus, Presidential Decree No.96 (3 March 1998)48 said that liabilities of 
collective farms (kholkhozy and sovkhozy), and other agricultural enterprises as of 
December 1997 were extended and due to be repaid from 1 January 2000 to 1 
September 2000.49 The same Decree authorised SF banks to issue new credits to these 
enterprises in 1998, which contradicted the aforementioned ‘Main requirements for 
banks to use directed credits’ (Korosteleva 2005). The latter says,
‘Banks, defined to finance preparation and carrying out of sowing campaigns, issue 
short-term loans within credit lines open for these purposes by the NB RB to 
financially stable collective farms and other agricultural enterprises and 
organisations, which do not have over-due loans with the banks issued to them 
earlier’.50
Furthermore, Resolution of the Council of Ministers No.50 (15 January 1999) 
authorised the SF banks to prolong loans issued to the collective farms and agricultural 
enterprises up to September, 1999, without accruing interest on these loans for the 
period of loan prolongation. The authorities often ‘requested’ SF banks serving state 
programmes to forgive interest payments51.
Banks’ margins in connection with directed credits or preferential loans were 
often set within a 1-2 per cent limit. In this case, the concept of margin was practically 
meaningless as 1) it was negative in real terms and could not even cover banks’ costs of 
serving credit; 2) as mentioned above, interest payments were paid occasionally (on 
loans to house construction and industry), if at all (as in case of agricultural sector); 3) 
as a matter of fact, these loans became outstanding as time went by and were rarely
48 Konsul’tant Plyus: Belarus [CD-Rom] 2002.
49 See also Presidential Decree No.351pn (10 December 1998) (Konsul’tant Plyus: Belarus [CD-Rom] 
2002) that authorised postponing of repayment of loan issued to ‘Orsha’ enterprise at the amount of BRB 
10.4 billion and the accrued interest until December 2001. With inflation of 969 per cent in 1999-2001 
this sum was worth only BRB 973 million in 2001. Moreover, the repayment o f this loan was not 
guaranteed yet in 2001. It was also very common of the Belarusian authorities to prolonging loan 
repayments endlessly until they were wiped off by inflation.
50 Paragraph 1.1 of the ‘Main Requirements for banks to use directed credits’, No. 6.2, adopted by the 
NBB on 11 February 1998 (Konsul’tant Plyus: Belarus [CD-Rom] 2002).
51 See for example Resolution of the Council of Ministers No. 1417 (10 September 1998) (Konsul’tant 
Plyus: Belarus [CD-Rom] 2002), annulling the interest payments of 35 milliard BRB roubles accrued 
during 1995-1997 on loans issued to flax-scutching mills on buying feedstock.
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recovered. In other words, these loans were potentially bad debts. In this case, the 
National Bank or the Ministry of Finance applied debts-for-equity swap schemes to 
these banks, by this increasing state ownership in them . This action had another 
implication: it made these banks’ performance look better statistically (because the 
percentage of bad debts was decreasing whilst capital increased), but in reality it was an 
artificial growth of capital (Korosteleva 2005).
These directed or emission credits as a way of the state reallocating financial 
flows, particularly via channelling credits directly from the NBB to commercial banks, 
can be regarded as quasi-budget expenses. This is why Belarus was among the limited 
number of post-communist countries that managed to keep its budget deficit at level less 
than 3 per cent of GDP.
Speaking about banks’ refinancing mechanisms, it is interesting to note that 
while in 1995 80 per cent of the credits were reallocated through market actions , after 
1996 they became allocated administratively. Following the NBB Regulation rules 
No.93 (23 August 1996)54, banks were mainly refinanced at the interest rate set by the 
Council of Directors of the NB that depended on a official refinancing rate. The official 
rate was the announced refinancing rate, at which a small amount of the credit market 
had been served. The factual refinancing interest rate was in fact the rate at which the 
National Bank granted credits. As noted by Rusakevich (2002, pp. 19-20) this rate was 
composed of the following main interest rates:
1. A highly privileged rate on directed credits granted for housing construction 
programme. It was usually one tenth of the announced refinancing interest rate. With 
inflation between 63.9 per cent and 293.7 per cent p.a. in 1997-1999, this rate was only
52 For example, Resolution of CM No. 1563 (13 November 2002) (Konsul’tant Plyus: Belarus [CD-Rom] 
2002) authorised recapitalisation of Agroprombank, one o f the SF banks, through increasing the state 
share (Ministries of Finance and Agriculture) in its statutory fund. The same Resolution authorised the 
bank to finance purchase of agricultural machinery (loan to be granted for 6 years under 5 per cent pa.).
53 Credit auctions first were introduced in 1993 (see Temporary Rules of Carrying out Credit Auctions 
approved by the NBB, No.l (20 January 1993) (Konsul’tant Plyus: Belarus [CD-Rom] 2002). The 
volumes of loans allocated through credit auctions were set in Main Directions of monetary-credit policy 
for each year and were reconsidered quarterly depending on the tasks of liquidity regulation of monetary 
market. Following Regulation Rules adopted by the NBB, No.71 (5 May 1995) (Konsul’tant Plyus: 
Belarus [CD-Rom] 2002) under conditions of high inflation loans were issued only for 7 -14 days. Two 
types of auctions were envisaged: 1) “rate tender” -  bids for fixed amount of money. All demands, 
starting with a tender offered the highest interest rate and ending with a tender who still fits the set credit 
limit, were satisfied; 2) at a single cutting off rate -  the same procedure as in 1), but all demands were 
satisfied at a single cutting off rate
54 KonsuPtant Plyus: Belarus [CD-Rom] 2002.
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5 per cent pa55 and credit was granted under the condition that it was to be repaid within 
40 years56.
2. A privileged rate on the majority of directed credits to agriculture. In 1997- 
2000 this was half of the announced rate.
3. The official refinancing rate which was mainly used as a rate of return on 
GKO of the first circulation.
4. Rates on market instruments of short-term financing (Lombard and overnight 
credits), which were, as a rule, higher than the announced refinancing rate. However, 
these rates were still administratively set by the monetary authorities and were not 
always much in excess of the official refinancing rate. Thus, for example, while the 
official refinancing was set at 36 per cent p.a. in September 1997, the Lombard rate was 
set in range of 40-45 per cent p.a. (see appendix C for chronology of interest rates 
controls).
The fact that the real factual refinancing rate was more favourable for banks than 
the real deposit rate (see figures 5.5 and 5.6) encouraged banks to appeal to cheap NBB 
credit resources57 rather than to attract means of individuals and enterprises into 
deposits. Actually, the real deposit interest rates were not so high during 1995-96, and 
even negative afterwards, to activate the latter anyway.
Financing of priority enterprises by commercial banks ‘on favourable terms’ has 
particularly surged since 1999, after the Belarusian authorities expressed their intention 
to increase the use of commercial banks’ resources in financing economic agents. In 
fact, the Belarusian official statistics suggest that, in 2000, directed credits to the house 
construction and to the agricultural sectors were fully replaced with preferential credits 
issued by commercial banks to the above sectors of economy. However, this did not
58change the heart of the problem much, as inflationary financing was still in place . 
Therefore, the figures on direct credits presented in table 5.8 do not reflect the full
55 Interest payments were envisaged to be paid only three years after the loan had been issued.
56 When the house construction programme was launched in 1996 (Presidential Directive No.516 (22 
December 1995) (Konsul’tant Plyus: Belarus [CD-Rom] 2002) loan was initially granted for 20 years. 
Since 2000 JSSB “Belarusbank” has been authorised to finance only 75 per cent (95 per cent still in rural 
areas) versus 90 per cent in 1995-99 of the cost of house construction for no more than 20 years (40 years 
in rural areas) under 10 per cent (5 per cent in rural areas) p.a.
57 The NBB set refinancing limits every year for each bank individually. These limits were often 
reconsidered during each year always towards increase.
58 There should be noted that over the recent years this practice has been gradually replaced with new, 
market-based, schemes of banks’ refinancing, amongst which ‘repo’ operations and Lombard credits 
could be named. It has had positive effect on macroeconomic stabilisation.
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extent of inflationary financing of the Belarusian economy as they do not count for 
preferential loans59.
Share of each form of refinancing in total volume 
of refinancing, %
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Directed credits 65.3 53.5 58.7 45.1 0
including:
house construction N/a 25.7 32.4 33.9 0
agricultural sector N/a 27.2 23.4 9.3 0
other 1.9
Lombard credits 8.5 1 0 14.7 15.8
Overnight credits 37.4
Purchase of government securities (including ‘repo’ 
operations)
12.8 14.6 28.4 22.9 18.7
Swap transactions 13.4 29.9 11.3 15.1 5.3
Other forms refinancing 0 1 1.6 2.2 22.8
Total: 100 100 100 100 100
Table 5.8: Structure o f  banks ’ refinancing60
According to the NBB all forms of refinancing, excluding directed credits, are defined 
as market forms of refinancing. However, it is interesting to note that none of these 
credits were allocated on a market basis in the true sense of the word. Interest rates on 
all these loans were set administratively through the whole analysed period of time (see 
appendix C for chronology of interest rates controls).
Alongside directed credits and preferential loans schemes, the NBB 
continuously exercised monetisation of budget deficit61. In this regard it is interesting to 
compare figures on the NBB credits to the government with figures on the actual budget 
expenditures in part of supporting priority sectors of economy (agriculture, house 
construction and industry) and see to what extent the latter could potentially be covered 
by the NBB emission.
59 Unfortunately, the lack of transparency in banking statistics does not allow collecting data on 
preferential loans.
60 NBB material given to the author by the Head of Foreign Exchange Analysis and Forecasting Division 
of the NB during our meeting in March 2003.
61 As a matter of fact monetisation of government debt was banned in Russia since 1995, while in many 
CEECs -  at a even earlier stage of transition.
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1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Total expenditure, 
mln. BRB
63345.7 135865.3 249577.5 1142843 3181146
including:
Agricultural sector 1996.0 4222.9 9799.0 37253.6 87050.9
House construction 2489.0 6133.9 13107.3 81387.7 248081.6
Industry 675.4 1730.4 3747.9 20409.9 34735.6
Budget deficit/surplus -3645.9 -6738.5 -9995.5 -87935.7 -1747.3
Total expenditures on the 
aforementioned budget 
articles, as % of total 
government expenditure
8.1 8.9 10.7 12.2 11.6
NBB financing of government 
deficit (plan)
1860.00 3375.0 6075.3 28700 75875.9
NBB financing of budget 
deficit (actual)
7484 12437.9 48440.7 138682.7 261058
Percentage change in 
government financing by 
NBB
66 289 186 88
Total expenditures on the 
aforementioned budget 
articles, as % of NBB 
financing (actual)
69 97 55 100.3 142
Table 5.9: Actual government expenditures in part o f financing agricultural sector, 
house construction and industry62
In fact, conceptually there was not much difference between loans granted to the 
government to finance priority sectors of the economy and the NBB directed credits. 
The National Bank issued loans to the Ministry of Finance, which in turn reallocated 
them between the SF banks. It is also worth noting that from 1999 it has was very 
common for SF banks to finance ‘strategic’ enterprises at the factual refinancing rate 
and for the government to compensate half of the refinancing rate due to be paid by 
‘strategic’ enterprises to banks. In fact, this compensation was meant to be paid from 
the Republic’s budget (section on ‘Subsidies to state enterprises and organisations and 
other subsidies’). A similar financing scheme, introduced around the same time,
62 Author’s calculations on the NBB data (National Bank of Belarus 2000a (January), 2000b (January), 
2001, 2002, 2003). Figures on NBB financing of budget deficit were derived from the Law ‘On Budget of 
the Republic of Belarus for 1996’, No. 279-XIII (19 April 1996), the Law ‘On Budget of the Republic of 
Belarus for 1997’, No. 20-3 (21 February 1997), the Law ‘On Budget of the Republic of Belarus for 
1998’, No. 107-3 (29 December 1997), the Law ‘On Budget of the Republic of Belarus for 1999’, No.245- 
3 (24 February 1999), the Law ‘On Budget of the Republic o f Belarus for 2000’, No.367-3 (31 January 
2000) (Konsul’tant Plyus: Belarus [CD-Rom] 2002).
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envisaged compensation of 50 per cent of the refinancing rate to SF banks (also to be 
paid from the Republic’s Budget) that issued loans to ‘strategic enterprises’ at half of 
the refinancing rate.63 Compensation was not given on a regular basis.
Because of low capitalisation of the banking system64 and the enormous 
investments that some projects required (for example, to finance capital renewals in oil 
refinery companies in Mozyr or a potassium company ‘Belaruscalii’), the authorities 
often authorised more than one SF bank to participate in the financing of these projects. 
These loans were called consortia loans and they were mainly denominated in foreign 
currency under government guarantee. What was special about these loans was that the 
government guarantee, in fact, meant loan repayment in BRB at the official exchange 
rate that was around 60 per cent lower than the market exchange rate (see below for 
more details)65. Moreover, there exists evidence that these loans were not repaid on time 
and the government often extended the guarantee66.
Loans issued by SF banks were sometimes repaid by the Ministry of Finance 
borrowing from the same SF banks against promissory notes67. New credit repayment 
schemes were introduced in 2002. They involved borrowing money from SF banks 
through the issuing of GKOs rather than through NBB monetary emission to obtain
/-Q
resources to repay loans issued earlier by SF banks to state enterprises . When SF 
banks became too burdened with bad debts they requested the authorities to transfer the 
enterprises’ debt to the Ministry of Finance69.
In summary, the policy of directed credits and preferential loans had its negative 
spillover effects on the economy as a whole. All possible consequences of this and other 
repressionist policies will be considered towards the end of this chapter, after we have a
63 See, for example, Resolution of the Council of Ministers No. 1488 (28 September 1999) and Resolution 
of the Council of Ministers No.1410 (11 September 2000) (Konsul’tant Plyus: Belarus [CD-Rom] 2002).
64 As at 2001 the level of capitalisation accounted only for 4.7 per cent of GDP.
65 See for example Resolutions of the Council of Ministers No.1632 (22 October 1999) and No. 1447 (17 
September 1999) (Konsul’tant Plyus: Belarus [CD-Rom] 2002).
66 See for example Resolution of the Council of Ministers No.667 (12 May 2000) which extends the 
government guarantee issued on 19 March 1999 on the loan at the amount of USD 6221804 to 
‘Beltorginvest’ till 19 March 2001. See also Resolution of the Council of Ministers No.845 (6 June 2001) 
and No. 157 (6 February 2002) (Konsul’tant Plyus: Belarus [CD-Rom] 2002).
67 See for example Resolution of the Council of Ministers No. 1682 (19 December 1997) (Konsul’tant 
Plyus: Belarus [CD-Rom] 2002).
68 See for example Resolution of the Council of Ministers No.1205 (14 August 2001), Resolution of the 
Council of Ministers No.1508 (16 October 2001) and Resolution No.30 (10 January 2002) (Konsul’tant 
Plyus: Belarus [CD-Rom] 2002).
69 It was, for example, the case of Belarusbank and Agroprombank (see Resolution of the Council of 
Ministers ‘On transferring the debt of some industrial enterprises on loans o f IMF to the Ministry of 
Finance’ No. 1891 (29 December 2001).
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comprehensive picture of all the policies that are integral constituents of the Belarusian 
financial strategy.
Interest rates controls
No doubt exists that the Belarusian credit policy has primarily been based on the policy 
of administratively controlled interest rates, in which the official refinancing rate was 
always used as a yardstick70. At the same time it should be acknowledged that 
availability of the official records of interest rates controls (particularly with regard to 
lending and deposit rates) is very limited71. The Belarusian legal database holding the 
majority of records on regulation of banks’ activity in Belarus contains some 
fragmentary information on the use of deposit rate floors, margin controls, and lending 
rate ceilings (primarily for directed credits). Lending interest rates ceilings on loans of 
commercial banks are only directly mentioned in ‘Main Monetary and Credit 
Guidelines of the Republic of Belarus for 1994’72 and in the Banking Code73. The first 
document says that ‘until the market mechanism of economic regulation is in place, the 
NBB has the right to carry out a policy of temporarily imposition of lending rates 
ceilings both on directed credits loans and on loans of commercial banks to real sector’. 
The second document reads as follows: ‘In exceptional cases the NBB has the right to 
set minimum/maximum lending interest rates for commercial banks in their operations 
with individuals and legal entities’ (paragraph 52). From my personal experience of 
working in one of the Belarusian SF banks during 1997-2000, it is possible to say that 
many instructions, including those regulating interest rates, came in the form of the 
written letters for the ‘internal use’ of the NBB or in the form of NBB oral 
‘recommendations’. The fact that most of the information on interest rates ceilings, 
particularly on lending interest rates ceilings, is confidential, was confirmed by the 
Head of Foreign Exchange Analysis and Forecasting Division of the NB during our 
meeting in March 2003.
In fact, the official refinancing rate can give us some indication of the extent of 
lending interest rates control. As it was mentioned earlier, most of the SF banks’ loans
70 See for example TACIS 2000 (January-March) and Rusakevich 2002.
71 See appendix C on chronology of interest rates controls and changes in the official refinancing rate.
72 Approved by the National Bank of Belarus, Letter No.20-94 (2 June 1994) (Konsul’tant Plyus: Belarus 
[CD-Rom] 2002).
3 Adopted by the House of Representatives, Banking Code No.441-3 (25 October 2000) (Konsul’tant 
Plyus: Belarus [CD-Rom] 2002).
107
Julia A. Korosteleva (2006) Chapter 5
were preferential, with the interest rate being either half of the refinancing rate or at the 
level of the refinancing rate. In turn, the latter was mostly negative in real terms over the 
whole period (figure 5.5). Here it is worth recalling that these banks were in control of 
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Figure 5.5: Announced andfactual refinancing ra tes4
Moreover, following the Roubini and Sala-i-Martin’s approach (1992)75 in the absence 
of reliable information on the actual controls, the level of real interest rates can be 










 Lending rate (monthly average)  Deposit rate (monthly average)
Figure 5.6: Real lending and deposit interest rates76
74 Rusakevich 2002.
75 See chapter 6 for details.
76 Authors’ calculations on the data provided by the National Bank o f  the Republic o f  Belarus (National 
Bank o f  Belarus 2000a (January), 2000b (January), 2001, 2002, 2003).
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As one can see from figure 5.6 that was a significant surge up to 10-11 per cent in both 
lending and deposit real interest rates in the first half of 1995. Afterwards, they started 
to decline and were either negative or very low positive until 2000.
As far as deposit interest rate controls are concerned, deposit floors were in 
place from December 1994 to May 1998. In fact, in 1994-1995 deposit floors played a 
positive role in alleviating banks’ attempts in exploiting market power, which occurred 
with liberalisation of interest rates at the end of 1994-1995 (see chapter 4). The latter 
(freeing of interest rates) triggered some banks, particularly in regional centres, to 
behave as monopolists. The evidence reported by the NBB suggested that banks, in 
chasing high profits, had tended to decrease as much as possible the deposit rate and in 
turn increase the lending rate (chapter 4). Thus, by setting deposit floors the authorities 
made an attempt to end this practice.
There is no documentary evidence of deposit interest rate ceilings. However, as 
in the case of lending interest rate ceilings, figure 5.6 speaks for itself. Moreover, as Fry 
argued, ‘in the absence of deposit rate ceilings, the FR tax may be still be borne by 
depositors to the extent that banks are required to use their own resources to acquire 
non-reserve assets that yield net returns below the world market interest rate’ (Fry 1995, 
p.6). Thus, by being obliged to issue loans at interest rates being low or negative in real 
terms or to invest in government bonds with the real yield being proxied by the real 
announced refinancing rate, commercial banks did not have much option in offering 
comparable returns on deposits. In fact, with the high inflation rate, there was need for 
deposit rate ceilings as such. Acceleration of inflation was lowering the nominal interest 
rate in a natural way, if  the latter were not adjusted for inflation.
In conclusion, it becomes evident that interest rates never operated as an 
instrument of efficient allocation of funds in Belarus. Moreover, they, as very high 
interest rates, had an adverse selection effect on borrowers from the point of view of 
encouraging investment with lower returns (agriculture, house construction and state 
enterprises of industrial sector) and crowding out high-yielding investment potentially 
associated with the private sector.
Reserve requirements
The policy of unprecedented monetary-credit expansion created excess liquidity in the 
market. The paradox, in fact, was that some of the SF banks (particularly Belarusbank 
and Agroprombank) were contracting liquidity, while others had it in excess. Thus, the
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NBB resorted to the policy of higher reserve requirements to be able to regulate any 
‘market’ imbalances.
DeMelo and Denizer (1997) in their work on monetary policy during transition 
use 12 per cent or less as a yardstick for maximum reserve requirements for transition 
economies to be recognised as market-oriented.
It would be fair to note that in Belarus this instrument was not exercised so 
heavily in a sense that reserve requirements have never exceeded 30 per cent and their 
trend have been changing from upwards to downwards. However, reserve requirements 
were still in excess of 12 per cent during the most of the analysed period. After some 
easing up in 1995, the authorities have raised them again from the third quarter of 1996. 
In the fourth quarter of 1997-1998 reserve requirements reached their maximum of 21 
per cent and started to decline, heralding again at the beginning of 2000, as one can see 
from figure 5.7.
i i Reserve requirements, weighted average — Money multiplier (M3/M0)growth, %
Figure 5.7: Reserve requirements and money multiplier (M3/M0) growth77
The above figure shows the expected relationship between money multiplier growth and 
reserve requirements, implying the surge in the former leads to a fall in the latter. 
However, it does not always hold in our case. For example, the rise in reserve 
requirements in 1996 was accompanying by the rise in the money multiplier. It can be
77 Authors’ calculations on the data provided by the National Bank o f  the Republic o f  Belarus (National 
Bank o f  Belarus 2000a (January), 2000b (January), 2001, 2002, 2003). Reserve requirem ents calculated 
as a weighted average o f  reserve requirements on demand, time rouble deposits and deposits denominated 
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explained by the fact that SF banks, being unable to cope with rising requirements, were 
sometimes given concessions by the NBB.
Despite being not so heavy in relative terms, the policy of high reserve 
requirements can still have a greater negative effect on financial sector than would be 
expected. Under high inflation higher reserve requirements have a magnified effect, 
increasing the wedge between deposit and lending rates (see Fry (1995, p.43) for an 
illustrative example). Thus, under de-facto controlled lending rates deposit rates could 
have been potentially negligibly low. That is why the authorities had to impose deposit 
floors in 1996-1999.
Finally, a rise in reserve requirements can also be viewed as a way to increase 
government revenue from seigniorage as reserves constitute monetary base, increase in 
which in real terms is positively related to gains from seigniorage. This issue is dealt 
with in details in chapter 7.
Multiple exchange rates policy
The policy of foreign exchange can be divided into three main periods: 1993-4, when 
floating exchange existed, 1995-6 with fixed exchange and 1996-2000, with its ‘planned 
devaluation’ system78. The latter was particularly noticeable as it rested upon the policy 
of multiple exchange rates. There had been six exchange rates in Belarus in 1996-2000: 
the official rate set by the NBB to be used for tax and accounting purposes; for 
surrender of obliged 30-40 per cent of exporters’ earnings (corresponds to stock market 
exchange rate (main session); the stock market exchange rate (additional session) for 
surrender additional obliged 10 per cent of exporters’ earnings; the non-stock market 
exchange rate or commercial rate for inter-bank settlements; the non-resident market 
exchange rate (quotations of the Central Bank of Russia, the exchange rate ‘set’ by 
commercial Belarusian banks for cash currency sale to individuals; the black market 
rate. In fact, since the official exchange rate was on average 60 per cent lower than the 
market exchange rate (see figure 5.8), by surrendering their 30-40 per cent of earnings
70at the official exchange rate exporters were paying an additional 15 per cent tax .
78 The mechanism of rate’s formation on a market basis actually began to work since 4 January 1993, 
when the NBB introduced the quotation of the Belarusian rouble to hard currencies.
79 15 per cent = .40*.60/1.60 (Nuti 1999, p.8).
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In 1999 the authorities initiated transition to the uniform and stable exchange rate and 
convertibility of the Belarusian rouble in the area of current account’s operations. 
Indeed, at the end of 1999 the NBB liberated the exchange rate set by commercial banks 
for cash currency sale to individuals (appendix B). By September 2000 the official 
exchange rate was devalued to the market level, which, in turn, was held in by partial 
‘sterilisation’ of money supply and achieved positive rates. After the unification, the 
exchange rate has remained relatively stable.
The policy of multiple exchange rates revealed its ineffectiveness that is to be 
examined under ‘Policies implications’.
Policy implications
All the four discussed policies, comprising the Belarusian financial policy in the late 
1990s, had a magnified negative effect on the economic development.
Thus, the expansionary policy of directed credits and preferential loans, 
targeting, in the first place, ‘strategic’ (state) enterprises, resulted in high inflation and 























□  Devaluation of the official BRB/USD exchange rate
□  Devaluation of the market BRB/USD exchange rate
Devaluation o f  the official and market BRB/USD exchange rate
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One of the important implications of inflationary financing is decline in real 
cash balances, as prices rise in greater proportion than the quantity of money. This 
results in finance shallowness that has a negative impact on economic growth.
That is exactly what happened in Belarus in the late 1990s. Together with the 
policy of negative real interest rates, it boosted the aggregate demand resulting in 
economic growth in 1997. However, the economic growth is rather a short-run 
phenomenon. The inability to stimulate domestic saving and therefore private fixed 
investment imposes constraints on its sustainability. Indeed, both inflation as a result of 
monetary-credit expansion and the policy o f low deposit interest rates discouraged 
domestic savings that in the context of restrictions on capital inflows should have 
remained the main source of financing of economic agents (discussed in chapter 8). 
Figure 5.9 shows the change in financial depth, defined in a narrow sense as a ratio of 
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Figure 5.9: Financial depth, measured as a ratio o f  quarterly average rouble bank 
deposits to GDP nominal 0
As one can see the ratio of total rouble deposits to GDP never exceeded 25 per cent, 
implying that, as a potential source of investment, domestic deposits played a fairly 
insignificant role in financing the Belarusian economy. In fact, as only 70 per cent of 
the economy was monetised, it does not seem so surprising. Financial depth ratio
80 Authors’ calculations on the data provided by the National Bank o f the Republic of Belarus (National
Bank of Belarus 2000a (January), 2000b (January), 2001, 2002, 2003).
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decreased from 69 per cent of GDP in 1990 to 10 per cent in 2001. However, while 
acknowledging the problem of finance shallowness the authorities find its solution in
O |
increasing demand for money elaborating a package of measures that were believed to 
increase the coefficient of monetisation. What is interesting is that the figures of 
monetary growth and inflation were stated as the directions in the government 
programme of money demand increase, without supplying any calculations of these 
rates or at least explaining their rational origin.
Another consequence of the policy of directed and preferential credits was 
devaluation of the Belarusian rouble. With increasing inflation and the Belarusian 










Figure 5.10: Foreign currency deposits as percent o f  total deposits
The analysis of the problem of substitution of national currency in Belarus focuses more 
on foreign currency deposits (FCD) measure because of the unavailability of reliable 
data on the amount of Dollar currency in circulation within the domestic economy and 
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1 Resolution o f  the Council o f  Ministers o f  Belarus and the National Bank o f  Belarus ‘About the 
programme o f  the measures to increase demand for money in 2002’, No. 1875/30 (28 December 2001).
2 The term ‘dollarisation’ serves as shorthand for the use o f  any foreign currency.
83 Authors’ calculations on the data provided by the National Bank o f  the Republic o f  Belarus (National 
Bank o f  Belarus 2000a (January), 2000b (January), 2001, 2002, 2003).
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Figure 5.10 indicates that Belarus is typified by FCD constituting a significant 
percentage of total deposits, of between 30-70 per cent. The observed tendency o f FCD 
decreasing in 1995-1996 was mainly due to the tightening of monetary policy in 1995 
and as a result a significant fall in inflation followed and the policy of positive real 
interest rates. The surge in FCD at the end of 1998 in Belarus can be explained by the 
sharp devaluation of the Belarusian Rouble, caused by the Russian financial crisis. 
From 1999 to 2001 the share of FCD in total deposits remained high, which is in line 
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84Figure 5.11: Foreign currency deposits (as a percent o f  M2), 1995-2001
One should note that with the ratio of FCD to broad money exceeding 30 per cent, 
Belarus can be classified as a highly dollarised economy. Moreover, high inflation in 
terms of the continuously exercising policy of money emission, remained the main 
obstacle for reducing the degree of its dollarisation in Belarus.
So, the policy of multiple exchange rates appeared to be an instrument to hold 
down the price of foreign exchange. In turn, it created the deficit of foreign currency in 
the official market that stimulated the development of the shadow market. The
84 Authors’ calculations on the data provided by the National Bank of the Republic of Belarus (National
Bank of Belarus 2000a (January), 2000b (January), 2001, 2002, 2003).
115
Julia A. Korosteleva (2006) Chapter 5
overvalued Belarusian rouble encouraged importing that spilled into the current account 
deficit.
1995 1996 1997 1998
-10
-12
—♦—Current account —■—Trade balance
Figure 5.12: Trade balance and current account, as a % o f  GDP85
Moreover, excess demand for foreign currency triggered the authorities to impose 
foreign exchange and cross-border payments restrictions. The latter as well as high 
inflation, wiping out enterprises’ nominal assets, induced them to turn to the use of 
alternative financial mechanisms and barter operations. According to the official data, 
non-monetary operations had a steadily constant share of 30 per cent in total annual 
sales during 1997-2002. Along with barter operations accounting for majority of non­
monetary operations, enterprises have been using promissory notes and commercial 
credit as substitutes of bank money. According to some experts, extensive reliability of 
the Belarusian enterprises on barter transactions appears as one of the most important 
factors that contributed to the resumption of the economic growth in the late 1990s (see 
TACIS 1999).
Finally, financial strategy encompassing all aforementioned policies, although 
seemed to have contributed to revitalising the Belarusian economy, but mainly, perhaps, 
in a short run, if at all. In a long run, it resulted in financial disintermediation and forced 
enterprises to search for alternative ways to stay afloat.
Overall, the examination of financial development in Belarus in the 1990s, with a 
particular focus on 1996-2000, revealed the following.
85 Authors’ calculations on the data provided by the National Bank of the Republic of Belarus (National
Bank o f Belarus 2000a (January), 2000b (January), 2001, 2002, 2003).
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First of all, the policy of financial repression in Belarus had primarily political 
grounds in a sense that under the worsening of macroeconomic situation and decline in 
living standards of population it aimed at providing sustainability of the Belarusian 
‘populist’ model of economic development that, in turn, was a key to the viability of the 
Belarusian political leadership.
Second, financial policy introduced in Belarus in the second half of the 1990s, 
and comprising the polices of directed and preferential credits, negative interest rates, 
high reserve requirements and multiple exchange rates, can be characterised as financial 
repression. Moreover, repressionist financial policy had its complements in 
development strategy in a form of price controls and wage increases policies, 
restrictions on import-export operations and fiscal policy envisaging various tax 
concessions for some agricultural and industrial ‘strategic’ enterprises.
Third, financial repression had rather short-term positive effects on economic 
development through money-led stimulation of investment and consumption, 
particularly surging in 1997-98. However, in the long run the policy appeared to be 
disrupting the economy as it led to demonetisation, dollarisation and financial 
disintermediation that in theory were believed to hinder economic growth. The next two 
chapters test these assumptions.
117
Chapter 6 Financial Restraints: Explaining the Phenomenon of 
Financial Disintermediation in Belarus at the end of 90s
In chapter 5 we discussed the special features of developments in the financial sector in 
Belarus over the period from 1995-2002 and hypothesised that financial restraints 
imposed on the Belarusian financial sector by the government can be termed financial 
repression. The present chapter aims to provide some empirical evidence on the case 
study of financial repression in Belarus. In particular, using various econometric 
techniques, we are going to test if there was financial repression in Belarus in 1996- 
2000 and, if  so, we will estimate its impact on financial deepening with further 
inferences drawn for the Belarusian economic growth pattern of the late 1990s.
6.1 Evolution of Financial Repression Models
While chapter 3 unveils the main empirical findings regarding the impact of financial 
repression on financial development and economic growth, the present section focuses 
on some elaborate theoretical financial repression models and on how these models 
have evolved over the time.
As discussed earlier, most of the empirical studies of financial repression, 
particularly first generation financial repression models, placed an emphasis on the key 
instrument of financial repression, namely the deposit interest rate ceiling. In such 
models (see, for example, Kapur 1976 and Mathieson 1979) an increase in the deposit 
rate of interest was claimed to be a primary instrument of stabilisation policy. In fact, 
these studies departed from the McKinnon-Shaw proposition that ‘inflationary 
economies -  at least the less-developed ones -  tend also to be financially repressed’ 
(Kapur 1976, p.777). Therefore, ‘this phenomenon of financial repression should be 
integrally incorporated into any analysis of stabilisation policy: in particular, it is 
claimed that, as a result, stabilisation through an initial increase in the average nominal 
interest rate paid on money holdings is likely to have significantly more favourable 
short-run effects on the time path of real output than is stabilisation through an initial 
reduction in the rate of monetary expansion’ (ibid).
Assuming ‘technical complementarity between each hour of use of fixed capital 
and the associated requirement of working capital’, Kapur (1976) argued that fixed 
capital was not utilised at its full capacity because in financially repressed economies
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financing of working capital was restrained. It was assumed that bank credit was used to 
finance only the fraction of the cost of replacing ‘worn-out’ working capital and net 
investment in working capital. Under conditions of a fixed nominal deposit interest rate 
leading to a shortage of savings, demand for bank loans was always in excess of their 
supply.
Based on the Harrod-Domar model of growth1, Kapur’s macroeconomic model 
took the following form2:
M  <j*q ny = u  * ----- -— 7t0 > (6.1)
PY  (1 - a )
where y  denotes the rate of economic growth, fi stands for monetary growth, M  
is nominal money holdings, P  is current price level, Y is real GDP, cris the output- 
capital ratio, q is the ratio of bank credit to money, a  is the ratio of utilised fixed capital 
to total utilised capital, n  is the inflation rate, and Q is the fraction of the cost of 
replacing depleted working capital financed by bank loans.
As in most of the early empirical studies, Kapur’s model was based on the 
assumption that the output-capital ratio cr was constant. Therefore, this allowed 
financial conditions to affect only the quantity of investment, whereas later studies 
revealed that growth was mainly attributed to improvements in the quality of investment 
or in other words to the increase in the productivity of capital expressed as the output to 
capital ratio (see chapter 3).
In (6.1) the rate of economic growth is positively associated with the rate of 
monetary growth, the output-capital ratio, the ratio of bank credit to money and the ratio 
of utilised fixed capital.
Kapur’s money demand function, nested into equation (6.1) , is based on 
Cagan’s money demand function:
1 It should be noted that the analysis of the effect of finance on economic growth can depend on the 
choice of the model of economic growth (Fry 1995, p. 12). Thus, the Harrod-Domar model, based on 
constant marginal returns to capital, supports an argument of financial policy having a permanent effect 
on economic growth through the savings-investment ratio. At the same time, the neo-classical economic 
growth model, by assuming diminishing marginal returns to factors of production, envisages only short­
term effects on economic growth through the savings-investment ratio and no effect on economic growth 
in a long run. Finally, endogenous growth models, assuming constant or increasing marginal productivity 
of capital due the presence of positive production externalities (for example from the learning process of 
capital), also suggest a permanent effect of the investment ratio on economic growth.
2 For stepwise derivation of the model see Kapur (1976).
3 For this M in (6 i) is substituted with e a^n ^ ^  from (6.2).
PY
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—  = Ye a( 716 d \  (6.2)
P
where M/P denotes real money balances, Y is real GDP, d is the average nominal
deposit interest rate, n e is the expected rate of inflation, a  is a. positive constant 
denoting the semielasticity of the demand for money with respect to the rate of inflation.
Kapur’s work suggests that an increase in the deposit rate has a more rapid 
deflationary effect than a reduction in the monetary growth rate. He attributes this to the 
fact that ‘an increase in the deposit rate directly increases the expected real return to 
money perceived by money holders, whereas a reduction in monetary growth rate can 
only increase the expected real return after it has worked through the entire system to 
produce a fall in the expected inflation rate’4 (Kapur 1976, p.790). Thus, one of the 
policy implications of these models is abolishing interest rate ceilings.
Developed in the 1980s and early 1990s, endogenous growth models (see for 
example Lucas 1988, Greenwood and Jovanovic 1990, Bencivega and Smith 1991, 
1992 and King and Levine 1993) in the first place aimed at establishing the rationale for 
financial intermediation and at providing an explanation of how financial intermediaries 
emerged (see Fry 1995, p.76). In this strand of literature, growth is modelled 
endogenously -  ‘that is, it does not depend on exogenous technological change’ 
(Greenwood and Jovanovic 1990). It was believed that in the early stages of economic 
development financial institutions are virtually absent, as financial intermediation 
requires some fixed entry costs (transaction costs) to be paid by individuals who wish to 
use financial intermediaries’ services (see Fry 1995). Individuals begin to resort to the 
financial sector’s services, as they reach the point at which their wealth exceeds some 
minimum level and they start thinking of optimising their wealth. At this point, financial 
intermediaries emerge onto the stage, as they can offer individuals a bigger variety of 
financial products with varying returns and a possibility to minimise investors’ risks 
through diversifying their portfolios.
The rationale for the existence of financial intermediaries in endogenous growth 
models is dictated by the presence of uncertainty and is related to its risks and costly 
information, implying high monitoring costs (see Pagano 1993 and Fry 1995). Financial 
institutes can encourage allocation of individuals’ savings towards the most productive
4 This explanation was initially offered by McKinnon (see Kapur 1976, p.790).
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investment. It can be done through collecting and analysing information by financial 
intermediaries and then channelling funds to their most profitable use, in this way 
raising the average return to capital (see Greenwood and Jovanovic 1990); by 
‘providing maturity intermediation’ by increasing liquidity of investment and therefore 
decreasing the premature withdrawals of investors (see Bencivenga and Smith 1991); by 
optimising transaction costs by allowing, first of all, financial institutes to perform a 
monitoring task that reduces the costs of each individual doing this (see Blackburn and 
Hung 1998); and sharing the risks5 (see Saint-Paul 1992). The existence of a bi­
directional relationship between financial development and economic growth is 
advanced in endogenous growth models; that is, development of financial institutes is 
stimulated by rising incomes, while simultaneously financial intermediaries affect 
growth via raising the productivity of investment and the saving ratio6 (Fry 1995, p.75). 
Thus, unlike first-generation models, endogenous growth models contend that financial 
intermediation affects growth not only through an increase in savings rate but also 
through improvement in the quality of investment.
The basic endogenous growth model is the ‘AK model’, in which aggregate 
output is a function of aggregate capital stock. Based on Pagano’s presentation, the 
Lucas (1988) endogenous growth model takes the following form (see Pagano 1993, p. 
614):
g  = A ( p s - 8 , (6.3)
where g is the economic growth rate, A is the marginal productivity of capital, 
(j) is the proportion of savings channelled to investment and 8  is the capital 
depreciation rate.
The model suggests (as was adumbrated earlier) that there are three ways by 
which the development of a financial sector can affect economic growth, namely 
through 1) an increase in the productivity of investments; 2) reduction in transaction 
costs that will result in an increase in the share of savings channelled towards 
investment (see chapter 3); 3) an increase in the savings rate.
5 In his model Saint-Paul (1992) argued that productivity could be increased through obtaining a greater 
degree of specialisation of firms. In turn, it was recognised that the latter may well have increased risks 
from sectoral demand shocks. However, these risks can be minimised by letting investors to diversify 
their portfolios via the stock market (this is possible upon condition that a well-developed stock market 
exists) (Saint-Paul 1992).
6 In endogenous growth theory each firm faces constant or even declining returns to scale, but due to the 
existing positive production externalities from knowledge component of capital overall productivity turns 
to be an increasing function of the aggregate capital stock (see Fry 1995 and Pagano 1993).
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In the context of the finance-growth nexus, endogenous growth theory has 
several implications for financially repressed economies. By the definition of financial 
repression, financial intermediaries in such economies cannot perform the role assigned 
to them by endogenous growth theory (as noted above) to ensure the allocation of 
capital to its most productive use. In the first place, due to some legislative restrictions 
imposed on the financial sector, no effective formal institutions exist in such economies 
that could guarantee high and risk-minimised returns to investors. In an environment of 
uncertainty, investors tend to be highly risk-averse and prefer to invest in unproductive 
tangible assets. Moreover, directed credit and preferential loans schemes, widely 
exercised in FR economies, lead to ineffective allocation of scarce funds, mainly 
channelled towards low productive and non-profitable projects, leaving few prospects 
for economic growth sustainable in the long-run.
The present study of the impact of financial repression on financial deepening 
and economic growth in Belarus is based on various works of Demetriades and Luintel 
that were introduced in chapter 3. In particular, the model of financial repression is 
adopted here with some adjustments made for specific features of economic 
development in Belarus during the period of examination.
6.2 Specifying the Functional Model to Estimate an Impact of FR on 
Financial Development and Economic Growth in Belarus
As it was shown in chapter 5, the banking system in Belarus, being a pillar of the 
financial system, was highly monopolised in 1996-2000. It was (and has remained to a 
large extent) a state monopoly, with authorities intervening in economic activity and 
repressing the financial sector. As our analysis in chapter 5 revealed, the Belarusian 
case of financial repression, particularly of interest rates, was rather severe (with interest 
rates set far below the competitive ffee-market equilibrium interest rate). Therefore, it is 
believed to have discouraged savings and consequently reduced the volume of loanable 
funds, and lowered the productivity of investment. This should have had an adverse 
effect on the rate of economic growth in the long run, if  financial structure did matter 
for economic growth.
In order to examine the impact of FR on financial depth we will estimate 
equation (6.4) replicating the model that Demetraides and Luintel (1997) use to examine 
the Indian case of financial repression:
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LFD , = a 0 + a lLYt + a 2Rt + a 3FRIt + a 4DEVt + ut , (6.4)
where LFD is the log of financial depth, measured as the ratio of bank deposits 
to nominal GDP;
LY is the log of the real GDP per capita;
R is the real deposit interest rate;
DEV is the rate of devaluation of domestic currency;
FRI is a summary measure of financial repression.
The above model is adjusted for the following special feature of economic 
development in Belarus over the period of interest. As was mentioned in chapter 5, one 
of the consequences of repressionist policies in Belarus in 1996-2000 was dollarisation 
of the Belarusian economy. Therefore, we introduce the DEV variable to proxy 
dollarisation. To construct this series it is necessary to recall the multiple exchange rate 
regime operating in Belarus from 1996 to 2000. Since there is no reliable information 
on the volume of currency transactions carried out for each separate exchange rate, we 
follow the National Bank of Belarus’s method to overcome this problem. Thus the 
nominal exchange rate is to be computed as a weighted average of official (15 per cent) 
and market end-of-month exchange rates (85 per cent)7. With financial depth measured 
as total rouble deposits to nominal GDP, the coefficient of DEV is expected to have a 
negative sign8.
As noted in chapter 5, the widespread use of barter and other non-monetary 
operations in transactions between economic agents was another consequence of 
repressionist policies in Belarus between 1996-2000. But, it is impossible to address this 
problem due to the lack of information on barter transactions.
Our empirical analysis has two objectives. First of all, it aims to examine 
whether financial policy introduced in Belarus in 1996-2000 can be dubbed as financial 
repression, and if  so, what the effects were of repressionist policies on financial 
deepening. Second, it aims at unveiling the interactions between financial depth and 
economic growth.
7 These proportions are based on the NBB approximate evaluation of the volume of transactions that are 
carried at each exchange rate.
8 It would be also interesting to estimate an equation with financial depth measured as a ratio of deposits 
nominated in foreign currency to GDP from the point of view that the real deposit interest rate (on 
deposits nominated in FXC) and devaluation of domestic currency should have positive effects on 
financial depth. However, due to the lack of data on the deposit interest rate on FXC deposits this analysis 
cannot be undertaken.
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In the first instance, we hypothesise that financial repression took place in 
Belarus in 1996-2000. Therefore we expect the coefficient of FRI in equation (6.4) to be 
statistically significant. Moreover, if FRI variable turns out to be statistically different 
from zero, it will confirm the findings of Demetriades and Luintel (1997, 2001) that 
repressionist policies exert a direct impact on financial deepening that is independent of 
influence of FR through the real deposit rate of interest. We also put forward a 
hypothesis that the repressionist policies, on the whole, had a negative influence on 
financial depth and economic growth over the period. With regard to the former, the 
coefficient of FRI is assumed to enter equation (6.4) with a negative sign. In the second 
instance, we consequently expect that financial development inhibited economic growth 
in a long run, if  finance mattered for economic development.
6.3 Methodology and Data
The monthly data run from May 1995 to December 2002. The sample is chosen on the 
basis of data availability (see chapter 1 for more detail) and the desire to incorporate 
both the 1996-2000 repression and the fragments of partial financial liberalisation which 
occurred in 1995 and in 2001-02. There are 92 observations in total.
Financial depth is measured by total bank deposits nominated in roubles to 
nominal GDP denominated in roubles. Data on rouble bank deposits, 6-month nominal 
deposits and lending interest rates (the latter is needed to construct the index of FR), 
official and market-determined parallel exchange rates were obtained from the National 
Bank of Belarus. Real deposit/lending rates are defined as the nominal deposit/lending 
interest rate minus the current rate of inflation9. The rate of inflation is defined as the 
percentage change in a consumer price index (CPI). Data on the monthly rate of 
inflation and monthly real GDP (see appendix F for checking reliability of GDP data) 
were provided by the Belarusian Research Centre of Institute of Privatisation and 
Management (EPM), which in turn obtained the data from the Ministry of Statistics and 
Analysis (MSA). The real GDP per capita series is calculated by dividing the aggregate 
series by population. The financial depth and real GDP per capita are in logarithmic 
form.
9 We use the current rate of inflation to calculate the real deposit rate, assuming the prevalence of rational 
expectations in the formation of the inflation rate (see chapter 7 for justification of the assumption). 
Therefore, for simplicity we assume that the expected rate of inflation formed rationally is equal to the 
actual rate of inflation.
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Figure 6.2: Natural logarithm o f real GDP per capita11
10 A uthors’ calculations on the data provided by the National Bank o f the Republic o f Belarus (National 
Bank o f  Belarus 2000a (January), 2000b (January), 2001, 2002, 2003).
11 A uthors’ calculations on the data provided by the Institute o f Privatisation and M anagement [online]. 
Available from: http://ipm.by/index.pl?topicid=inside [Accessed September 2003].
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Figure 6.3: Real deposit interest rate12
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Figure 6.4: The rate o f  devaluation o f the Belarusian Rouble versus US Dollar13
From these graphs, the first trend which is notable is that the log of real GDP (LNY) 
exhibits a seasonal pattern.
By testing all four series for seasonality, the results of the variable deletion test 
show that the introduced seasonal dummy variables are jointly significant only in the 
log of the real GDP series14. The real GDP series was seasonally adjusted using an X-
12 A uthors’ calculations on the NBB data given to the author by the Head o f  Foreign Exchange Analysis 
and Forecasting D ivision o f the NBB during our meeting in M arch 2003.
13 Ibid.
14 F statistic (F (11, 80) is equal to 3.69 with probability 0.000 that rejects the null hypothesis o f joint 
insignificance o f  seasonal dummies at the 1 % level o f  significance.
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11.2 procedure15 performed in EViews Version 3.1. All other estimations are conducted 
using either Microfit version 4.0 or EViews Version 3.1.
To avoid multicollinearity and a reduction in the degrees of freedom we use a 
summary index of FR instead of introducing each repressionist policy individually (see 
Demetriades and Luintel 1996, 1997, Roubini and Sala-i-Martin 1992). We compose 
two alternative summary measures of financial policies to take into account the joint 
influence of all of the policy variables (Demetriades and Luintel 1996, 1997). The first 
one, FRI j , is a simple arithmetic mean of all policy variables. The second one, FRI 2 , is
constructed on the basis of principal component analysis16. Normalising policy variables 
(subtracting the mean and dividing by the standard deviation) preceded the construction 
of both indices.
The index is comprised of series on the following repressionist policies.
i. Deposit rates ceiling;
ii. Lending rates ceiling;
iii. Directed credit schemes and loans with concessionary lending rates 
to priority sectors;
iv. Reserve requirements
Because of the fragmentary nature of official data recording ceilings on deposit 
and lending interest rates, the first two controls are measured on the basis of Agarwala’s
I n
approach (1983). In the latter, the degree of interest rate repression is defined as high 
when real interest rates were less than minus 5 per cent per annum; medium when they 
varied between 0 and minus 5 per cent per annum; and low/absent when real interest 
rates were positive. Respectively, values 3, 2 and 1 are assigned to a dummy variable 
denoting FRI in Agarwala’s work. In Belarus, the annual real interest rate sometimes 
exceeded minus 200 in 1995-2002. Thus, in order to capture the severity of interest 
rates repression, we use a different scale of values for the dummy variable. It takes the 
value of zero when interest rates are positive; one when they are in a range between 0
15 X-l 1.2 procedure is based on the U.S. Bureau of the Census X-l 1 seasonal adjustment program. It uses 
a sequence of moving average filters to seasonally adjust data. Decomposition of series may take two 
forms, namely multiplicative and additive. The former is used when the series can be decomposed into a 
product of a trend and a seasonal component, while the latter is appropriate if the series can be 
decomposed into a sum of a trend and a seasonal component. A multiplicative method was used in the 
present work. For the technical details of the procedure see the Bureau of the Census report (1969).
16 For a discussion see, for example, Theil (1971).
17 As Roubini and Sala-i-Martin’s (1992) work suggests, the distortion dummy defined as dichotomous, 
taking the values zero when financial restraints are present or one when they are not, may not capture the 
severity of financial repression, producing statistically insignificant results.
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and minus 20; two when they vary between minus 21 and minus 40 and so forth, up to a 
value of eleven when real interest rates exceed minus 200. As one can see, the value of 
a dummy variable is greater as the degree of repression increases.
The ‘directed and preferential credits’ repressionist instrument reflects the 
intensity of the program. The dummy variable is zero for no direct credit; and one, two 
and three when the share of directed and preferential loans reach 20 per cent, 21-40 per 
cent, and over 40 per cent, respectively, of total bank credit.18 As only annual data on 
the directed credit program in Belarus are available, some subjective judgement was 
used to construct this variable. Monthly data were derived on the basis of annual data, 
taking into account the seasonal pattern of agricultural subsidies and the even annual 
distribution of house construction loans.19 Preferential loans are also taken into account 
while constructing the dummy variable. Since no data are available on the volume of 
these loans, information obtained during interviews with the NBB officials and from the 
official governmental and NBB documents (see chapter 5) served as the basis for 
judging the scale and intensity of this program.
Finally, the required reserve ratio is computed as a weighted average of the 
reserve requirements rate on demand and time deposits. The share of demand and time 
deposits in total deposits nominated in BRB are respectively used as weights. Data on 
the required reserve ratio was provided by the NBB.
A factor (principal components) analysis performed in SPSS identified two 
principal components constructing FRI 2 . Interest rate ceilings seem to load more to the
first principal component, while reserve requirements and directed and preferential 
loans scheme load to the second one. Cumulatively both components account for 84 per 
cent of the total variation in the policy variables. FRI 2 is constructed as a weighted
average of these two components, where the weights are equal to the relative 
contribution of each component in explaining the total variation. Thus, if the first 
principal component explains 54 per cent of variation, then the weights attached to it 
will be equal to 54/84.
Both the arithmetic average index and the one computed on the basis of 
principal components analysis were linearly transformed to take the value 0 in May
18 The approach is adapted from Demetriades and Luintel (1997).
19 To recall from chapter 5 both sectors were the major recipients of directed credits.
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1995 and to be scaled by 100 (see figure 6.5). They are strongly positively correlated 








FRI1 (measured as an arithmetic average)
FRI2 (measured on a basis of principal components technique)
Figure 6.5: Financial repression index, FRI20
As one can see from figure 6.5 the trends of both indices are identical, although FRI j is
lower compared to FRI 2 • The difference between them particularly sharpens in
September 1998 when financial crisis in Russia hits the Belarusian economy. It can be 
explained as follows. Recalling the results of factor analysis interest rate ceilings load 
more than the other two elements to the first component that explains the major 
proportion of variation in the index. With inflation rocketing in the aftermath of the 
financial crisis and nominal interest rates undergoing minor adjustment, real interest 
rates fell significantly, on average from minus 16 to minus 149 per cent. The change in 
the volume of directed credits and the ratio of reserve requirements was rather minor 
comparing to the one in the rate of the real interest. All this explains why FRIj, 
computed as an arithmetic average, looks smoother on a graph around the timing of 
financial crisis than FRI2 that is computed on a basis of principal components analysis.
20 Authors’ calculations on the data provided by the National Bank of the Republic of Belarus (National 
Bank of Belarus 2000a (January), 2000b (January), 2001, 2002, 2003); the NBB data given to the author 
by the Head of Foreign Exchange Analysis and Forecasting Division of the NBB during our meeting in 
March 2003.
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The index of financial repression is fairly low during May -  November 1996 and 2001- 
2002, denoting the periods of partial financial liberalisation. It rises from December 
1996, reaching its peak in September 1998 -  February 1999 in the aftermath of financial 
crisis in Russia. Thereafter it exhibits a downward trend.
6.4 Empirical results
6.4.1 Unit root tests
To ascertain the order of integration or in other words to test our series for stationarity 
we begin by applying the Dickey-Fuller (DF) and Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) 
tests. The ADF test presents the higher AR version of the DF test. Regressions (6.5) and 
(6.9) were estimated to test for the presence of a unit root in level and in first differences 
of series, respectively:
p
Ay, = a 0 + yyt_x + £  /3,Ayt_M + a xt + u, (6.5)
(=2
«=2
Along with (6.5) and (6.6) two other regressions were estimated; the first with a
linear trend not included in (6.5) and (6.6), and the second with both intercept and a
linear trend again, not included in (6.5) and (6.6). The null hypothesis in the ADF is the 
• • 1presence of a unit root in the series . The choice of the appropriate number of lags to be 
used in the ADF test can be determined by starting from a lag length of 12 and 
examining the reduction of each lag length, with the Akaike information criterion (AIC) 
or Schwarz Bayesian Criterion (SBC) as model selection criteria. The model with the 
highest value of AIC or SBC is a parsimonious one. However, sometimes these criteria 
can produce conflicting results. In this case the lag-length is determined by showing the 
residuals are white noise . In other words, if for example elimination of the lags 
produces serial correlation, then the lags are added back.
Table 6.1 presents the summary of the ADF test for the presence of a unit root in
levels.
21 See appendix E for the detailed description of the Dickey-Fuller and the Augmented Dickey-Fuller 
tests.
22 The DF distributions are based on the assumption that an error term is ‘white noise’ (Harris 1995, 
p.32).
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The results show that for the natural logarithm of real GDP per capita seasonally 
adjusted, for the real deposit interest rate (R) and for the rate of devaluation (DEV) it is 
possible to reject the null hypothesis of a unit root at the 1 % and 5 % levels of 
significance. This implies that these variables are stationary in levels, or in other words 
they are 1(0). Moreover, for LNYsa series the ADF regression contains both 
deterministic terms, namely an intercept and a linear trend, while for R and DEV the 
ADF regression is a random walk23. The results of the ADF test for financial depth and 
for the index of financial repression cannot reject the null hypothesis of a unit root, and 




Tar TPr & ^2 Tan T




H y p o th e s is 7  =  0 a Q = 0 
given 
7  =  0
a x =0 
given 
7  =  0
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r  = <* 1 =
= t f 0 =0
7  =  0 cc0 = 
0
given 
7  =  0
a Q = 
= 7 = 0
7  =  0
LFD
(L=12) -1.01 .895 -1.161 .01 1.31 -2.02 1.99 1.98 -.42
LNYsa24
(L=12th)
-5.87*** 5.88*** 5.66*** 15.47*** 11.54*** -1.61 1.62 1.32 .91
FRI,
(L=12) -1.20 2.25 -1.79 1.61 1.71 -1.47 1.37 .93 -.53
f r i 2
(L=12) -1.47 2.06 -1.46 .14 .28 -1.59 1.45 .15 -.66
R (L = 1 ) -2.89 -0.55 -0.9 .03 1.29 -2.91** -1.23 1.95 -2.63***
D EV (L = l) -3.04** 1.54 -.41 .09 1.44 -3.07** 2.05* 2.09 -2.25**
Table 6.1: Results o f ADF test for the presence o f a unit root in level25
23 While for DEV series the value o i r a allows rejecting the null hypothesis a 0 = 0 at 10 % level of 
significance, the value of (f)x does not appear statistically significant to reject the HO: a 0 = y  = 0 .
24 LNYsa is a seasonally adjusted natural logarithm of real GDP per capita; since only the AR at lag 12 is 
significant, there is no need to include all the AR terms up to 12 into the regression, but only the 12th 
lagged differences.
25 Authors’ calculations on the data provided by the National Bank of the Republic of Belarus (National 
Bank of Belarus 2000a (January), 2000b (January), 2001, 2002, 2003); the NBB data given to the author 
by the Head of Foreign Exchange Analysis and Forecasting Division of the NBB during our meeting in 
March 2003; Institute of Privatisation and Management [online]. Available from: 
http://ipm.bv/index.pl?topicid=inside [Accessed September 2003]. *** = reject the null hypothesis at the 
1 % level; ** = reject the null hypothesis at the 5 % level; * = reject the null hypothesis at the 10 % level. 
L in parentheses denotes a number of lagged differences. For the detailed description of the Dickey- 
Fuller and the Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests and for the interpretation of the labels denoting tau- 
statistics see appendix E.
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As a rule of thumb a non-stationary series becomes stationary after taking its first 
differences. Table 6.2 summarises the results of the unit root test for LFD and FRI 
variables in first differences. The null hypothesis of a unit root can be rejected at the 1 
% level of significance. Moreover, the estimated ADF regression for both series 
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Hypothesis y  = 0 a 0 = 
0
given 
y  = 0
a x =0 
given 
y  = 0
y  = a x 
=0
y  = a x = 
= a Q=0
y  = 0 a  o = 
0
given 
y  = 0
a 0 =
= r  = 
0
y -  0
LFD
(L = ll)
-11.51*** -1.77 1.77 1.57 1.08 -11.23*** -.34 0.06 -11 3***
FRI, (L = l) -7 93*** .93 -.99 .49 .33 -7.88*** .12 .008 -7 92***
f r i 2
(L = l l th)26 -8.66*** .75 -.79 .31 .21 -8.64*** .53 .0001 _ g  7 * * *
Table 6.2: Results o f  ADF test fo r the presence o f a unit root in first differences27
Diagnostic tests (see table 6.3) performed to check whether the residuals are white noise 
highlight the problem of normality in FRI2, R and DEV series. This suggests a structural 
change in the data that can be also traced by the graphic analysis of the data. Therefore, 
the conclusion of the absence of a unit root in these series can be biased. For the 
plausibility of the results we will test all the series for a unit root, allowing for a 
structural change in them.
26 Since only the AR at lag 11 is significant, there is no need to include all the AR terms up to 11 into the 
regression, but only the 11th lagged differences.
27 Authors’ calculations on the data provided by the National Bank of the Republic of Belarus (National 
Bank of Belarus 2000a (January), 2000b (January), 2001, 2002, 2003); the NBB data given to the author 
by the Head of Foreign Exchange Analysis and Forecasting Division of the NBB during our meeting in 
March 2003; Institute of Privatisation and Management [online]. Available from: 
http://ipm.by/index.pl7topicidHhside [Accessed September 2003]. *** = reject the null hypothesis at the 
1% level; ** = reject the null hypothesis at the 5 % level; * = reject the null hypothesis at the 10 % level. 
L in parentheses denotes a number of lagged differences. For the detailed description of the Dickey- 
Fuller and the Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests and for the interpretation of the labels denoting tau- 
statistics see appendix E.
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%2 (12)=14.10[.294] X 2 (2)= 2.78[.249] X 2 0 ) = -408[.523]
FRIj
( L = l )
K D
X 2 (12)=15.96 [.193] X 2 (2)= 2.43[.297] %2 (1)= -752[.386]
FRI2
( L ^ l * )
K D
X 2 (12)=12.81 [.383] X 2 (2)= 20.85[.0001 X 2 (1)= .205[.650]
R
(L = l )
1(0)
X 2 (12)= 13.93[.305] X 2 (2)= 134.49[.000] X 2 (1)= .029[.864]
DEV (L=l) 
1(0)
X 2 (12)= 5.88[.922] X 2 (2)= 269.33 [.000] * 2 (1)=3.5[.061]
Table 6.3: Summary o f diagnostic tests28
Zivot and Andrews’ (1992) methodology is employed to perform a unit root test with 
the presence of a structural change. It allows us to treat the breakpoint as endogenous or 
unknown . Table 6.4 presents the results of the Zivot-Andrews test.
28 Authors’ calculations on the data provided by the National Bank of the Republic of Belarus (National 
Bank of Belarus 2000a (January), 2000b (January), 2001, 2002, 2003); the NBB data given to the author 
by the Head of Foreign Exchange Analysis and Forecasting Division of the NBB during our meeting in 
March 2003; Institute of Privatisation and Management [online]. Available from: 
http://ipm.bv/index.pl?topicid=inside [Accessed September 2003]. A number of lagged differences L is 
in parentheses; p-values are given in square brackets; I(x) indicates the level of stationarity. P-values are 
given in square brackets.
29 In chapter 7 we use different methodologies to perform a unit root test allowing for a structural break. 
They are Perron’s (1989) test with a known breakpoint and Baneijee’s et al. (1992) test with unknown 
timing of the break. While Zivot-Andrews’ test is now incorporated in some of the econometric packages 
(in the present case it was performed utilizing WinRATS-32 version 5.04), the aforementioned tests 
envisage rather a very routine procedure (virtually ‘manual’) to mn them (see appendix E for a 
description of the aforementioned tests).
133
Julia A. Korosteleva (2006) Chapter 6
Minimum t statistic/time of break
Variables Shift in intercept Shift in trend Shift in both trend 
and intercept
LFD -3.93 -3.93 -3.93
(L=l) 1995:09 1995:09 1995:09
LNYsa -8.15*** -7.66*** -8.16***
(L=0) 1997:06 1998:04 1997:06
FRIi -3.93 j*** -6.002***
(L=l) 1995:09 1998:11 1998:09
f r i2 -3.23 -4.19 -5.02
(L=0) 2000:01 1998:11 1998:09
R -4.59 -4.78** -5.59***
(L=l) 2000:02 1998:11 1998:9
DEV -4.07 -4.07 -4.92
(L=l) 1998:08 1998:11 1998:08
Critical
values
[1 %] -5.34 -4.93 -5.57
[5 %] -4.80 -4.42 -5.08
Table 6.4: Results o f Zivot-Andrews ’ unit root test in the presence o f a structural 
change30
The results presented in table 6.4 confirm that a natural logarithm of real GDP per 
capita appears to be 1(0) series. Moreover, the real deposit interest rate could also be 
treated as 1(0) rather than 1(1) variable if we allow for a structural change in the data in 
both intercept and trend in the aftermath of the financial crisis in Russia. The breakpoint 
picked up in intercept of R in February 2000 for which the minimum t-statistic does not 
reject the null hypothesis of a unit root can neither be explained rationally nor be 
supported graphically. As a result of the test, the rate of devaluation turned out to be 
1(1), whereas the ADF suggested it to be stationary in level. However, the graphic 
examination of the series suggests it to be I (0). Here, it should be noted that the Zivot- 
Andrew test allows for only one exogenous break in a series, whereas the graph 
suggests the series to have more than two structural breaks in levels. A two-break test
30 Authors’ calculations on the data provided by the National Bank of the Republic of Belarus (National 
Bank of Belarus 2000a (January), 2000b (January), 2001, 2002, 2003); the NBB data given to the author 
by the Head of Foreign Exchange Analysis and Forecasting Division of the NBB during our meeting in 
March 2003; Institute of Privatisation and Management [online]. Available from: 
http://ipm.bv/index.pl?topicid=::inside [Accessed September 2003]. *** = reject the null hypothesis at the 
1% level; ** = reject the null hypothesis at the 5 % level.
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designed by Lumsdaine and Papell (1997) also cannot be applied here, as the number of 
breaks in series exceeds two. Therefore, for our further analysis we will treat DEV 
series as 1(0).
The results of the Zivot-Andrew test are also different from the ADF test results 
for FRIi that appears to be 1(0) if we allow for a structural break in series around the 
dates of the financial crisis in Russia. At the same time the unit root hypothesis cannot 
be rejected for FRI2 . Compared to FRIi series, FRI2 exhibits a spikier pattern with 
financial repression rocketing up in August-October 1998. The results of a unit root test 
in the presence of a structural change for LFD series are in line with the ADF test 
results. Summarising the results of both unit root tests performed, we conclude that LFD 
and FRI2 series appear to be stationary in first differences, while LNYsa, FRIi, DEV 
and R are stationary in level. Moreover, the results of Zivot-Andrews’s test suggest a 
clear break in intercept/or trend/or both present in at least three series. It occurred in the 
aftermath of the financial crisis in Russia. The results of the test suggest the breakpoint 
to fall within September-December 1998. Therefore, the latter has to be incorporated 
into the model as a dummy variable D to capture an impact of financial crisis in Russia 
on financial depth in Belarus (see below for the values this variable will take)31.
6.4.2 Estimating the impact of Financiai Repression on Financial 
Deepening
The unit root analysis suggests that we can use cointegration techniques such as the 
autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) approach to cointegration or the ‘bounds test’, 
developed in Pesaran et al. (2001). This approach does not require us to know whether 
the variables are integrated of order 1(1) or 1(0). The ARDL procedure envisages two 
stages. The first stage involves checking for the existence of long-run relation between 
the variables, based on computing the F-statistic for testing the significance of the 
lagged levels of the variables in the error-correction form of the ARDL.
Depending on the chosen order of lags, the error-correction form of the ARDL is 
as follows:
31 While estimating the final model other breaks mentioned in the text were included in the regression to 
test their significance. None of them appears to be statistically significant in explaining financial depth. It 
should be noted that they are statistically significant only in individual regressions explaining, say, the 
devaluation rate or real income in terms of other variables, while testing for long-run relations in ARDL 
approach to cointegration procedure or performing a Hausman test. That is why we include only one 
dummy variable, denoting financial crisis in Russia, in a final regression.
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A Y t (Xq + cxxt + ^^cx2AY(_i + cx3A X  t_i +  ^ i .y ,_ j  i~*~ ( ^ - 7 )
1=1 7=0
where S] and S2 are long-run coefficients and a 2 and a 3 are short-run 
coefficients, or0is a drift term and a x is a time trend, n and m denote the maximum
order of the lags of AY and AX  respectively (for definition of Y and X see (6.8)).
The null hypothesis is that of ‘non-existence’ of the long-run relationship, to be 
defined as follows: HO: Sl=S2= 0 against HI: S2 & 0. Here the ordinary F statistic
is used to test the joint significance of these coefficients. The computed F-statistics are 
compared with the critical values developed by Pesaran et al. (2001). There are two sets 
of critical values. One is calculated assuming that all ARDL variables are of 1(1), while 
the other assumes all the variables are 1(0). If the F statistic falls outside this band of 
critical values, one can draw conclusions without knowing whether the variables are 
1(1) or 1(0) (Pesaran et al. 2001). The same procedure is repeated for testing the 
significance of the other lagged level variables by regressing AX  on the same 
regressors of equation (6.7).
The second stage includes estimating the long-run coefficients and the 
associated error-correction model (for more details see Pesaran 1997, Pesaran et al 
2001).
In order to examine the existence of a long-run relationship in equation (6.4) we 
estimate a conditional error correction model of financial depth (6.8) for the number of 
lags of the VAR model. We assume that the expected rate of devaluation is on average 
equal to the actual rate of devaluation.
1) 7 1 1
ALFD, = a 0 + 'Y_,a1hLFD,_i + £ a 3AFfi/l,_; + £ a 4AlnXsa,_; + £ a 5AZW,_, +
1=1 7=0 7=0 7=0
2
+ Y ta 6AR,-j +SlLFDM +S2Fm,_, +S3 Infra,., +S4DEVM + S6R,_t + DC/98 + u ,(6.8)
7=0
where DU98=1 if time of break= August 1998 - December 1998 and 0 
otherwise.
The lag order of the financial depth equation was chosen on the basis of the 
model selection criteria and providing residuals are white noise. This resulted in the 
choice of an ARDL (11, 7, 1, 1, 2) specification without trend (see (6.8)). The F 
statistic computed to test the joint significance of long-run coefficients di is equal to 
F(LFD|FRIi, LNYsa, DEV, R) = 16.4572[.000] that rejects the null hypothesis of ‘non­
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existence’ of the long-run relationship between LFD, FRIi, LNYsa , DEV and R at the 
1 % level of significance .
The same procedure was applied to test the significance of explanatory lagged 
level variables in the error correction model, in explaining their first differences. As 
discussed above if F statistics for testing the joint significance of the lagged level 
variables fall below the lower bound of the critical value band provided by Pesaran et al. 
(2001) it implies that they do not enter significantly in the equations for A LNYsa, 
A FRI, AR, and A DEV and therefore they can be treated as ‘long-run forcing’ 
variables. This procedure, first applied to the real GDP per capita series, resulted in 
rejecting the HO of LNYsa being a ‘long-run forcing’ variable for the explanation of 
financial depth. The F statistic33 exceeds the upper bound of the critical value band at 
the 1 % level of significance, implying the problem of endogeneity of the real GDP per 
capita variable. The procedure was applied to other three explanatory variables. The null 
hypothesis of FRIi being a ‘long-run forcing’ variable cannot be rejected at the 1 % 
level of significance34. However, we fail to reject it for FRI2 , R and DEV35.
These results suggest that there exist more than one cointegrating relationship in 
the financial depth equation. A further application of the ARDL procedure is 
inappropriate in estimating the financial depth equation, because the ARDL technique is 
based on estimating a single equation, while dealing with situations where there can be 
more than one level relationship, as in our case, is a matter of employing the VAR 
model.
Following the unit root analysis we have only FRI2 as an explanatory variable 
that is first differences stationary. Therefore, FRI2 is the only variable that can be 
potentially cointegrated with the dependent variable denoting financial depth. With a
32 Critical value bounds of the F statistic with unrestricted intercept and no trend at the 1 % level of 
significance are: 1(0) 3.817 and 1(1) 5.122. We also tested for existence of long-run relationship between 
LFD, LNYsa , DEV, R and FRI] replaced with FRI2. The HO of ‘non-existence’ of the long-run 
relationship was rejected at the 1 % level of significance (Fst = 12.33 [0.000] (Pesaran et al. 2001, pp. 
T.1-T.3).
33 F(LNYsa|LFD, FRIb DEV, R) = 6.44[.000] Critical value bounds of the F statistic with unrestricted 
intercept and trend at the 1 % level of significance are: 1(0) 4.40 and 1(1) 5.72 (ibid).
34 F(FRI]|LFD, LNYsa, DEV, R) st. = 3.43[.008] Critical value bounds of the F statistic with unrestricted 
intercept and trend at the 1 % level of significance are: 1(0) 4.40 and 1(1) 5.72 (ibid).
35 F(FRI2|LFD, LNYsa, DEV, R) st. = 4.62[.001] Critical value bounds of the F statistic with 
unrestricted intercept and trend at the 5 % level of significance are: 1(0) 3.47 and 1(1) 4.57; F(R|LFD, 
LNYsa, DEV, FRI]) st. = 4.8 [.001] Critical value bounds of the F statistic with unrestricted intercept and 
no trend at the 5 % level of significance are: 1(0) 2.86 and 1(1) 4.01; F(DEV|LFD, LNYsa, FRI], R) st. = 
27.44[.000] Critical value bounds of the F statistic with unrestricted intercept and trend at the 1 % level of 
significance are: 1(0) 4.40 and 1(1) 5.72 (ibid).
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view to employing the Johansen cointegration procedure,36 the inclusion of level 
stationary series in a cointegrated space is visible following the arguments developed by 
Rahbek and Mosconi (1999)37. However, in the present circumstances it is not 
advisable, as the results can be spurious and hard to interpret, suggesting more than one 
cointegration relationship when, in fact, there exists only one true cointegration 
relationship. This is because the number of cointegrated relationships increases with 
every stationary variable included. Moreover, the inclusion of a dummy variable to 
capture the impact of financial crisis in Russia will affect the distribution of the test 
statistics, such that the critical values for these tests reported by software can lead to 
biased results. Finally, the Johansen cointegration procedure does not have good small 
samples properties; it tends to over-reject when the null hypothesis is true (see Harris 
1995, p.88).
Therefore, we have to abandon the use of cointegration techniques in estimating 
equation 6.4. In turn, we will use OLS procedure by taking the first differences of the 
dependent variable, LFD, and explanatory variable, FRI2, to make them stationary. Other 
variables enter the equation in levels. In particular, an Autoregressive Distributed Lag 
(ADL) model is going to be utilised here in order to capture the dynamics in the series. 
The estimated coefficients of the explanatory variables will take on the interpretation of 
their impact on financial deepening during the evaluation period. Unlike cointegration 
techniques, the use of the ADL model will not allow us to draw any separate inferences 
about the short-run and long-run effects that the explanatory variables exerted on 
financial deepening. Before utilising the ADL estimator we tested all the series for weak 
exogeneity following the problem of endogeneity identified earlier. A Hausman test was 
performed. We run an auxiliary regression with application to the real GDP series 
(financial repression index, the rate of devaluation and the real deposit interest rate) of 
the kind of ADL model specified below (6.11). We introduced the first differences of the 
financial depth variable and of the principal components financial repression index in 
equation 6.11, for the OLS estimates to be valid. The logarithms of the real government 
expenditures per capita and of the real industrial output per capita were used as 
instrumental variables for the real income series with the other variables treated as 
exogenous or predetermined. The current and the lagged values of the inflation series
36 For a discussion of the procedure see chapter 7.
37 Rahbek and Mosconi (1999) contend that the inclusion of the accumulated stationary explanatory 
regressors in the error correction term will not affect the distribution of the test statistics.
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were used as instrumental variables for the real deposit interest rate, the devaluation rate 
and for the index of financial repression. The retrieved residuals from the estimated 
regression were included in the model of financial deepening (6.11). The coefficient of 
the variable denoting residuals from estimated equation 6.11 appears to be statistically 
insignificant for all the tested series , implying that the OLS estimates are consistent and 
the real GDP per capita, the financial repression index, the real deposit interest rate and 
the rate of devaluation series are determined outside the system under analysis or in other 
words exogenously. The latter is confirmed by the Granger-Causality test. To perform 
this test we run bivariate regressions (6.9) in Eviews for all pairs of (LFD, X) series, 
specifying LFD in the first differences for the OLS estimates to be consistent:
LFDt = a 0 + a xLFDt_x +... + a ^ F D ^  + PxX t_x +... + PiXt_t + ut (6.9)
X  t = 0Cq + ccxX t_x +... + ccxX  t_x + p xLFDt_x +... + filLFDt_l + ut ,
In each of the regressions X represents LNYsa, FRI, DEV and R respectively. L 
denotes a lag length, equal to 12 in the present case, given our monthly data. The reported 
F-statistics in Eviews are the Wald statistics for the joint HO hypothesis:
p x = p 2 =... = p l = 0  ( 6 . 1 0 )
Following the results of the test only the real deposit interest rate appears to be 
determined endogenously. Thus, the HO of the first differences of LFD not Granger 
causing R can be rejected at the 1 % level of statistical significance (Fst. =3.02). The HO 
of R not Granger causing the first differences of LFD can be rejected at the 5 % level of 
statistical significance (Fst. =1.96). This suggests a two-way relationship between the 
interest rate and the first differences of LFD, although the latter was not confirmed by 
the results of the Hausman test.
The real GDP per capita series, a variable of particular interest for the second 
part of the analysis (evaluating the impact of financial repression through financial 
deepening on economic growth), turns to be exogenous with regard to the first 
differences of financial depth variable, implying the former Granger causing the latter. 
The HO of the first differences of LFD not Granger causing LNYsa cannot be rejected at 
any levels of statistical significance (Fst. =.32, p-value= .96). The HO of LNYsa not 
Granger causing the first differences of LFD can be rejected at the 10 % level of 
statistical significance (Fst. =1.83).
38 The p-values for the coefficients of residuals for LNYsa, FRIi, FRI2, DEV and R regressions are 
respectively equal to .167, .515, .803, .737 and .543 and therefore HO of exogeneity cannot be rejected.
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This difference in the results obtained in performing a test for exogeneity within ARDL 
approach to cointegration and the Hausman and Granger-causality tests may be 
explained by the fact that in the first instance a levels specification of LFD was used, 
while in the second case LFD was specified in differences.
The ADL model is specified as follows.
LFDt — 0 Cq + ccxt + + oc^LFDt_2 +... + PxLNYsut + P 2 LNYscit_x +... + SXFRJ( +
+ S 2 FRI t_y +... + (f>\ Rt + ••• Mi DEV t + fj>2^EV t_ j + y xDU 98 + ut (6.11)
The expected rate of devaluation in the equation is proxied by the actual rate of 
devaluation39.
The appropriate lag-length is chosen by the general-to-specific approach 
advocated by Hendry (1995). Given our monthly data we start with 12 lags and then use 
unit reductions to achieve the highest values of AIC and SBC (model selection criteria), 
consistent with white noise residuals. This results in the choice of an ADL [(1, 12), 2, 
(1, 3) 1, 1] specification, where (1, 12) means that only the first and the twelfth of 
A LFD series are included in the equation, as they are the only ones that appear to be 
statistically significant and their inclusion is required to overcome a problem of serial 
correlation in the residuals. The choice of the first and the third lags for the FRIi series 
can be similarly explained. To overcome a problem of endogeneity of the real deposit 
interest rate, identified by the Granger-causality test, we first run the Generalised 
Instrumental Variable Method40. The deposit real interest rate was regressed on a set of 
instruments that were closely correlated with it, but uncorrelated with an error term. 
Along with the right-hand side predetermined (exogenous) variables the current and 
twice lagged values of the inflation rate were used as instrumental variables for R. The 
results of the model estimation appeared to be very much similar to the OLS regression 
estimation reported in table 6.5. Since the Hausman specification did not confirm the 
endogeneity of R, we are inclined to regard it as determined exogenously. The results of 
estimating model (6.11) by Two-stage Least Squares methodology are reported in 
appendix D.
39 In fact, hypothesising the prevalence of rational expectations in the formation of the rate of devaluation 
of the national currency, we pre-estimated the model by using the Generalised Instrumental Variable 
Method to account for a problem of measurement errors (see section 7.4.3 for a description of the 
methodology). Twice lagged values of the devaluation rate were used as instrumental variables. The
results were unsatisfactory, with Sargan’s X  statistic indicating model misspecification and 
inappropriate instrumental variables.
40 See section 7.4.3 for a detailed discussion of the methodology.
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X 1 (12)= 15.6 [.212] 
Functional Form: 
X \ l ) =  2.36 [.124] 
Normality:
;tr2 (l)=  2.12 [.347] 
Heteroscedasticity: 















Table 6.5: Summary o f the results o f estimating model (6.11) with FRI*1
The empirical performance of the model is satisfactory. It passes diagnostic tests. All 
the coefficients with the exception of the rate of devaluation appear to be statistically 
significant. All but the interest rate variable have the expected signs. Theoretically, a 
real deposit interest rate should be positively correlated with financial deepening. 
Imposition of financial restraints should affect only the significance of this variable 
(reducing it), but not the direction of the relationship. However, the results above show 
that the real deposit interest rate in Belarus was negatively correlated with financial 
depth. This may suggest that its repression was particularly severe. At the same time, 
given high correlation between the rate of devaluation, the real deposit interest rate and 
the FR index42, a negative sign of the coefficient for the real deposit interest rate can be 
attributed to multicollinearity in the model. To check this we perform some sensitivity 
analysis to see whether the estimates are different when 1) the rate of devaluation is 
removed from the equation, and 2) when the deposit rate ceiling is removed when 
constructing the index of financial repression. Table 6.6 reports the results.
41 Authors’ calculations on the data provided by the National Bank of the Republic of Belarus (National 
Bank of Belarus 2000a (January), 2000b (January), 2001, 2002, 2003); the NBB data given to the author 
by the Head of Foreign Exchange Analysis and Forecasting Division of the NBB during our meeting in 
March 2003; Institute of Privatisation and Management [online]. Available from: 
http://ipm.bv/index.pl?topicid=inside [Accessed September 2003]. Standard errors are in round 
parentheses. To save space p-values are used here and thereafter instead of asterisks to denote statistical 
significance of the coefficients.
42 The Pearson correlation coefficient is equal to .66 for the rate of devaluation and the real deposit 
interest rate, -.68 for the rate of devaluation and the FR index, and -.82 for the real deposit interest rate 
and FR index.
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-12.7 -.008 .44 -.001 -.002 -.10 .67 Serial Correlation:
(3.09) (.002) (0.26) (.0003) (.0005) (.04) ^ ( 1 2 ) =  16.1 [.19] 
Functional Form:P-value P-value P-value P-value P-value P-value
[.000] [.000] [.097] [.000] [0.002] [019] Z 2 ( 1)= 1.02 [.312] 
Normality: 
^ 2 (l)=1.5  [.48] 
Heteroscedasticity: 
Z 2 (1)= -03[.86]
Table 6.6: Summary o f  the results o f re-estimated model (6.11)43
As one can see from table 6 . 6  the estimates are not much different from the ones 
obtained earlier. So, both the sign and magnitude of the coefficient for the real interest 
rate are upheld. This suggests that the negative coefficient for the real interest rate is 
more likely to reflect a poor instrument. Indeed, even when the deposit interest rate was 
rising in real terms, it still remained negative through most of the period. So households 
had no incentive to switch from investing in tangible assets and foreign currency (cash), 
to depositing their earnings in banks. Furthermore, the FRI also exerts a direct negative 
impact on financial deepening that is independent of FR influence through the real 
deposit rate of interest, and it is statistically significant at the 1 % level.
We also run a regression for the first differences of FRI2 inclusive into 
regression explaining financial deepening. The ADL is specified as follows [(12), 1, (1, 
3) 1,1] (see table 6.7).
43 Authors’ calculations on the data provided by the National Bank of the Republic of Belarus (National 
Bank of Belarus 2000a (January), 2000b (January), 2001, 2002, 2003); the NBB data given to the author 
by the Head of Foreign Exchange Analysis and Forecasting Division of the NBB during our meeting in 
March 2003; Institute of Privatisation and Management [online]. Available from: 
http://ipm.bv/index.pl?topicid=:inside [Accessed September 2003]. Standard errors are in round 
parentheses.
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.65 Serial Correlation: 
£ 2 (12)= 22.2 [.035] 
Functional Form: 
^ 2 (l)=2.50[.113] 
Normality:

















Table 6.7: Summary o f the results o f estimating model (6.11) with FRI2  4
The results presented in table 6.7 are less satisfactory than in the case of the arithmetic 
average measure of financial restraints (FRIi) used in the regression. First of all, the 
estimated model does not pass a test for a serial correlation. Second, the index of FR 
computed on the basis of principal components analysis appears to be statistically 
significant only at the 10 % level of significance. This lower level of significance can be 
explained by the fact that the effect is shared between the FRI and the rate of 
devaluation of the national currency. The latter appears to be statistically significant in 
explaining financial deepening. However, it should be noted that the results do not pass 
the test for serial correlation in residuals at the 5 % level of significance and therefore 
can be biased.
In summary, our findings suggest that financial repression in Belarus had an 
overall negative impact on financial deepening. Financial disintermediation could have 
had negative implications for economic growth in the long run, if  the financial structure 
had mattered. In the case of Belarus, it seems likely that it did not, but given the 
estimation technique we can talk only about its contemporaneous effect (for a detailed 
discussion of the impact of the Belarusian financial policy on the economic growth see 
chapter 8 ).
44 Authors’ calculations on the data provided by the National Bank of the Republic of Belarus (National 
Bank of Belarus 2000a (January), 2000b (January), 2001, 2002, 2003); the NBB data given to the author 
by the Head of Foreign Exchange Analysis and Forecasting Division of the NBB during our meeting in 
March 2003; Institute of Privatisation and Management [online]. Available from: 
http://ipm.bv/index.pl?topicid=inside [Accessed September 2003]. Standard errors are in round 
parentheses.
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The main purpose of this chapter has been to present the empirical evidence of the 
impact of financial repression on financial deepening in Belarus from 1995-2002. The 
evidence reveals that, first of all, the restraints imposed on the financial sector in 
Belarus over 1996-2000 can be dubbed financial repression. Second, financial 
repression, measured as an index incorporating four major financial repressionist 
policies, had an overall negative contemporaneous effect on financial deepening.
We believe that it is unlikely that finance played any significant role in 
explaining the economic growth in Belarus. The theoretical arguments on the finance- 
growth nexus suggest that there is a positive association between them. Our empirical 
analysis revealed that Belarus had experienced financial disintermediation in the period 
under examination, and this could not have contributed positively to economic growth. 
We envisage that the results of the model could be more parsimonious if we were to 
account for the problem of the extensive use of monetary surrogates in the economy. If 
we were to speculate on this, we would expect the monetised part of real GDP series to 
be better associated with financial depth in Belarus. Moreover, it could also be the case 
that there was a bi-directional relationship between finance and GDP, allowing for 
endogenous economic growth to take place.
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Chapter 7 Seigniorage and Inflation Tax as Complementarities 
of Financial Repression
As outlined in chapter 2 in the literature on financial development, along with the 
concept of financial repression (FR) itself, important attention is drawn to the concepts 
of seigniorage (S) and the inflation tax (IT). However, neither S nor IT are considered 
instruments of FR. All three concepts appear to be complementary in considering the 
issue of implicit taxation of the financial system. Section 7.1 distinguishes all three 
concepts and outlines the ways of their interaction.
Money creation remained the main source for financing budget deficits in all 
transition economies during the early stages of transformation. Consequently, the 
economic gains from money creation came in the form of seigniorage and inflation tax. 
Despite the de-jure independence of the central banks created in the transition 
economies, de-facto they remained under the control of the government during the early 
stage of transition. This permitted them to print money, to finance government 
expenditures with seigniorage.
Inflation is considered to be a monetary phenomenon in the sense that a 
continuous increase in the general price level is due to monetary expansion creating an 
excess of money supply over its actual demand. While acknowledging that emission 
policy has remained the dominant monetary instrument in some transition economies 
like Belarus and Turkmenistan over the years of transition, the majority of other 
transition economies, such as the majority of Central European countries, realising the 
inflationary nature of money creation, have switched to using more market instruments 
to carry out monetary policy. Consequently, by reducing money emission, these 
countries have limited the gains from seigniorage and the inflation tax, while Belarus, 
for example, tried to benefit from them. However, since inflation tax is a tax, there 
exists a maximum point at which it is optimised under a certain rate of money growth 
that can be called the revenue-maximizing rate.
Section 7.2 draws on a methodological framework to define the revenue- 
maximizing rate of money growth optimising tax on real balances. Then, the 
productivity of the tax is analysed by comparing the actually raised revenue from the 
inflation tax with the revenue that could be raised if the quantity of money had risen at a 
constant rate.
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Section 7.3 specifies the model of demand for money that is used to estimate the 
maximum revenue the government can gain from money printing under steady-state 
conditions.
Section 7.4 reports the empirical results. The contribution of this section is in the 
unique approach in treating the data. We use sophisticated econometric techniques in 
testing the series for unit root. The results of applying the standard Augmented Dickey- 
Fuller test show that it is not able to capture the impact of structural breaks in the data. 
The research that has been done on money demand in Belarus so far does not account 
for structural breaks. That leads to the incorrect treatment of the data regarding them as 
1(1) rather than 1(0). Moreover, we do not confine our analysis to using Perron’s 
methodology, which allows correcting the data for structural breaks exogenously, and in 
turn can lead to over rejection of the unit root hypothesis. We also apply Baneijee’s et al 
(1992) and Zivot and Andrews’ (1992) methodologies that allow searching for 
endogenous breaks in series.
For the robustness of the results, we use the two-fold approach to estimating our 
final regression. Assuming all series are 1(0), the first approach is to estimate a Partial 
Adjustment Model (PAM), while the second one is an Autoregressive Distributed Lag 
(ARDL) approach to cointegration, which does not require us to know whether the 
variables are integrated of order 1( 1) or 1(0 ).
The main findings follow in conclusion.
7.1 Distinction and Interaction between Financial Repression, Seigniorage 
and Inflation Tax
In the literature on financial development, along with the concept of financial repression 
itself, significant attention is focussed on the concepts of seigniorage (S) and inflation 
tax (IT). However, neither S nor IT are considered instruments of FR. In the first place 
it is necessary to introduce the concepts of seigniorage and inflation tax to see later how 
they can be related to financial repression.
Seigniorage is the revenue that government collects from printing money. It can 
be expressed as follows:
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SE = g ,
where
_ M t - M (_, _
1
i js: £ . 
1
U  J P, JU  J (7.1)
M  -  M ,  
g m = — —---------money growth,
M -  nominal monetary base,
P- price level, measured as the consumer price index, 
M N real money balances.
The inflation tax is literally a tax on nominal assets1. Since most of government 
debt takes the form of non-indexed nominal assets, the value of that debt is eroded when 
prices rise. In turn debt-holders suffer a capital loss. Thus, inflation tax are losses which 
money holders incur as a result of inflation caused by significant increases in the 
quantity of money. It is measured as:
IT=
p,-t JU J (7.2)
where the tax rate is the inflation rate: n
P - PJt r t-1
t - \
There exist some alternative measures of the tax rate. The above one is a 
conventional definition of inflation, which is usually applied. Easterly et al. (1995),
nSachs and Larrain (1992), Calvo and Leiderman (1992) define it as
1 +  7T
. In our
estimations of inflation tax we use the conventional definition of inflation rate.
Seigniorage and inflation tax are closely related concepts, and sometimes there 
is no clear distinction. That is, in the economic literature both terms are often used 
interchangeably. For example, Romer (1996), Aschauer (1997), Boichanka (2001) etc.
1 Here it should be borne in mind that the inflation tax base is high-powered money (M 0). For a 
discussion of this issue see below.
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use seigniorage as the common term defining the tax on real cash balances. Cagan 
(1956) uses the definition of the inflation tax while estimating the government gains on 
printing money.
Seigniorage can be expressed as the sum of the inflation tax on the monetary 
base and the increase in the real stock of monetary base (see for example Cagan 1956, 
Easterly et al. 1995, Blanchard and Fischer 1990). That is,








• M t M, ,When real money balances are constant over time, that is ---- = --------,
Pt-i
seigniorage and inflation tax are equal.
Getting back to the issue of the interrelation of all three concepts, namely 
inflation tax, seigniorage and financial repression, it follows that they are all regarded as 
forms of implicit discriminatory taxation of the economy, and particularly the financial 
system. The complementarities between them lie in the following: 1) interest savings on 
government liabilities can be obtained through the inflation policy that, given nominal 
interest rate ceilings, implies very low real interest rates; 2 ) imposition of reserve 
requirements, one of the instruments of FR, increases directly the IT base; 3) a limited 
choice of financial instruments and low or negative real interest rates increase money 
demand, in this way augmenting the IT base (Giovanni and De Melo 1993, p. 955).
(7.2) embodies the classical approach to IT. However, in some empirical studies, 
other monetary aggregates are used as the IT tax base. For example, should distortions 
in real interest rates (under condition of nominal interest-ceilings) due to inflation be 
included as part of IT or as FR. Giovannini and de Melo (1993) argue that it is incorrect 
to relate them to IT because the inflation tax base is high-powered money, while 
financial repression affects the portfolio of non-monetary assets held by domestic 
residents.
Giovannini and de Melo (1993) argue it is to be expected that an inflation tax 
will be used together with financial repression. In turn, Fry (1995) argues that in classic 
cases of financial repression, the proliferation of financial instruments from which 
governments can extract seigniorage is encouraged. For example, this can be done
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through imposing taxes on private securities markets, because seigniorage cannot be 
easily extracted from these markets (Fry 1995, pp. 20-22).
Basically, what becomes clear from the above is that all three concepts appeared 
to be complementary in considering the issue of implicit taxation of the financial 
system2. However, seigniorage seems often disregarded in discussions of FR, while 
preference is given to IT. This is likely because financing a budget deficit by printing 
money is virtually costless itself unless it turns into the source of inflationary financing, 
which is when an increase in money supply is not supported by output growth. Here, 
seigniorage and inflation tax go hand-in-hand, and the greater use of seigniorage results 
in faster money growth, and eventually in higher inflation.
Further, Makinen and Woodward (1990) argue that the complementarity 
between FR and IT breaks down under very high rates of inflation. Since the legal 
tender is losing its credibility very quickly under high inflation, households tend to 
divert their domestic assets into primarily foreign assets. In this case, financial 
repression and inflation tax become substitutes.
The next section considers the theory of the optimal tax on real balances and 
consequently its revenue-maximizing money growth rate.
7.2 Conceptual Framework of Defining the Optimal Seigniorage
Assuming that the economy is initially in a steady state, seigniorage, regarded as a tax, 
graphically can be represented as a Laffer curve with respect to the rate of money 
growth. It initially rises and then falls with higher inflation. Figure 7.1 represents the 
bell-shaped form of the seigniorage Laffer curve. There is a maximum point at which 
seigniorage is optimised under a certain rate of money growth that can be called the 
revenue-maximizing rate of money growth. Under more moderate rates of money 
growth - less than the revenue-maximizing one - seigniorage exhibits an upward trend. 
When a money growth rate exceeds the revenue-maximizing one, the inflation rate 
increases in greater proportion than the money growth rate. This finally leads to the 
decline in real cash balances or in other words to the proportionally greater reduction in 
the tax base for seigniorage compared with the increase in the tax rate itself. As a result 
the revenue declines which graphically puts seigniorage on the downward sloping side
2 For the rationale for the use of inflation tax see chapters 2,3 and 4 where this issue was discussed for 
financial repression.
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of the Laffer curve. Thus, basically there is a kind of trade-off between a higher rate of 
money growth increasing seigniorage and the associated inflation decreasing it by 
lowering demand for money. When government needs can be financed with seigniorage 
lower then the maximum rate, there exists a dual steady state equilibrium implying that 
the same amount of seigniorage can be obtained at low and high inflation steady state 
points.
Smax
Figure 7.1: The Seigniorage (S) Laffer curve3
There exists a body of work on the issue of seigniorage and its optimal value. Most of 
these empirical studies are based on Cagan’s (1956) work ‘The monetary dynamics of 
hyperinflation’. Given that wealth in real terms and real income are relatively stable 
under hyperinflation, Cagan (1956) assumes that in a period of high inflation, changes 
in demand for real balances largely result from the extreme fluctuation in prices. That is 
the demand for money is rather a function of the expected rate of inflation rather than 
the nominal interest rate4. The optimal seigniorage is calculated by applying the steady- 
state conditions to the revenue-maximizing rate of money growth. Under steady-sate 
conditions, when the quantity of money rises at a constant rate, expected inflation is 
assumed to be equal to actual inflation, and the quantity of real balances does not 
change over time. This implies the equality of the rate of money growth and inflation. 
To consider these relations between inflation and seigniorage under steady-state 
conditions it is necessary to recall the money demand function under high inflation 
suggested by Cagan (1956, pp.33-37):
3 The figure is adapted from Romer (1996, p.422).
4 For more details see Cagan (1956, pp.25-117).
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In ^  = - a E  - y , (7.4)
where M  is an end-of-month index of the quantity of money in circulation, and P 
is an end-of-month index of the price level, a  is a positive constant denoting the 
semielasticity in the demand for money with respect to the rate of inflation \ y is a 
constant; E  stands for the expected rate of change in prices and is assumed to be a 
function of the actual rate of change, C, that is in turn equal to the difference between 
the logarithms of successive values of the index of prices. The expected rate of inflation 
is expressed by the following equation: 
f  dE^
v dt j t
Converting equation (7.4) from logs and substituting in the formula of inflation 
tax5 (7.2) gives:
R = 7te~a*-r , (7.6)
where n  -  the rate of rise in prices.
Maximum seigniorage6 can be obtained by differentiating this expression with 
respect to gm, and given that this derivative is zero and the second derivative is negative:
r)R
—  = (\-a7r)e-a*-r = 0  (7.7)
dn
~  = ( a 27 i-  2a)e~c"!~r < 0 (7.8)
dn
These conditions are satisfied for n < \! a .  Here it is very important to 
emphasize that this maximum revenue is treated in the sense that it can be maintained 
indefinitely. No maximum revenue exists when the tax is first imposed; the higher the 
tax rate, the higher the revenue due to underestimation of inflation and consequently
5 Here we follow Cagan’s methodology deriving the maximum value of the tax on cash balances (see 
Cagan (1956, pp.80), where he uses the inflation rate as a tax rate. However, the terms of seigniorage and 
the inflation tax in this case are indeed interchangeable, as the above conditions imply their equality. So, 
it does not make much difference what term to refer to while deriving the optimal revenue.
6 Here it should be noted again that seigniorage and inflation tax are used interchangeably.
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gradual adjustment in real cash balances. This is the case when the government can 
obtain seigniorage greater than the maximum value. After households start correctly 
estimating expected inflation, the adjustment to their real cash balances tends to be 
instantaneous. Then, the higher money growth leads to higher inflation and 
correspondingly to a decrease in the demand for real money balances and a fall in the 
revenue from seigniorage.
To see that, one should assume that an adjustment of real money demand to its 
desired level is not instantaneous due to the existence of a lag in expectations. It implies 
that the actual real stock of money exceeds the desired level of real balances.
Assuming that the adjustment in real balances is not instantaneous gives an 
impetus to introducing a partial adjustment hypothesis:
In - In M t- 1 = 8 In






8 is the adjustment coefficient.
r \ *Mj_
k P . j
is the desired level of real money balances given by Cagan’s money-demand
function.
Alternatively, we can rewrite it as follows: 
In ( k  )
*
( M t At = £ ln t i+ t- 1
j p\  r t-\ y
(7.10)
That is the actual real money balances at time t is a weighted average of the 
desired real money balances at that time and the real money balances existing in the 
previous period with 8  and (1 - 8) being the weights.
Since
mIn ( M . )
( M,  At - In t- 1
U  J p\  r t- 1 J
d
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Ttlwhere — is a growth rate of real money balances, it gives us: 
m
*” ( Q _  s
m(t)
In
r V  Mr±
y P , ;
- In
M
P\  r t-1 y
(7.12)
Assuming that the government needs (G) to be financed by seigniorage exceed
m  7
the maximum steady-state seigniorage, Romer (1996, pp.425-26) proves that — <0.
m
Moreover, the fact that real money balances are falling implies that
In
y P . j
- In
M
Pv  r t- 1  y
< 0 (7.13)
M  inExpressing the inflation rate as n =  (7.14) and substituting (7.12) into
M  m
(7.14) gives us:
Mn  = ------
M
In
y P . j
- In
P\  r t-1 y
(7.15)
Condition (7.13) means that the rate of inflation exceeds the rate of money
growth.
The above argument implies that when the adjustment in real cash balances is 
gradual, government can obtain seigniorage greater than the steady-state maximum 
value, but only at the expense of accelerating inflation.
7.3 Specifying the Functional Form of the Money Demand Function
The procedure for estimating the optimal seigniorage under steady-state conditions 
described above envisages the estimation of demand for real money balances.
In a market economy, real balances are demanded as medium of exchange and a 
store of value. Hence real money demand maybe a function of such variables as real 
wealth, real income, and the opportunity coast of holding cash.
7 Romer’s (1996) calculations are also based on Cagan’s money demand function specification.
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= L(Y,i), where
M- nominal money balances
P- price level
Y -  scaling variable representing economic activity
i -  opportunity cost of holding money (nominal interest rate).
Based on these theoretical grounds a large variety of models have been 
developed to estimate money demand. The present work will not give a detailed review
Q
of all of these models . However for further analysis of seigniorage it would be useful to 
mention some of the approaches to estimation of money demand, such as a static 
(equilibrium) model, dynamic and error-correction money demand models.
A static model can be derived from the early theories of the demand for money 
such as Fisher’s (1911) quantity theory of money, from transactions demand theory (e.g. 
Keynes 1936, Baumol 1952 and Tobin 1956), from the portfolio balance approach, or 
from the Monetarist models based on the quantity theory of money (e.g. Friedman 
1956).
The second approach to money demand function is the stock-adjustment 
(dynamic) model or Partial Adjustment Model (PAM). It was described in more detail 
in section 7.2. It assumes that an adjustment of real money demand to its desired level is 
not instantaneous due to the existence of the lag in expectations. It may be particularly 
relevant to transition economies where steady-state conditions are not always met. 
Following the findings of Budina, Hanousek, and Tuma (1994), who applied Cagan’s 
money demand model to estimate the maximum level of seigniorage in the Czech 
Republic, Romania, Poland and Bulgaria, the static model was suitable for countries 
with relatively stable economic development such as the Czech Republic and Poland. 
But in the cases of Romania and Bulgaria, demonstrating large variation in change of 
prices, the results of estimation were statistically insignificant.
Boichanka (2001) estimated money demand function for Belarus, Ukraine and 
Russia, applying two models: the first based on Cagan’s model, assuming steady-state 
conditions, and the second is the stock-adjustment model. His results demonstrate that 
only in Belarus is the semielasticity of money demand with respect to the nominal 
interest rate significantly different from zero at the 10 % level. However the explanatory
8 For the systemic literature survey of money demand theories see Sriram 1999a, Boichanka 2001 and 
Cuthbertson and Barlow 1991.
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power of the regression (R2) was low, as was also the case for Russia and Ukraine. 
However the dynamic model applied to all of the three countries showed the results to 
be statistically significant with high R2. Boichanka’s findings on Ukraine appeared to be 
in line with the results of Aschauer’s (1997) work on estimating the money demand for 
Ukraine in 1993-1996 using the stock-adjustment model of money demand.
Estimating the dynamic model in the way represented by equation 7.10 (see 
section 7.2) can cause problems because of high correlation between current and lagged 
values of the dependent variable. Then, some of the variables in the model are likely to 
be non-stationary which can lead to the problem of spurious or meaningless regression. 
The latter can be overcome by taking the first differences of the dynamic model, or in 
other words estimating the short-run relationships between variables. However, in this 
case the important information about the long-run relationships can be lost, and that in 
turn can make further forecast useless.
Thus, to overcome these limitations there is a need to consider the third 
approach to estimating money demand functions that is the error-correction model 
(ECM) that incorporates both short-run and long-run effects. The latter has been used a 
lot in the recent empirical studies on money demand estimation (see, for example, 
Pelipas 2002, Yang 2001, and Sriram 1999b). The simple ECM is a transformed 
dynamic model and it can be expressed as follows:
= /o + y2A \n y t -(1  - a x)
M  A A A.
' ~ ' - f a - f a n U - f a y t_x + e t (7.16)
Kx
where yx,... yA - are the short- run parameters to measure the immediate impact 
effects. ( 1  - a x) is a speed of adjustment parameter, and it is equal to 0  when the
adjustment is instantaneous, or in other words when the equilibrium holds, fa ,..., fa  
are long-run parameters to measure the long-run impact. All the series are assumed to 
be cointegrated.
In recent empirical studies Johansen’s full information maximum likelihood 
approach to estimating ECM (1988) of money demand function has taken centre stage. 
Johansen’s procedure envisages testing for cointegrating relations in the context of 
vector error-correction model (VECM). The concept of cointegration implies the 
existence of long-term relationships between series. In turn, it requires a series to be 
integrated of the same order of integration and to be first-difference stationary (or 
integrated of order 1 , 1( 1 )) if it is non-stationary in levels.
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Running a little bit ahead, we need to point out that our money demand model 
for Belarus contains 1(0) variables. If we allow for a structural breaks in the series or if 
we still leave some doubt about the power of the test for a structural break, our money 
demand model contains a mixture of 1(0) and 1(1) variables (see section 7.4). This 
makes it difficult to apply Johansen’s procedure. Instead we can use either PAM 
described above, or ARDL approach to cointegration (Pesaran et al. 2001) discussed in 
chapter 6  (pp. 136-37). For robust results we will use the two-fold approach to 
estimating our money demand function, namely a Partial Adjustment Model (PAM) and 
an Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) approach to cointegration (see section 7.4).
Explanatory variables
Next we need to discuss which variables determine the level of real cash balances in 
Belarus. As outlined above, conventionally money demand can be defined as a function 
of real income, capturing the transaction motive to hold money; and the opportunity 
cost, as a rule represented by the nominal interest rate.
Because interests rates are not market determined and are subject to regulation 
by the monetary authorities in some transition economies, they cannot serve as a good 
proxy for the opportunity costs of holding money. This is especially typical of countries 
with high inflation rates and negative interest rates (e.g. Belarus). In these terms it 
makes sense to include the inflation rate as a supplement of the interest rate to measure 
the opportunity cost for holding money. Moreover, use of inflationary expectations to 
represent the opportunity cost of holding precautionary cash balances is needed to 
explain the relation between inflation and real cash balances within the adapted 
framework for estimating optimal seigniorage. Recalling Cagan’s study of 
hyperinflation, in a period of high inflation, changes in demand for real balances largely 
result from the extreme fluctuation in prices. Finally, the expected rate of inflation as a 
proxy for opportunity costs has been used in many studies of money demand in 
countries with high inflation (see for example, Feltenstein and Ha 1991, Choudhry 
1995, Yartseva 1999 etc.).
As far as the real income variable is concerned, Cagan (1956) does not include it 
in his model of real cash balances, arguing that it remained relatively stable during the 
period of hyperinflation. Moreover, Kiguel and Neumeyer (1995), while investigating 
the relationship between seigniorage and inflation in Argentina in the periods 1979-80,
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1982-84, and 1986-1987, found that the coefficient on the transactions variable, 
represented by GDP, was not significantly different from zero. Other economists 
include income in the demand function, imposing a unitary income elasticity restriction. 
Some empirical studies show that this restriction does not hold (see for example Filosa 
1995). In the present study we included real income as an explanatory variable, 
proxying it by monthly GDP.
The problems of empirical modeling of the money demand function in transition 
economies include the phenomenon of currency substitution for foreign currency and 
for quasi-money. The latter can be ignored for the time being since in the present study 
nominal money balances are proxied by high-powered money. As far as the problem of 
dollarization is concerned it can be captured by including the expected rate of 
devaluation of the national currency as an opportunity cost of holding money. However, 
using both the expected rate of inflation and the expected rate of currency devaluation in 
our model can result in problems of multicollinearity.9
Thus, the present model of money demand will include a real income, proxied 
by monthly GDP, and the expected rate inflation, to be discussed later.
Sources o f dynamic behaviour
Cagan in his work on the monetary dynamics of hyperinflation argues that there is need 
to account for lags to explain the impact of the rate of change in prices on the demand 
for real money balances. On the one hand, it is a lag between the expected and the 
actual change in prices. On the other, he puts forward that adjustment of the real money 
balances towards the desired ones is not instantaneous.
Cagan finds that a lag in inflation expectations appears to be unusually long. At 
the same time he assumes that a lag in their impact on real cash balances is negligible. 
However, the impact of each of them could not be empirically distinguished that might 
imply that the greater length of the lag in expectations can be explained by the effect of 
the lag in real balances adjustment. He also finds that both an equation accounting for
9 In fact, hypothesising the prevalence of rational expectations in the formation of the rate of devaluation 
of the national currency and the inflation rate, we pre-estimated model (7.18) by using the Generalised 
Instrumental Variable Method to account for a problem of measurement errors. Twice lagged values of 
the devaluation rate and inflation rate were used as instrumental variables. The results were 
unsatisfactory, with none of the explanatory variables, except for the once lagged value of the real cash 
balances, being statistically significant in explaining the money demand. The estimated coefficient of the 
rate of devaluation was equal to -.003 with a standard error equal to .006.
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the lag in inflation expectations and an equation capturing the dynamics in real cash 
balances are identical, and thus imply the same relation between prices and money. 
Cagan also incorporated both lags together in the model, arguing that an equation with 
both lags would probably fit the data better. However, he did not estimate this equation, 
finding it difficult because the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable m M - p t_x in
the regression could make the estimates inconsistent due to the problem of serial 
correlation in the residuals. So, in his money demand function, relating actual real 
money balances to an exponentially weighted average of past rates of price change (see 
equation (7.4) in section 7.2), Cagan assumes that actual and desired real money 
balances are equal, and that variations in the expected rate of change in prices account 
for variations in real cash balances during hyperinflation.
In the present work to capture both dynamic processes in series we aim to 
estimate the following equation with application to PAM:
In f  M \  .......................... .........................................( M '— x p x + ^ P a ^ y t ~ ^ ^
V P Jt-1
where
- natural logarithm of real money balances at time t
M- nominal monetary base (MB)
P - price level measured by CPI
.In —
U J ,
n e - is the expected inflation at time t.
By logging both sides of the equation, the coefficients take on the interpretation 
of elasticises (or semi-elasticity in case of inflation rate) or in other words the relative 
change in the dependent variable for a percentage change in explanatory variables.
Coefficient XP{ shows the short-run relationship effect of the explanatory
variables on the dependant one. X is the adjustment coefficient (see section 7.2). p t
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interpret long-run relationships. Theoretically, the coefficients will take the following 
signs: J32>0, /?3 <0, /?4 >0.
Equation (7.18) is an adaptive expectations model of inflation, where n et is a 
weighted average of the actual and past values of inflation./ is the adjustment 
coefficient. The larger its value, the quicker the expected value of inflation adjusts to its 
previous actual outcomes. 10
Deriving the revenue-maximizing money growth rate and maximum seigniorage with 
application to our money demand model
Assuming steady-state conditions, converting this money demand function from logs 
and substituting into the formula for seigniorage (7.1) yields:
The procedure for obtaining the maximum seigniorage is the same as described 
in section 7.2.
Assuming the steady-state conditions in the long run the full adjustment of real 
money balances to its equilibrium level will occur, that is:
In = In ( M \
[ p  J t U J
and money demand function will take the following form:
Under steady-state condition the expected inflation rate is equal to the actual 
inflation rate, and equal to the rate of money growth. That is:
10 To derive the adaptive expectations model see for exam ple D ougherty (2002). For m ore details o f  
techniques used to estim ate it see section 7.4.2.
c -  M ‘  -  (
8 t ~ P ^ ~ gt exp + t y 2t + Iny + (1 -  X)In —  + Aut (7.19)
\ P )t -1
(7.21)
n  = n t =g, (7.22)
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The derived revenue-maximizing rate of growth is consistent with Cagan’s 
findings, and in the next section I present the empirical results for Belarus.
7.4 Empirical Results
7.4.1 Exploring the Data
It is necessary to begin this section with a data description and a graphical 
examination. As outlined in the previous section the model includes the following 
variables:
• Monetary base as a measure for monetary aggregate
• Inflation rate as a proxy for opportunity cost
• GDP, capturing the transactions demand for the Belarusian rouble.
The data are represented on a monthly basis ranging from May 1995 and 
December 2002. The sample is chosen on the basis of 1) data availability, and 2) 
consistency with chapter 6 .
The monetary base (MB) is regarded as high-powered money, and is the sum of 
currency in circulation and the sum of reserve accounts of commercial banks at the 
National Bank. The nominal monetary base is deflated by the Consumer Price Index 
(CPI) in order to create the real money balances, and the monthly inflation rate is the 
rate of change of the CPI. The nominal GDP is deflated by the GDP deflator to create 
real GDP.
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Data on the nominal monetary base was obtained from the National Bank of
Belarus1 \  while data on the monthly rate of inflation and monthly GDP (see appendix F
for checking the reliability of GDP data) were provided by the Research Centre of
12Institute of Privatisation and Management, Belarus .
The real money balances and the real GDP series are presented in logarithmic 
form. Figures 7.2, 7.3 and 7.4 show the inflation rate (DP) and the natural logs of real 
money balances (LNM) and real GDP (LNY) correspondingly from May 1995 to 





1995M5 1996M3 1997M1 1997M11 1998M9 1999M7 2000M5 2001M3 2002M1 2002M 11
Figure 7.2: Inflation rate (DP)13
11 National Bank o f Belarus 2000a (January), 2000b (January), 2001, 2002, 2003.
12 Institute o f Privatisation and M anagement [online]. Available from: 
http://ipm .by/index.pl?topicid=inside [Accessed September 2003].
l3Ibid.
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Figure 7.4: The natural logarithm o f  real GDP (LNY)15
While graphically examining GDP data, what first arrests our attention is that the log of 
real GDP (LNY) exhibits a seasonal pattern with the peaks in March and August- 
September that is closely linked with sowing and harvesting campaigns.
14 A uthors’ calculations on the data provided by the National Bank o f  the Republic o f Belarus (National 
Bank o f  Belarus 2000a (January), 2000b (January), 2001, 2002, 2003).
15 A uthors’ calculations on the data provided by the Institute o f Privatisation and M anagement [online]. 
Available from: http://ipm .by/index.pl?topicid=inside [Accessed September 2003].
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By testing all three series on seasonality, the results of the variable deletion test 
show that the introduced seasonal dummy variables are jointly significant only in the 
log of the real GDP series16. The real GDP series was seasonally adjusted using an X- 
11.2 procedure performed in EViews Version 3.1. All other estimations are conducted 
using either Microfit version 4.0 or EViews Version 3.1.
Figure 7.5 shows the seasonally adjusted log of real GDP.
1 0 .5t
10 . 0 -
9 .5 -
9 .0 1 ■■■ | ■ ■ . .  |   . , | ■ ■ , . |— | ■ . . . | , — h -------
1995M5 1996M3 1997M1 1997M 11 1998M9 1999M7 2000M 5 2001 M3 2002M1 2002M 11
Figure 7.5: The natural logarithm o f real GDP, seasonally adjusted17 
7.4.2 Testing for a Unit Root in Series
To test our series for stationarity we begin through applying the Dickey-Fuller (DF) and
18Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests described in detail in section 6.4.1.
Table 7.1 presents the summary of the ADF test for the presence of a unit root in 
levels or whether series is 1(0) or 1(1) stationary.
16 F statistic (F (11, 80) is equal to 4.2985 with probability 0.000. This rejects the null hypothesis o f joint 
insignificance o f  seasonal dummy at the 1% level o f statistical significance.
17 A uthors’ calculations on the data provided by the Institute o f  Privatisation and M anagement [online]. 
Available from: http://ipm.by/index.pl?topicid=inside [Accessed September 2003].
18 See appendix E for the detailed description o f the Dickey-Fuller and the Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests 
along with additional tests for the presence o f a unit root in series.
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given 
y = 0
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y =  0
LNM 
(L=12) .
-2.46 2.44 0.93 0.4 2.15 -2.38 2.38 3 0.2
LNYsa19
^=12*)
-5.51*** 5.52*** 5.19*** 13.5*** 10.1*** -1.61 1.62 1.4 0.9
DP (L=l) -3.24* 1.87 -0.33 0.1 2.09 -3.26** 2.5* 3.1 -2**
Table 7.1: Results o f  ADF test for the presence o f a unit root in level20
The results show that for the natural logarithm of GDP seasonally adjusted (LNYSA) 
and for the rate of inflation (DP) it is possible to reject the null hypothesis of a unit root 
at the 1 % and 5 % levels of significance correspondingly. It implies that these variables 
are stationary in levels. Moreover, for the LNYSA series the ADF regression contains 
both deterministic terms, namely an intercept and a linear trend, while for the DP series 
only an intercept is included in the regression. For DP series both the <j>2 and (f>x 
statistics are not significant enough to reject the null hypotheses a Q = a 2 - y  = 0  and 
a Q = y -  0 . The value o fra// allows rejecting the null hypothesis a 0 = 0 at the 10 %
level of significance. The results of the ADF test for the natural logarithm of money 
balances series (LNM) could not reject the null hypothesis of a unit root that implies 
that LNM is not stationary in levels. As a rule of thumb non-stationary series becomes 
stationary after taking its first differences.
Table 7.2 summarizes the results of the unit root test for LNM variable in first 
differences. The null hypothesis of a unit root can be rejected at the 1 % level of 
significance. Moreover, the estimated ADF regression for LNM series is regarded as a
19 LNYsa is a seasonally adjusted natural logarithm of real GDP per capita; since only the AR at lag 12 is 
significant, there is no need to include all the AR terms up to 12 into the regression, but only the 12th 
lagged differences.
20 Authors’ calculations on the data provided by the National Bank of the Republic of Belarus (National 
Bank of Belarus 2000a (January), 2000b (January), 2001, 2002, 2003); Institute of Privatisation and 
Management [online]. Available from: http://ipm.by/index.pl?topicid=inside [Accessed September 2003]. 
*** = reject the null hypothesis at the 1 % level; ** = reject the null hypothesis at the 5 % level; * = reject 
the null hypothesis at the 10 % level. L in parentheses denotes a number of lagged differences. For the 
detailed description of the Dickey-Fuller and the Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests and for the interpretation 
of the labels denoting tau-statistics see appendix E.
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-6.98*** 0.06 0.15 0.01 0.1 -7.04*** 0.52 0.14 -7.06***
Table 7.2: Results o f ADF test for the presence o f a unit root in first differences22
Diagnostic tests (see table 7.3) performed to see whether the residuals are white noise, 
generally look good, apart from the test for normality in the DP series. One can see that 
there is a serious problem of normality in the series, suggesting a structural change in 
the data. Therefore, the above conclusion of the absence of a unit root in series can be 
biased. In this case we should test for a unit root in the presence of a structural change. 
Moreover, although the results of the test for normality of LNM series with estimation 
of the ADF regression both in levels and in first differences show that the residuals are 
normally distributed, a graphic examination of the data clearly point at the presence of a 
structural break somewhere in August 1998. Recalling the results of the ADF test of 
LNM series in first differences, one should note that the ADF regression exhibits a 
random walk. However, a graphic examination of the data shows that LNM is trended. 
Thus, the conclusion made earlier that LNM is 1(1), might be premature. This offers an 
impetus along with DP series to test also LNM series for a unit root allowing for a 
structural change.
21 Since only the AR at lag 12 is significant, there is no need to include all the AR terms up to lag 12 into 
the regression, but only the 12th lagged differences.
22 Authors’ calculations on the data provided by the National Bank of the Republic of Belarus (National 
Bank of Belarus 2000a (January), 2000b (January), 2001, 2002, 2003); the Institute of Privatisation and 
Management [online]. Available from: http://ipm.by/index.pl?topicid=:inside [Accessed September 2003]. 
*** = reject the null hypothesis at the 1 % level; ** = reject the null hypothesis at the 5 % level; * = reject 
the null hypothesis at the 10 % level. L in parentheses denotes a number of lagged differences. For the 
detailed description of the Dickey-Fuller and the Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests and for the interpretation 
of the labels denoting tau-statistics see appendix E.
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X 2 (12)= 12.3604[.417] X 2 (2)= 5.3947[.067] X 2 ( 1 ) =  1.3244[.250]
DP (L=l) 
1(0)
X 2 (12)= 14.7212[.257] X 2 (2)= 408.2107[.000] ^ 2 ( 1 ) =  .048296[.826]
y ^
Table 7.3: Summary o f diagnostic tests
Examining the inflation rate series graphically, we can observe two sharp changes in 
their level, occurring in December 1996 and September 1998. A sharp surge in inflation 
in September 1998 can be explained by the impact of the financial crisis in Russia in 
August 1998. It is more difficult to explain the rationale behind a surge in inflation at 
the end of 1996. It is likely to be caused by the accelerated monetary emission that 
fuelled inflation and could not be restrained despite existing price controls. Moreover, a 
relatively significant devaluation of the Belarusian rouble (evaluated at market 
exchange rates) at the end of 1996 and the beginning of 1997 led to increased import 
prices which in other words was inflation due to the increase in the enterprises’ 
expenses.
Treating August 1998 as a break point, we can perform a unit root test with the 
presence of a structural change, using Perron’s methodology (1989), and Baneijee’s et 
al (1992) and Zivot and Andrews’ (1992) methodologies with unknown timing of the 
break.24
Following the graphic examination of the data around the provisional structural 
break in August 1998 one can observe a one-time change in the level of the data. 
Therefore, to test for a unit root with the presence of structural break we use Perron’s 
‘crash’ model (7.25) (see appendix E). The null hypothesis is the presence of a unit root
23 Authors’ calculations on the data provided by the National Bank of the Republic of Belarus (National 
Bank of Belarus 2000a (January), 2000b (January), 2001, 2002, 2003); the Institute of Privatisation and 
Management [online]. Available from: http://ipm.by/index.pl?topicid=inside [Accessed September 2003]. A 
number of lagged differences L is in parentheses; p-values are given in square brackets; I(x) indicates the 
level of stationarity.
24 For the detailed description of these tests see appendix E.
166
Julia A. Korosteleva (2006) Chapter 7
in the series. Under the alternative hypothesis of stationary series, (7.25) allows a one­
time change in the intercept of the function.
k
y =  a 0+ a xt + a 2 y M +  a 3DUt+ a 4 D(TB)t + +
(7.25)
where D U t is a dummy variable that assigns a level change; DU,=1 if t> TB, 0 
otherwise.
D(TB) t is a pulse dummy variable that characterise the null hypothesis of a unit 
root; D(TB) , =1 if  t= TB+1, 0 otherwise
Here, TB is a break point that is August 1998 in the present case.
Under the null hypothesis a 2 =1, a x= 0, <z3 =0, while under the alternative one
a 2 < 1 , a 3 * 0 , and a 4 should be close to 0 .
The lag-length is determined in the same way as in the ADF test - that is by
providing the residuals are white noise25.
The results of Perron’s test for the inflation rate series are summarised in table
7.4.














SC: Z 2 ( 12)=16.0219[. 190] 
N: X 1 (2)= 5.3213[.070] 
H: X 1 0)= 2.9617[.085]
Table 7,4: Perron's unit root test allowing fo r  one structural change: inflation rate
• 26  series
The test statistic on a 2 =(0.629- l)/0.101= - 3.67. The null hypothesis of the inflation 
series containing a unit root can be rejected at 5 % level (t-critical = - 3.46). Although
25 In Perron’s work (1989) a maximum value of lags (L) was set equal to 1 max that was regarded as an 
upper bound. L was chosen equal to 1 max if the last included lag was significant, namely the test statistic
on CC5 was greater than 1.6. If not, the number of lags was reduced by one. Although this choice of the
lag-length is consistent with model-selection criterions, AIC and SBC, in the present case, it does not 
provide residuals are white noise.
6 Authors’ calculations on the data provided by the National Bank of the Republic of Belarus (National 
Bank of Belarus 2000a (January), 2000b (January), 2001, 2002, 2003); the Institute of Privatisation and 
Management [online]. Available from: http://ipm.by/index.pl7topicidrinside [Accessed September 2003].
CC2 is the coefficient of the once lagged inflation series; Ct3 is the coefficient of the level dummy
variable; CC4 is the coefficient of the pulse dummy variable. Standard errors are in parentheses. SC means 
serial correlation, N -  normality, H -  heteroscedasticity.
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we can reject the null hypothesis of a unit root, the robustness of these results can be 
questioned. Under the alternative hypothesis of no unit root the coefficient of pulse 
dummy variable (D(TB')) should be close to zero, while the coefficient of the level 
dummy variable (DU) should be significantly different from 0. In the present case a 
coefficient of pulse dummy variable (D(TB)) is significantly different from 0. 
Moreover, the value of t statistic is not significantly different from its critical value. The 
results of Perron’s test can be also biased because of the assumption of the date of break 
to be known a priori. However, the break might have occurred not in August 1998 but 
in September or October 1998, if there was a lag in response to the crisis in Russia. In 
this case there is need to use a more sophisticated test for the presence of a unit root 
allowing for a structural break of unknown timing, or in other words assuming that the 
date of the break is unknown a priori. Thus we use a recursive, rolling and sequential 
approach (Baneijee et. al. 1992).
To perform the Baneijee et al. test we estimate regression (7.26) and compute 
the set of ADF t statistics (see appendix E).
k
Ay,= « 0 + <V+ « 2y/-i+ 2 * 3 Ay t- i  + u t (7.26)
i
The lag-length, L=4, is determined on the basis of model-selection criteria and 
providing the residuals are white noise. The summary of the tests is presented in table
7.5.
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X 1 (2)= .63[.44] 
Heterosced.:
X 2 (1)= .05[.83]
Serial
Correlation
X 2 (12)= 9.311 [.00]
Normality:





X 2 (12)= 13.717[.319] 
Normality:
X 2 (2)= .2553[.613] 
Heterosced.:
^ 2 (1)= 1.3925[.238]
Table 7.5: Recursive rolling and sequential tests fo r  the presence o f a unit root:
70inflation rate series.
The results do not provide much clarity about the possible structural changes in inflation 
rate data and generally look rather conflicting. For example, the estimated t min rolling 
statistic shows that a structural change has likely occurred between September 1998 and 
March 2001. The minimum mean-shift t statistic is significant enough to reject the 
hypothesis of a unit root, and points to the break occurring in August 1998, although the 
F max statistic is not significant enough to support this conclusion.
Rethinking the graph analysis of inflation series again, one can observe the 
possible shift in trend occurred somewhere at the end of 1999. The minimum trend-shift 
t statistic points to a possible break occurring in May 1999. It is significant at 10 % 
level of significance to reject the null hypothesis of a unit root allowing for a change in 
trend. However, the F max statistic is not statistically significant enough to support this 
result. Moreover, diagnostic tests, particularly a normality test, still pinpoint the 
problem of normality, questioning the robustness of the results when mean-shift statistic 
is used.
27 Regression (7.26) was estimated; D=1 for (t>k), 0 otherwise.
28 Regression (7.26) was estimated; D=t-k for (t>k), 0 otherwise.
29 Authors’ calculations on the data provided by the National Bank of the Republic of Belarus (National 
Bank of Belarus 2000a (January), 2000b (January), 2001, 2002, 2003); the Institute of Privatisation and 
Management [online]. Available from: http://ipm.by/it]dcx.pl?topicid=insi.de [Accessed September 2003]; 
*** = reject the null hypothesis at the 1 % level; ** = reject the null hypothesis at the 5 % level; * = reject 
the null hypothesis at the 10 % level.
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The results of the Zivot-Andrews test, performed in WinRATS-32 version 5.04, 
suggest a clear break in intercept/or intercept and trend occurring in September 1998. 
The minimum t statistics are equal to -4.91 (break in intercept) and -6.69 (break in both 
intercept and trend) that allow to reject the null hypothesis of a unit root in the inflation 
rate series at the 5 and 1 % levels respectively.
Summarizing the aforesaid, one can conclude that there is only one clear break 
in the inflation series, occurring around the date of the financial crisis in Russia 
(August-September 1998). Thus, further analysis will be undertaken accounting for this 
break.
We also test money demand series for stationarity allowing for a structural 
break. For this we estimate (7.25). Table 7.6 summarises the results of Perron’s (1989) 
test for unit root with the presence of one structural change in series.

















SC: X 1 (12)=15.56[.212] 
N: X 2 (2)= 0.961 [.953] 
H: X 2(V= .055[.815]
Table 7.6: Perron’s unit root test allowing for one structural change: real cash 
balances series31
The test statistic on a 2 = (0.7532- l)/0.0564= - 4.38. The null hypothesis of the money 
demand series containing a unit root can be rejected at the 1 % level of significance (t- 
critical = - 4.34). This implies that the money demand series is trend-stationary with a 
shift in mean. The results of the Zivot-Andrews test confirm that real cash balances 
series is 1(0 ) if we allow for a structural change in both intercept and trend in the 
aftermath of the financial crisis in Russia (October 1998).32
30 For Zivot and Andrews’ critical values see table 6.4 in chapter 6. For the detailed description of the test 
see appendix E.
31 Authors’ calculations on the data provided by the National Bank of the Republic of Belarus (National 
Bank of Belarus 2000a (January), 2000b (January), 2001, 2002, 2003); the Institute of Privatisation and 
Management [online]. Available from: http://ipm.by/index.pl7topicidHnside [Accessed September 2003].
Regression (7.25) was estimated. (X2 is the coefficient of the once lagged real cash balances; a 3 is the 
coefficient of the level dummy variable; a A is the coefficient of the pulse dummy variable. Standard 
errors are in parentheses. SC means serial correlation, N -  normality, H -  heteroscedasticity.
32 The minimum t-statistics estimated at -5.56 (allowing for a break in intercept) and -5.16 (allowing for 
a break in both intercept and trend) allow to reject the HO of a unit root at the 1 and 5 % levels
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7.4.3 Estimating the Final Regression
For robust results it is reasonable to use the two-fold approach to estimating our final 
regression. Assuming all series is I(0)33, the first approach is to estimate a Partial 
Adjustment Model (PAM), while the second one is an Autoregressive Distributed Lag 
(ARDL) approach to cointegration, which does not require us to know whether the 
variables are integrated of order 1( 1 ) or 1(0 ).
7.4.3.1 Partial Adjustment Model under the Hypothesis of Adaptive 
Expectations Formation
To capture both dynamic processes in series, namely the lag in inflation expectations 
and a gradual adjustment of the actual to desired real money balances (see section 7.3), 
we use a Partial Adjustment Model (7.27) with an adaptive expectations model of 
inflation (7.28) nested into it.
P j ,
(= xpx + Xp27Tet + xp3 Iny, + (1 -  X)\n —  + Zj34DU + Xu, (7.27)
Kp  Jt-1
= r * ,  +  r (  i -  rK-i + rO -  r f  * , - i + - .  (7-28)
where M- nominal monetary base (MB)
P - price level measured by CPI 
(  M \
Ln —  - natural logarithm of real money balances at time t 
\ p  J t
Ln y -  natural logarithm of real GDP, seasonally adjusted 
n e is the expected inflation at time t.
DU is an impulse dummy variable capturing the impact of the Russian financial 
crisis. DU =1 if Tb= August 1998 -  April 1999 and 0 otherwise. As it was suggested by 
the results of various tests for structural break and as it can be observed graphically, 
August 1998 -  April 1999 are regarded as the most turbulent months for real balances.
respectively.
33 This assumption can be supported by the results of a unit root test with the presence of structural breaks 
in the series (see section 7.4.2).
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To estimate equation (7.27), we should use different techniques for the 
robustness of our results.
First we use a grid search to find the appropriate 7  that lies between 0 and 1. For
this we construct ten values of f u s in g  the following values of y \  0 .1 ,0 .2 ... 1 . 0  for 
different number of lags, and fitting (7.27) with each of the computed in this way n ] . 
The maximum number of lags used is five. As the number of lags increases the weights 
( l - y ) n, with n equal to the number of lags, geometrically decline and become 
statistically insignificant. The choice of the parsimonious result is based on obtaining 
the lowest residual sum of squares in regression (7.27). At the same time there is also 
the need to pay attention to model-selection criteria, namely the Akaike information 
criterion (AIC) or the Schwarz Bayesian Criterion (SBC), and to make sure that the 
residuals are white noise, while comparing the final results. Table 7.7 presents the 




a 2 a 3 <*4 AIC SBC Adj. R 
Sq.
RSS

















Table 7.7: Summary o f the results o f estimating the PAM with a grid search method 
used to derive the expected rate o f inflation34
As one can see the model selection criteria are higher for the model with the maximum 
length of the lagged values of inflation rates in (7.28) equal to three. However, the 
model does not pass the conventional test for autocorrelation of residuals that bias the
34 Authors’ calculations on the data provided by the National Bank of the Republic of Belarus (National 
Bank of Belarus 2000a (January), 2000b (January), 2001, 2002, 2003); the Institute of Privatisation and 
Management [online]. Available from: http://ipm.by/index.pl?topicid=inside [Accessed September 2003]. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. Model estimated:
CCQ + CCX 7t e( + CC2DU+ a 3LNY+ CC4LNM(-1) (7.29). Initially regression (7.29) was estimated with the
presence of a linear trend. Due to its statistical insignificance, it was later omitted from regression (7.29). 
To save some space p-values are used here and thereafter instead of asterisks to denote statistical 
significance of the coefficients.
172
Julia A. Korosteleva (2006) Chapter 7
results35. But the Newey-West adjustment of standard errors allows us to obtain 
consistent autocorrelation estimates (see table 7.8).
a 2 ar3
-.0089 0.3E-3 .0767 .8853
(.0026) (.041) (.05217) (.0412)
P-value P-value P-value P-value
[0 .0 0 1 ] [.994] [0.145] [0 .0 0 0 ]
Table 7.8: Summary o f the results o f estimating regression (7.29) based on Newey-West 
adjusted S.E. ’s Barlett weights, truncation lag=12
One can see from Table 7.8 that a dummy variable and intercept are statistically 
insignificant. Re-estimation of model (7.29) without these two variables gives the 
results presented in table 7.9.
«3 <*4
-0.0088 0.1058 .8952
(0 .0 0 1 ) (0.0338) (0.0363)
P-value P-value P-value
[0 .0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 2 ] [0 .0 0 0 ]
Table 7.9: Summary of the results of estimating model (7.29) with the estimates 
adjusted for autocorrelation55
35 Diagnostics: serial correlation: (12)= 26.83[.008]; functional form: (1)= .1181 [.731]; normality:
X 1 (1)= 3.0268[.22]; heteroscedasticity: J 2 (1)= .4072[.523].
36 Authors’ calculations on the data provided by the National Bank of the Republic of Belarus (National 
Bank of Belams 2000a (January), 2000b (January), 2001, 2002, 2003); the Institute of Privatisation and 
Management [online]. Available from: http://ipm.by/index.pl7topicidHnside [Accessed September 2003]. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. Model estimated:
CC0 + OCl n  e{ + a 2DU+ a 2LNY+ a ALNM(-l) (7.29). The choice of the lag-length equal to 12 is 
explained by the fact that we have monthly data.
37 Although a few researches have been undertaken on the Belarusian money demand function since 
transition began, most of them either do not take into consideration a dummy variable that captures an 
impact of the financial turmoil in Russia in August 1998 (see Boichanka 2000, Yartseva 1999) or show 
results that are in line with ours, implying statistical insignificance for this dummy variable (see Pelipas
2002).
38 Authors’ calculations on the data provided by the National Bank of the Republic of Belarus (National 
Bank of Belams 2000a (January), 2000b (January), 2001, 2002, 2003); the Institute of Privatisation and 
Management [online]. Available from: http://ipm.by/index.pl7topicidHnside [Accessed September 2003]. 
Standard errors are in parentheses.
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Though the method of grid search is widely used in estimating non-linear regressions, it 
can be criticised from the following point of view. While constructing n et values with
y  ranging from 0.1 to 1 with the use of Excel, we get the computed values of n et that
potentially deviate from fcet by disturbance term. In turn it can bias the obtained
coefficients in the final model. That is why we should use another technique to estimate 
regression (7.28). It is the iterative linearization method. Microfit and Eviews allow 
estimating non-linear regression by using this technique. Basically, it involves 
linearization of a non-linear equation around some initial set of parameters. Then, OLS 
is performed on this linear equation, and a new set of parameters is generated. Non­
linear equations are linearized around this new set of parameters. The process is 
repeated until convergence is achieved. Table 7.10 presents the summary of the most 
parsimonious results.























Table 7.10: Summary o f  the results o f estimating non-linear regression (7.30) by the 
iterative linearization m ethod9
Although the model selection criteria chose the model with three lagged values of the 
inflation rate, the specified model does not pass the conventional test for serial 
correlation. To overcome this problem requires the Newey-West procedure to adjust 
estimates for serial correlation. Table 7.11 presents the results of non-linear estimation 
based on Newey-West adjusted S.E.'s Bartlett weights.
39 Model estimated: a 0 + a l ( a 2 nt + a 2( l - a2) n t_x + a 2( l - a2) 2 n t_2 +. . .+a2( l - a2) n n t_n)
+ (X3 DU+£Z4LNY+ar5 LNM(-l) (7.30). Initially regression (7.30) was estimated with the presence of a 
linear trend. Due it its statistical insignificance, it was omitted from regression (7.30) later on. 
Coefficients a x, a 3, OC4 and CCS are correspondingly equal to X(32, Xf34 , X f3 and (1 — X) of
regression (7.27). Diagnostics: serial correlation: ^ 2 (12)== 26.87[.008]; functional form: (1)=
. 1175[.732]; normality: ^ 2 (1)= 3.0240[.22]; heteroscedasticity: % 2 (1)= .4092[.522].
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a 2 «3 *4 «5
-.0089 .90620 .1031E-3 .077 .88575
(.00256) (0.1741) (.040292) (.053260) (.049810)
P-value P-value P-value P-value P-value
[0.001] r.ooo] [.998] r.i55] [0.000]
Table 7.11: Summary o f  the results o f estimating model (7.30) based on Newey-West 
adjusted S.E. 's Bartlett weights, truncation lag= 1240
As in a grid search technique a dummy variable and intercept are statistically 
insignificant, so we re-estimate model (7.30) omitting these two variables. The results 
are presented in Table 7.12.
oc2 « 4 «5
-.0087 .96244 .10277 .89543
(.972E-3) (.23381) (.035617) (.03825)
P-value P-value P-value P-value
[.000] r.oooi [.005] [.0001
Table 7.12: Summary o f  the results o f estimating model (7.30) with the estimates 
adjusted fo r  autocorrelation using Newey-West adjusted S.E. 's Bartlett weights 41
The above results are consistent with those obtained by using a grid search 
methodology. All the coefficients have the expected signs and are statistically 
significant. One can notice that the coefficient of inflation expectations is close to one. 
In this regard it is also reasonable to test a hypothesis of rational expectations formation 
for the robustness of our results.
40 Authors’ calculations on the data provided by the National Bank of the Republic of Belarus (National 
Bank of Belarus 2000a (January), 2000b (January), 2001, 2002, 2003); the Institute of Privatisation and 
Management [online]. Available from: httpi/Zipm-by/index.p^topicidHnside [Accessed September 2003]. 
Standard errors are in parentheses.
41 Ibid.
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7.4.3.2 Partial Adjustment Model under the Hypothesis of Rational 
Expectations Formation
When hypothesising rational expectations, we assume that on average the rational 
expected rate of inflation is equal to the actual rate. It follows from the interpretation of 
the conditional expected function, which implies that the forecast error has a zero mean 
and it is uncorrelated with all the components of the information set (see Patterson 
2000, p. 533). Therefore, defining t n et -  E, {n t | Q ,.!} as the expectation of inflation 
formed at t-1 to prevail at t, where is the information available at the moment of 
expectation formation, it follows (see Patterson 2000, p.534):
This equation has potential measurement errors, that could render the inflation 
estimator inconsistent, because ;r, is correlated with a deterministic term and it is
determined endogenously. To overcome this problem requires the Generalised 
Instrumental Variable Method, or in other words the Two-Stage Least Squares Method 
(TSLS) that requires n t to be regressed on a set of instruments that are closely
correlated with the expected rate of inflation, but uncorrelated with an error term, fit .
Since it is unrealistic to have all the variables that compose , known a priori, it is
reasonable to adopt a ‘partly rational expectations’ concept due to Sargent (1973) and 
McCallum (1976). This means that we can use just the lagged values of the inflation 
rate as the information set. Moreover, since the use of TSLS method requires the 
number of instruments to be at least equal to the number of regressors, any other right- 
hand side predetermined (exogenous) variables can be used as instruments as well. 
Thus, we estimate equation (7.33) by using TSLS technique, where intercept, dummy 
variable (DU), real income (LNY), once lagged value of the real cash balances
(7.31)
(7.32)
By substituting (7.32) into (7.27) we obtain equation (7.33):
where is //,=  %Ut-Xp1e{
(7.33)
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( L N M ), and twice lagged values of the inflation rate are used as instrumental 
variables ( n t_x,n t_2). The results of the estimated regression are presented in table 7.13.


























Table 7.13: Summary o f the results o f estimating PAM (7.33) under hypothesis o f RE 
formation42
All the coefficients have the expected signs, including the dummy variable, although it 
is still statistically insignificant. Sargan’s %2 statistic shows that the model is correctly 
specified and the instrumental variables are valid instruments. There is still a problem of 
the presence of serial correlation in the residuals that bias the results. The Newey-West 
procedure should be used to adjust estimates for serial correlation (see table 7.14 for the 
adjusted results).
42 Authors’ calculations on the data provided by the National Bank of the Republic of Belarus (National 
Bank of Belarus 2000a (January), 2000b (January), 2001, 2002, 2003); the Institute of Privatisation and 
Management [online]. Available from: http://ipm.by/index.pl7topicidHnside [Accessed September 2003]. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. Model estimated:
l n ^ j  = A/?, + + A/?3 In y + Xfi 4DU + (1 -  A ) ln ^ ^ -j  + //,(7 -33). Initially
regression (7.33) was estimated with the presence of a linear trend. Due to it its statistical insignificance, 
it was later omitted from regression (7.33). Coefficients a x, (X2,OC3,OC4 and Ct5 are correspondingly
equal to Xf3x, X(32, Xf33, X(34 and (1 — X) of regression (7.33). Diagnostics: serial
correlation: % 2 (12)= 21.82[.04]; functional form: ^ 2 (1)= .15[.70]; normality: ^ 2 (1)= 1.8[.41];
heteroscedasticity: %2 (1)= .017[.68].
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a 2 «3 <*4 «5
.65709 -.00887 .0472 -.002 .88514
(.4137) (.003) (.0482) (.043) (.046)
P-value P-value P-value P-value P-value
[.116] [.002] [.330] [.959] [.000]
Table 7.14: Summary o f  the results o f estimating PAM (7.33) under the hypothesis o f 
RE formation with the estimates adjusted for autocorrelation using Newey-West 
adjusted S.E. 's Bartlett weights, truncation lag= 1243
After adjusting the standard errors for serial correlation one can notice that a dummy 
variable is still statistically insignificant. Re-estimation of equation (7.33) without a 
dummy variable, after adjusting for autocorrelation, improves the estimates, but the real 
income variable still appears to be statistically insignificant (table 7.15).
a 2 a 3 <*5
.66275 -.0090727 .047771 .88404
(.41102) (.0011237) (.046002) (.040710)
P-value P-value P-value P-value
[ . i n i [.000] [.302] [.000]
Table 7.15: Summary o f  the results o f estimating model (7.33) with a dummy variable 
omitted from the regression and with the estimates adjusted fo r  autocorrelation using 
Newey-West adjusted S.E. 's Bartlett weights44
This suggests that in Belarus in 1995-2002 money demand was still mainly determined 
by the expected inflation rate. Indeed, because of the policy of excessive money 
emission over most of the analysed period, this fact is not surprising. Moreover, it is 
necessary to note that the adjustment in real cash balances is not instantaneous. The 
coefficient of adjustment is equal to 0.11596 (1-0.88404) suggesting that nearly 12 per 
cent of the discrepancy between actual and real cash balances is eliminated within one 
month, and the full adjustment is achieved within 8.6 months or in other words nearly 3 
quarters. The long-run semi-elasticity coefficient of the money demand with respect to
43 Authors’ calculations on the data provided by the National Bank of the Republic of Belarus (National 
Bank of Belarus 2000a (January), 2000b (January), 2001, 2002, 2003); the Institute of Privatisation and 
Management [online]. Available from: http://ipm.by/index.pl7topicidHnside [Accessed September 2003]. 
Standard errors are in parentheses.
44 Ibid.
178
Julia A. Korosteleva (2006) Chapter 7
the inflation rate is equal to -0.0782 meaning that on the average the real cash balances 
decreased by the rate of 7.8 per cent a month when the inflation rate increased by one 
per cent.
Y.4.3.3 ARDL Approach to Cointearation
Another technique that is reasonable to apply to estimating equation (7.28) for checking 
the robustness of the final results before proceeding further, is an ARDL procedure or in 
other words the bounds testing approach to cointegration described in more details in 
section 6.4.2
At the first stage of the ARDL procedure we examine the existence of a long-run 
relationship in equation (7.27) where the expected rate of inflation is proxied by the 
actual rate of inflation. For this we estimate a conditional error correction model of 
money demand for the number of lags of the VAR model. The lag order of the money 
demand equation was chosen on the basis of the model selection criteria and providing 
residuals are white noise. Tables 7.16 and 7.17 present the corresponding statistics for 
selecting the lag order of the money demand equation and the results of the bounds test. 
Model selection criteria and LM statistics choose the lag order of money demand 
equation equal to 2.
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With a linear trend Without a linear trend
p AIC SBC Z 2sc(l) X 2 sc(4) X 1 sc(12) AIC SBC X 2sc(l) X 2 sc(4) X 2 sc(12)
















































Table 7.16 Statistics for selecting the lag order o f  money demand equation45
45 Authors’ calculations on the data provided by the National Bank of the Republic of Belarus (National Bank of Belarus 2000a (January), 2000b (January), 2001, 
2002, 2003); the Institute of Privatisation and Management [online]. Available from: http://ipm.bv/index.pl?topicid=inside [Accessed September 2003]. P-values are in
n m m
square brackets. Model estimated: Alnm, = a 0 + a xt + ^ # 2Alnmt_t +^fj a 3A7rt_j + ^Tia 4A ln y t_J + a sDU  +  Sl lnjraM +  d2n t_x + S3 ln^M+ ut
/=i ;=o j =o
2 2 2(7.34); X sc(1)> X  sc(4), X  sc(12) are LM statistics for testing no residual serial correlation against orders 1, 4 and 12 correspondingly. P-is the lag order of the 
VAR model for ECM (7.34)
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p With intercept and 
deterministic trend, 
F (LNM| n , LNY)
With intercept and no 
deterministic trend,
F (LNM| n , LNY)
2 11.145*** 9.887***
Table 7.17: Bounds test for testing the existence o f long-run relationship in money 
demand function46
Since F(LNM| n , LNY) exceeds the upper bound of the critical value band at the 1 % 
level of significance, it implies that the null hypothesis of non-existence of long-run 
relationship between LNM, ;rand LNY can be rejected.
The same procedure is applied to test the significance of ;rand LNY lagged 
level variables in the error correction model explaining tsnt and A LNY. If F statistics
for testing the joint significance of the lagged level variables fall below the lower bound 
of the critical value band it implies that they do not enter significantly in the equations 
for An t and A LNY, and in other words can be treated as ‘long-run forcing’ variables.
The results of the bounds test are presented in tables 7.18 and 7.19 
correspondingly.
P With intercept and 
deterministic trend, 
F (;r|L N M , LNY)
With intercept and no 
deterministic trend, 
F (;r|L N M , LNY)
1 8.64*** 8.59***
Table 7.18: Bounds test fo r testing the significance o f  n  lagged level variable in the 
error correction model explaining A;r, 47
46 Authors’ calculations on the data provided by the National Bank of the Republic of Belarus (National 
Bank of Belarus 2000a (January), 2000b (January), 2001, 2002, 2003); the Institute of Privatisation and 
Management [online]. Available from: http^/ipm.by/mdex.pWtopicidHnside [Accessed September 2003]. 
P denotes a lag order. *** means that HO is rejected at the 1 % level o f significance. Critical value bounds 
of the F statistic with unrestricted intercept and trend at the 1% level of significance are: 1(0) 6.34 and 1(1) 
7.52; and with unrestricted intercept and no trend correspondingly they are 1(0) 5.15 and 1(1) 6.36 
(Pesaran et. al. 2001, pp. T.1-T.3).
47 Ibid
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p With intercept and 
deterministic trend, 
F (LNY| n , LNM)
With intercept and no 
deterministic trend,
F (LNY| n , LNM)
2 3.4656 .62540
Table 7.19: Bounds test for testing the significance o f  LNY lagged level variable in the 
error correction model explaining A LNY48
From the results presented in Table 7.19 one can see that the F statistic for 
testing the joint significance of the lagged level variables falls below the lower bound of 
the critical value band, suggesting that the income variable does not enter significantly 
into the equations for A LNY, and can be treated as a ‘long-run forcing’ variable for the 
explanation of money demand.
From Table 7.18 one can see that the F statistic far exceeds the upper bound of 
the critical value band at the 1 % level of significance, implying the problem of 
endogeneity of the inflation rate variable. In turn this suggests that there exists more 
than one cointegrating relationship in the money demand equation.
A further application of the ARDL procedure is inappropriate in estimating the 
money demand function, because the ARDL technique is based on estimating a single 
equation, while dealing with situations where there can be more than one level 
relationship, as in our case, is a matter of further research. Our assumption about the 
order of integration of the series, namely 1(0) if we allow for a structural break in it, or a 
mixture of 1(0) and 1(1) if not, does not allow us to apply the Johansen cointegration 
procedure, requiring all the series to be 1(1). That is why to proceed further with 
deriving the revenue-maximizing money growth rate we should use the estimates 
obtained from the PAM under the hypothesis of rational expectations formation. The 
rationale of using the results obtained from the PAM is based on the assumption that our 
series is likely to be treated as level stationary or in other words 1(0) that is plausible if 
we allow for a structural break in the series.
48 Authors’ calculations on the data provided by the National Bank of the Republic of Belarus (National 
Bank of Belarus 2000a (January), 2000b (January), 2001,2002, 2003); the Institute of Privatisation and 
Management [online]. Available from: http://ipm.by/index.pl?topicid:=inside [Accessed September 2003]. 
P denotes a lag order. *** means that HO is rejected at the 1 % level of significance. Critical value bounds 
of the F statistic with unrestricted intercept and trend at the 10 % level of significance are: 1(0) 4.19 and 
1(1) 5.06; and with unrestricted intercept and no trend correspondingly they are 1(0) 3.17 and 1(1) 4.14 
(Pesaran et. al. 2001, pp. T.1-T.3).
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7A.3.4 Deriving the Revenue-maximizing Money Growth Rate on the Basis 
of the Obtained Estimates from PAM under the Hypothesis of Rational 
Expectations Formation
To recall our findings, during 1995-2002 on average real money balances in Belarus 
decreased by 7.8 per cent per month if  the inflation rate grew by one per cent. This 
suggests that Belarus was on the downward part of the Laffer curve on the Laffer curve 
during the above period. Indeed, further investigation of this issue based on the results 
in table 7.20, supports our conclusion for 1995= However, this was not the case for 
1998-2000 developments, when Belarus was positioned upwards on the Laffer curve, 
despite the fact that the inflation rate exceeded the nominal monetary growth rate during 
these periods, which presupposes Belarus’s downwards position on the Laffer curve. 
This phenomenon therefore requires further investigations to obtain a full picture of the 
results.
The revenue-maximazing rate of money growth for Belarus from May 1995 -  
December 2002 on average was equal to 12.79 percent per month. This is derived from
the formula g= - — , where is the coefficient of the inflation rate in (7.33). Table 
Pi
7.20 shows the revenue-maximizing money growth rate for Belarus correspondingly as 
a percentage change per month, quarter and year.
Revenue-maximizing Money Growth Rate49
as a percentage change 
per month
as a percentage change per 
quarter
as a percentage change per 
year
12.79 43.5 323.88
Table 7.20: Revenue-maximizing money growth rate fo r  Belarus expressed as a 
percentage change per month, quarter and year50
49 Taking into account that the monthly growth rate is equal to 12.79 per cent and the steady-state 
conditions held, the quarterly and the yearly revenue-maximizing growth rate are calculated 
correspondingly as ((1.1279)A3 -  1)*100 and ((1.1279)A12 -  1)*100.
50 Authors’ calculations on the data provided by the National Bank of the Republic of Belarus (National 
Bank of Belarus 2000a (January), 2000b (January), 2001, 2002, 2003); the Institute of Privatisation and 



























(end of period) 




(end of period), 




(end of period), 
as a % of GDP
1995 323.88 473* 566.57 -93.57 9.92 ** **
(457.43) (244.18) (213.25) (3.61) (2.47)
1996 323.88 126.01 52.66 73.35 9.65 2.9 1.21
(75.42) (39.13) (36.29) (2.44) (1.26)
1997 323.88 88.79 63.88 24.91 8.67 2.53 1.82
(96.41) (63.42) (32.99) (3.00) (1.97)
1998 323.88 100.21 73.2 27.01 7.99 2.87 2.1
(102.14) (181.74) (-79.6) (2.04) (3.63)
1999 323.88 172.59 293.8 -121.21 7.73 2.43 4.13
(204.05) (251.3) (-47.25) (2.27) (2.8)
2000 323.88 142.7 168.9 -26.2 7.31 1.92 2.27
(125.23) (107.97) (17.3) (1.93) (1.66)
2001 323.88 130.1 61.38 68.72 7.03 2.54 1.2
(120.02) (46.35) (73.67) (2.73) (1.06)
2002 323.88 59.01 42.76 16.25 6.71 1.77 1.28
(40.1) (34.87) (5.3) (1.42) (1.24)
Table 7.21: Maximum annual revenue from seigniorage and inflation tax and actual revenue from seigniorage and inflation tax compared52
52 Authors’ calculations on the data provided by the National Bank of the Republic of Belarus (National Bank of Belarus 2000a (January), 2000b (January), 2001, 2002,
2003); the Institute of Privatisation and Management [online]. Available from: http://ipm.bv/index.pl?topicid=:inside [Accessed September 2003]. * Since the data on the
total monetary base (inclusive both currency in circulation and bank reserves) are not available for 1994, here the data on currency in circulation are only taken to evaluate
the actual monetary growth rate in 1995. **For 1995 the figures on the actual revenue from seigniorage and from inflation tax (period average) as a per cent of GDP are
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Second, in 1995 the actual rate of money growth exceeded the revenue- 
maximizing rate and a higher level of seigniorage was achieved at the expense of 
accelerating inflation (calculated as a period average). In this period the actual rate of 
inflation exceeded the revenue-maximizing rate (it is equal to the revenue-maximizing 
money growth rate meaning the steady-state conditions) by 75 per cent. An inflation 
rate above the nominal money growth rate decreased real cash balances.
However, a hypothesis that Belarus continued to be positioned on the downward 
side of the Laffer curve from the end of 1995 onwards does not seem to receive enough 
support. The end-of-period actual inflation rate in 1995 was less than the actual 
monetary growth rate. This can be explained by the introduction of the complex of 
measures aiming to stabilize the economic situation. Mainly due to the announced 
regime of a fixed exchange rate and the introduction of real positive interest rates it 
became possible to decrease the velocity of money and to curb inflation by the end of 
1995, without a considerable fall in the monetary growth rate.
During the rest of the period Belarus remained on the upward-looking side of the 
Laffer curve. Despite the fact that in 1998, 1999 and 2000 the actual inflation rate 
exceeded the nominal money growth rate, both of them, nevertheless, remained lower 
than the revenue-maximizing money growth rate. However, an excess of the actual 
inflation rate over the actual nominal growth rate led to a decrease in real cash balances 
that was further aggravated by the restrictions introduced in foreign exchange markets 
in 1996. The phenomenon of Belarus remaining on the upward side of the Laffer curve 
during this period can be explained by the fact that the estimated revenue-maximizing 
money growth rate was itself very high. It, however, should not be referred to as a 
yardstick for achieving maximum seigniorage, because the costs of that will be high in 
the form of accelerating inflation . Given a mechanism of administrative price controls 
in Belarus I assume that the difference between the true and official rates of inflation is 
significant. A measure of a true rate of inflation (if it were possible to calculate) should 
have raised a coefficient of the inflation rate, and therefore have reduced the value of 
revenue-maximizing money growth rate and respectively the values of seigniorage and 
IT. The fact that in 1995, the year of partial price liberalisation, the rate of actual money 
growth was in excess of the revenue-maximising one, and period-average inflation
53 Also see Boichanka (2001) for similar conclusions.
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exceeded the period-average rate of money growth provides some evidence supporting 
this argument.
In summary, the policy of inflationary financing of the economy had an overall negative 
effect, triggering an inflationary spiral, so reducing real money demand and pushing 
domestic money holders to switch from savings in banks to purchases of foreign assets 
or non-monetary assets.
This policy of monetary emission pursued by the Belarusian government during
1995-2002 aimed to support state-owned enterprises and in doing so, to avoid a sharp 
output contraction that occurred in many transition economies of Central and Eastern 
Europe in their early stages of transition, after the introduction of stabilisation packages. 
This was undertaken at the expense of the private sector and those households who were 
not the recipients of the state’s subsidies. In this sense such a policy could not be 
regarded as equitable or efficient. The fact that by 2002 a decrease in money supply 
could be observed due to restrictions on the policy of monetary emission, with a 
consequent fall in the inflation rate, and the stabilisation of the Belarusian Rouble, can 
serve as evidence of the Belarusian authorities finally admitting the costs of excessive 
money issue.
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Chapter 8 The Belarusian Economy at a Crossroads: A 
Conclusion
As noted in the earlier chapters, the beginning of the transition process from 
communism to a market economy in Belarus, as everywhere else in the region, was 
marked by a sharp decline in GDP and industrial production, and the huge price jump 
fuelled by price liberalisation. During 1991-95 the GDP was declining by 12 per cent 
per annum and the yearly inflation rates were far in excess of 1,000 percent.
Five years after the transition began, the Belarusian authorities, anticipating the 
social and consequently political costs of pursuing an IMF strategy primarily focused on 
macroeconomic stabilisation through monetary and fiscal contractionary policies and a 
policy of high interest rates, abandoned it and switched to the strategy of maintaining 
the economy at as close as possible to full employment through expansionary 
macroeconomic policy. Low interest rates and directed credits and preferential loans 
schemes, accompanied by foreign exchange and capital controls, which taken together 
can be termed financial repression, became its pillar. Reversing the privatisation 
programme was to prevent the Belarusian asset stripping and decline that was typical of 
Russia. Price controls and continual wage increases (not linked to labour productivity) 
were supposed to address the decrease in real incomes, and consequently prevent 
population impoverishment. Retaining and increasing state ownership in Belarusian 
enterprises, supplying them with credits and inactivating bankruptcy procedures helped 
to avoid the corporate distress that was typical of many CEE countries, in particular of 
Hungary. Excessive state control exerted on the banking sector made it serve the needs 
of the Belarusian authorities to maintain the Belarusian strategy of development.
Against the background of continuing transition recession and a range of 
currency and banking crises shaking the transition economies in the region, the revival 
of the Belarusian economy with economic growth averaging at 7 per cent per annum in
1996-02 created an impression that this alternative strategy had succeeded. Can the 
Belarusian alternative approach to transition claim to be successful? Based on our study 
can we conclude that the Belarusian financial policy has proven efficient? What can we 
learn from the Belarusian experience of financial repression?
The analysis undertaken in the present study revealed that the Belarusian 
financial policy of the late 1990s had proven inefficient and unable to target long-term
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growth objectives. The policy of money-led stimulation of the economy triggered an 
inflationary spiral consequently leading to demonetisation and unofficial dollarisation of 
the economy. According to our findings a 1 per cent increase in the monthly inflation 
rate in Belarus during 1995-2002 on average led to a 7.8 per cent decrease in real 
money balances per month. Thus on average in 1996-2002 only 70 per cent of the 
economy was monetised. The policy of low interest rates discouraged savings, one of 
the main sources of financing enterprises in Belarus. The retained profits could not play 
a significant role in maintaining enterprises’ economic activity in Belarus in the 1990s 
because 1) the number of loss-making enterprises tended to increase reaching 35 per 
cent of all enterprises in 2002, as against 7.3 per cent in 1994. Overall profits have 
tended to decrease - amounting to only 11.8 per cent of GDP in 2002 versus 52.9 per 
cent in 1994; 2) credit expansion and state subsidies to loss-making enterprises, 
combined with high taxation of profitable firms, also exhausted the financial resources 
of the healthier enterprises. Furthermore, borrowing from the foreign markets was 
restricted and a market for corporate securities did not exist due to the reversal of the 
privatisation programme. Therefore, economy financing remained mainly inflationary, 
as it was financed by the current and lagged emissions of the National Bank.
The policies of directed and preferential loans, high reserve requirements and a 
policy of low interest rates altogether led to financial disintermediation and the financial 
sector virtually playing no significant role in economic development. The former 
[financial disintermediation] was confirmed by the results of our empirical analysis (see 
chapter 6) showing that financial restraints imposed in Belarus had an overall negative 
effect on financial deepening. As the early chapters noted, as far as the latter is 
concerned the effect of financial development on economic growth materialises through 
two major channels: on the one hand capital accumulation (extensive growth), and on 
the other, technological change (intensive growth). Following the fact that financial 
repressionist policies resulted in financial disintermediation and demonetisation of the 
economy, the economic growth can hardly be attributed to capital accumulation. 
Paradoxically perhaps, the policy of macroeconomic expansion triggered liquidity 
contraction and consequently an increase in arrears and barter transactions. Therefore, 
we can speculate that financial development, if it mattered for economic growth in
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Belarus in the long run1, inhibited economic growth through the aforementioned 
repressionist policies.
Turning to the issue of the impact of financial development on economic 
growth through technological change, we can speculate that it did not materialise due to 
the following reasons.
First, the state subsidies and banks’ loans were mainly designed to support 
poorly performing state-owned enterprises in agriculture and industry to keep them 
afloat. The government industrial policy was lacking ‘strategic coherence and 
selectivity’ and was unable to promote investment in specific sectors with strong growth 
potential and to ‘spur structural change towards rapid modernisation of the economy’ 
(Haiduk et al. 2004). The pattern of credit and subsidies allocation and a policy of low 
interest rates resulted in problems of adverse selection and moral hazard that were the 
opposite extreme to what was pronounced by the policy of high interest rates (see 
chapter 4). State-owned enterprises, adhering to the idea that they are too big for the 
state to let them sink, took bank loans for granted, often failing to repay them and 
waiting for new bank loans to bail them out. The investment did not go to support newly 
created private enterprises that were mainly serviced by non-system forming banks. In 
the risky and information-limited environment where the law often had a retroactive 
force and inactive bankruptcy procedures existed, the majority of the latter were 
reluctant to lend to the real sector, preferring to operate in the interbank loan or foreign 
exchange markets. Furthermore, as was outlined in chapter 5, the economic mechanism 
envisaged not only direct but implicit subsides to the state-owned enterprises in a form 
of tax exemption for some state-owned firms. This was at the expense of increasing the 
tax burden on the private sector, and granting access to cheap natural resources, which 
together led to crowding out of the private entrepreneur from the market.
Second, due to the highly inflationary environment, mainly short-term loans 
were granted to finance enterprises’ working capital. The rate of capital depreciation fell 
from 6-8 per cent prior to 1991, to 1.5-2.4 per cent in 2002, suggesting that it would 
take 42-66 years instead of 12-16 years for full renewal of the fixed capital stock 
(Daneiko 2003, p. 125). Overall capital depreciation reached 60 per cent in 2002 (ibid,
1 Although the Granger-Causality test results (see chapter 6) suggest that finance did not matter for 
economic development in the period under analysis, no decisive conclusions can be drawn about the 
finance-growth relationship in die long run. The fact that long-run forcing tests performed as part of the 
ARDL procedure to cointegration (see chapter 6) reject the exogeneity o f the real income series leaves 
some room for speculation about financial restraints having a negative effect on the economic growth in 
the long run.
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p. 125). Taken together this suggests that the average productivity of capital was 
expected to fall , due to the replacement of high-yielding investment that can be 
generated in the private sector or in the branches of the economy with high 
technological potential with low-retum investment, directed mainly to loss-making 
agricultural and industrial sectors, the inefficient house construction sector, and to 
stimulate household consumption through wage increases. Therefore, neither lowering 
the cost of capital nor directed credits and preferential loans schemes provided to 
enterprises, the two core financial repressionist policies in Belarus in the late 1990s, 
could facilitate efficient capital allocation and consequently provide sustainability of 
economic growth in the long run. The slowdown in growth in 1999-2002, mounting size 
of inventories3, increase in loss-making enterprises and significant deterioration of 
Belarus’ competitive position4 all provide evidence of the inefficiency of the Belarusian 
economic strategy. Unlike China (see chapter 5), Belarus has not attempted to create a 
competitive environment allowing for new entrants to the market and opening itself up 
for foreign direct investment. Neither has it used the opportunity of high growth to 
promote some gradual structural and institutional reforms.
In summary, the Belarusian experience of financial repression had an overall 
negative effect on financial development, resulting in shallow finance and financial 
intermediaries playing a passive role in the development process over the period of 
investigation. However, if finance had mattered in the long run, financial repression 
would have been expected to inhibit economic growth through decreasing the share of 
savings to be allocated to investment and lowering the average productivity of capital. 
Therefore, financial policy that Belarus pursued in 1996-2000 can be viewed as a 
‘survival-oriented strategy’ rather than a ‘growth-oriented strategy’ (Bakanova et al.
2003) that, in the first place, aimed to serve the government’s own needs in ensuring its 
political survival. Although since 2000, government policies have been gradually 
adjusted towards reducing economic distortions, in particular in the financial sector, and 
GDP growth surged again from 4.5 per cent in 2002 to 11 per cent in 2004, the
2 Unfortunately, we cannot provide evidence supporting this conclusion due to the unavailability of the 
data on capital stock.
3 As of 2002 inventories reached 65.3 per cent of current monthly output (Haiduk et al. 2004).
4 Competitiveness is an important determinant of economic growth in a small open economy such as 
Belarus. Therefore, worsening of Belarus’ competitive position, in particular relative to Russian 
producers (see footnote 5), can have detrimental effects for the Belamsian economy as a whole. The 
erosion of Belarus’ competitive advantage can be explained by high wage growth attributed to nominal 
wage increases and real currency appreciation (see Haiduk et al. 2004, Zaiko 2005 and World Bank 
2005).
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sustainability of a new growth pattern, and therefore social stability remains 
questionable. This is due to the delay in economic restructuring and the vulnerability of 
the Belarusian economy to any change in external environment. Since 2001 the external 
environment has favoured Belarusian economic development, to a great extent 
explaining these high rates of economic growth5. If the government continues to avoid 
fundamental reforms when growth is high6, it puts the country under the risk of a severe 
transition crisis that will inflict even greater economic and social costs than after the 
Soviet Union’s collapse.
5 In 2001-2004 Belarus benefited directly from the growth in oil prices - through the expansion of oil 
processing exports, and indirectly - through accelerated growth and demand in Russia, which still 
remains the Belarus’ main trade partner (World Bank 2005).
6 A high rate of growth allows for more smooth reforms. However, it is also true that when growth is 
high, the pressure for change is less.
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C ountry 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Czech Republic 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3+ 3+ 4-
Estonia 1 2 3 3 3 3 3+ 3+ 4- 4- 4-
Hungary 2 2 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4
Latvia 1 2 2 3 3 3 3 2- 3 3 4-
Lithuania 1 1 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Poland 2 3 3 3 3 3 3+ 3+ 3+ 3+
Russia 1 1 1 2 2 2 2+ 2 2- 2- 2
Ukraine 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2+
Belarus 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 2-
Turkmenistan 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Uzbekistan 1 1 1 1 2 2 2- 2- 2- 2- 2
Table A. 1 Index o f  banking reform (1991-2000)’
1 The EBRD Transition Reports 2000, 2002. Index is a scale from 1 to 4+. 1 stands for little progress beyond establishment of two-tier system. 2 denotes 
significant liberalisation of interest rates and credit allocation. 3 stands for substantial progress in establishment of bank solvency and of framework for 
prudential supervision; full interest rate liberalisation with little preferential access to cheap financing; significant lending to private enterprises and significant 
presence of private banks; 4 -  means significant movement of banking laws and regulations towards BIS standards, substantial financial deepening and 
significant term lending to private enterprises; 4+ stands for standards and performance norms of advanced industrial economies: full convergence of banking 
laws and regulations with Bank of International Settlements standards; provision of full set of competitive banking services.
Country 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Czech Republic 1 1 2 3- 3- 3- 3- 3 3 3 3
Estonia 1 1 2- 2- 2- 2 3 3 3 3 3+
Hungary 2 2 2 3 3 3+ 3+ 3+ 4- 4-
Latvia 1 1 1 2 2 2 2+ 2+ 2+ 2+ 3
Lithuania 1 1 2- 2 2 2 2+ 2+ 2+ 3 3
Poland 2 2 2 3 3 3+ 3+ 3+ 4- 4-
Russia 1 1 2- 2- 2 3 3 2- 2- 2- 2+
Ukraine 1 2- 2- 2- 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Belarus 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Turkmenistan 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Uzbekistan 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Table A.2 Index o f  reforms o f  securities markets and non-bank financial institutions (1991-2000)2
The EBRD Transition Reports 2000, 2002. Index is a scale from 1 to 4+. 1 stands for little progress; 2 stands for formation of securities exchanges, market- 
makers and brokers; some trading in government paper and/or securities; rudimentary legal and regulatory framework for the issuance and trading of securities;
3 denotes substantial issuance of securities by private enterprises; establishment of independent share registries, secure clearance and settlement procedures, 
and some protection of minority shareholders; emergence of non-bank financial institutions and associated regulatory framework; 4 means securities laws and 
regulations approaching IOSCO standards; substantial market liquidity and capitalization; well-functioning non-bank financial institutions and effective 
regulation; 4+ stands for standards and performance norms of advanced industrial economies: full convergence of securities norms and regulations with 
International Organization of Securities Commissions standards; fully developed non-bank intermediation.
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Appendix B Chronology of Restrictions Imposed/Released in 
Selected Financial Markets1 in Belarus from 1996-20002
25 April 1996 The NBB banned issuing loans nominated in foreign currency by 
commercial banks to firms. It was also concerned interbank loans (NBB telegram No. 4- 
96).
8 January  1997 A corridor for BRB/1 USD was considered to be within 
15,500-21,000 BRB/1 USD for the first quarter of 1997. The over-the-counter foreign 
exchange rate was not to exceed 1.05 of the official rate (Resolution of the Council of 
Ministers and NBB No. 12/1.
17 January  1997 The NBB temporarily banned convertibility of cash foreign 
currency through third currencies. Moreover, the foreign exchange rate for non-cash 
currency was said not to divert more than 3 per cent from the NBB official cross­
exchange rates (NBB telegrams No.31005/205, No.31005/206).
31 January 1997 The NBB set the difference between bought and sold foreign 
currencies by commercial banks from/to individuals to be sold to the NBB (NBB 
telegram No.31001/2072 of January 31st 1997).
5 February 1997 Administrative and financial sanctions of 70 -300 minimum 
wages were introduced for carrying out foreign exchange transactions on the ‘black 
market’. Furthermore, exchange offices of commercial banks were obliged to register 
the passport details of individuals buying foreign currency (Presidential Decree ‘On 
some measures of securing the order of foreign exchange transactions’, No.l).
17 February 1997 The National Bank set the foreign exchange rate of 
commercial banks not to exceed 1.5 per cent of the official rate plus 1 per cent of banks’ 
commission (NBB telegram No.31005/553).
3 M arch 1997 The National Bank removed the restrictions on issuing loans 
nominated in foreign currency by commercial banks to firms (NBB telegram 
No.04013/70).
1 Here, mainly the developments in domestic market for foreign currency, securities and promissory notes 
markets and credit market are covered.
2 National Bank of Belarus (Konsul’tant Plyus: Belarus [CD-Rom] 2002), TACIS various issues. 
Information on restraints imposed in currency market and in capital market in 1996 is very limited.
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To analyse the productivity of seigniorage over 1995-2002 in Belarus, we calculate the 
maximum revenue that can be obtained if the steady-state conditions hold, and compare 
with actual revenue (see table 7.21). All the computations are provided in appendix G.
From the results presented in table 7.21 first of all one can see that the maximum 
rate of seigniorage was on average between 7-10 per cent during 1995-2002 that is in 
line with the results obtained by Cagan (1956), and by Romer and Larrain (1993). Their 
findings also suggest that the revenue-maximising money growth rate varies about 300 
per cent per annum. This also supports our findings. Table 7.21 shows that throughout 
the period the actual rate of seigniorage does not exceed the steady-state one, although it 
is high enough to cover the budget deficit (see figure 7.6), and even partly cover quasi- 
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■  Seigniorage as a percent of GDP □  Government deficit as a percent of GDP
Figure 7.6: Seigniorage and budget deficit as a per cent o f  GDP5'
51 Seigniorage is based on author’s calculations on the data provided by the National Bank o f  the 
Republic o f  Belarus (National Bank o f Belarus 2000a (January), 2000b (January), 2001, 2002, 2003); the 
Institute o f Privatisation and Management [online]. Available from: http: /ipm.by/index.pl?topicid=inside 
[Accessed September 2003]. The data on budget deficit is derived from International Financial Statistics 
[online]. Available from: http: ifs.apdi.net/imf/logon.asp\ [Accessed November 2003],
184
Julia A. Korosteleva (2006) Appendix B
30 May 1997 Introduced the surrender requirements of 30 per cent for the 
foreign currency which commercial banks bought from individuals. (NBB Resolution 
No.904)
1 August 1997 According to NBB letter No.901 (29 June 1997), individuals 
were not allowed to take out of the country BRB cash exceeding 100 minimum wages 
(equivalent to USD 556) per person. Furthermore, bringing BRB cash into the country 
by individuals was totally banned. These measures were the first evidence of the 
growing currency crisis in Belarus.
4 September 1997 The NBB issued letter ‘On order of non-residents investing 
into the government and NBB securities’ (No.944), which came as a surprise. It 
appeared to be evidence of partial liberalisation of short-term capital inflows in the 
absence of current account convertibility (even with stronger exchange and cross-border 
payments controls than ever) and under conditions of an unstable macroeconomic 
situation, particularly when currency crisis was showing its teeth. According to the 
letter, non-residents were allowed to invest into government securities markets (both 
short-term and long-term) and NBB securities for BRB. The matter was that both 
remained in low demand from potential investors due to the reasons discussed in 
chapter 5.2
21 M arch 1998 Following the increasing gap between the official exchange rate 
of BRB and its quotation on the Moscow Interbank Stock Exchange (MISE), amounting 
to 76 per cent on 16 March 1998, the Belarusian authorities asked the Central Bank of 
Russia to stop the BRB trading on the MISE. This measure only increased speculative 
tensions and triggered a massive surge in BRB supply in stock exchanges in Ukraine 
and the Baltic countries, as well as in interbank and over the counter markets of Russia 
and further 25 per cent devaluation of BRB within the week. In response to this the 
Belarusian authorities terminated all payments in BRB between non-residents and 
payments in BRB for imported goods (TACIS 1998a). Furthermore, on 23 March the 
NBB terminated carrying out of non-cash transactions between residents of Belarus, 
excluding payments due to the NBB, the budget and the Fund of social defence (NBB 
telegram No.31-06/1450).
1 July 1998 The NBB temporarily prohibited buying and selling for BRB of 
foreign bills nominated in BRB (NBB telegram ‘On order of buying and selling of 
foreign bills for BRB’, No.31-06/172).
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7 July 1998 The NBB suspended transferring of BRB from individuals’ 
accounts to non-residents’ accounts and transferring of BRB from non-residents’ 
accounts to individuals’ accounts, open in authorised bank (excluding transferring of 
wages, scholarships, pensions, allowances, alimonies, and means on courts’ executive 
documents). Belarusian firms were also banned from paying back in BRB loans issued 
from non-residents and denominated in foreign currency (NBB telegram No.31- 
06/3437). This measure aimed to limit the BRB mobility to prevent any speculative 
attacks from foreign financial markets on the BRB stability.
14 August 1998 The NBB authorised that non-residents could not buy securities 
(including bills) which were nominated in foreign currency for BRB from Belarusian 
firms, and that Belarusian firms could not allocate Belarusian roubles to non-residents’ 
accounts in any forms (loans, deposits and other financial instruments) (NBB telegram 
No.31-06/4199).
November 1998 The NBB authorised that transactions of more than 1,000 units 
of foreign exchange were to be carried out at the official rate and only at the Minsk 
Interbank Currency Exchange (MICE)3 (was in force from 2 November 1998 to 26 
January 1999) (TACIS 1998b).
28 November 1998 The NBB increased the mandatory surrender requirements 
from 30 per cent of 95 per cent for foreign currencies, which commercial banks buy 
from individuals (TACIS 1998b).
8 December 1999 The NBB introduced two exchange rates, namely official and 
special. While the former was used for carrying on transactions at the main trade session 
where compulsory surrender of foreign currency at the amount of 30 per cent was 
undertaken, the latter was used exclusively for accounting purposes. From 16 December 
1998 the additional trade session, where the rest of foreign currencies’ trading 
(including additional 10-per cent surrender of export earnings), was announced. This 
rate was 1.5 times higher than official exchange rate but still far overvalued compared 
to the market rate (NBB telegram No.31-06/6600).
10 January 1999 Easing up of the surrender requirements for foreign currency, 
which commercial banks bought from individuals. They were reduced from 95% to 
30% (NBB Telegram No.31-06/7031 (23 December 1998)).
3 MICE was transformed into BCSE in January 1999
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February 1999 Removing of the restrictions on the sum of transactions with 
regard to the trading of foreign exchange at the interbank currency market. Moreover, 
the exchange rate for these transactions was allowed to be set on a basis of demand and 
supply (NBB Telegram No.31-06/492 (26 January 1999))
26 February 1999 Belarusian banks and firms were temporarily prohibited from 
purchasing foreign exchange outside the BCSE. The ban was not applied to transactions 
with a foreign company if the company placed the BRB equivalent in accounts 
registered as type “T“ (for international trade transactions), “1“ (for investment to the 
Belarusian economy), or “C“ (for the investment into government securities and 
treasury bonds) in authorised banks of Belarus. This regulation did not also affect 
exchange transactions with individuals (NBB Telegram No.31-06/1268).
1 M arch 1999 The rate of the additional trade session at the BCSE was 
suspended and as a result official exchange rate was unified. It was to be set on the basis 
of trading results and to be used in accounting, taxation and reports. De-facto it 
remained well below ‘black market’ exchange rate. In September 1999 the additional 
trade session was renewed (see below) (NBB telegram No.31-06/1270 (26 February 
1999).
2 June 1999 Currency market activities were strengthened further following the 
NBB Resolution ‘On the order of submission of information by banks concerning 
currency operations’, No.9.2, in which commercial banks were obliged to inform the 
NBB about advance payments to non-residents if the sum of the payment exceeded 
USD 100,000. Moreover, in some cases commercial banks were also required to submit 
information about the currency operations of their clients.
11 June 1999 The NBB set the exchange rate at which transactions with 
individuals were carried out, to exceed the official rate by no more than 3 per cent of the 
official rate. Moreover, restrictions on the sum of foreign currency able to be bought by 
each individual were imposed and were not supposed to exceed USD 200 per day 
(Letter ‘On transaction with individuals’, No 31-06/3765).
23 August 1999 The NBB authorised the Belarusian banks not to accept 
domestic currency from non-residents carrying out their activity on the territory of the 
Republic of Belarus, as well as payment documents and promissory notes denominated 
in BRB in payment against banks’ liabilities denominated in foreign currency (NBB 
Resolution ‘On regulation of some operations of banks’, No.15.lg).
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26 August 1999 The additional trade session at the Belarusian Currency-Stock 
Exchange was renewed with effect from 2 September 1999 (NBB Resolutions No 15.10 
and No 15.11). According to NBB telegram ‘On selling and buying of national 
currency’, No 31-20/5757, firms were obliged to sell 30 per cent of their earnings in 
foreign currency at the main session at the official exchange rate and can sell their other 
foreign currency revenues at an exchange rate up to 1.5 times the official exchange rate 
at the additional session. All foreign exchange transactions on sums over 1,000 units per 
day per firm outside the BCSE were prohibited. The measures were believed to revive 
activity in the official currency market.
11 September 1999 The NBB temporarily banned the use of bills by economic 
agents, including non-residents carrying out their activity in Belarus, issued by the 
Belarusian banks in payments against foreign economic transactions. (NBB telegram 
No.36-05/474).
25 November 1999 Easing up of the regulations on foreign currency 
transactions (NBB Resolution No.25.11). According to the Resolution the NBB 
cancelled regulations requiring banks to sell to the NBB foreign currency bought from 
individuals. The NBB also annulled the regulations limiting exchange transactions to 
1,000 foreign currency units outside the BCSE.
14 December 1999 Liberalisation of the cash foreign currency market occurred: 
commercial banks were allowed freely to set the exchange rate for transactions with 
individuals.
30 December 1999 The NBB annulled some documents restricting the usage of 
BRB in international transactions (NBB Letter No.31-06/8497). The following 
documents were terminated: Telegram No.31-06/172 (1 July 1998), Telegram No.31- 
06/4199 (14 August 1998) and Telegram No.31-06/3437 (7 July 1998) (see above on 
the content of documents).
16 February 2000 The NBB was ordered to issue NBB bills nominated in 
foreign currency amounting to USD 50 million to stimulate an increase in foreign 
currency reserves. According to this document ‘firms were exempted from obligations 
to concede a declaration about volumes and sources of investments channelled for 
purchasing these bills’, as well as they were granted the right to conduct transactions 
with the purchase bills on the secondary market (Presidential Decree ‘On the NBB bills 
nominated in foreign currency’, No.63). The NBB issued also bonds nominated in 
foreign currency for individuals. The latter were exempted from declaring sources for
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purchasing bonds and from paying income tax on revenues earned on operations with 
them.
24 February 2000 All payments in BRB from accounts of non-residents of the 
Republic of Belarus (excluding non-resident banks), open in the authorised Belarusian 
banks, into correspondent accounts of non-resident banks were banned (NBB 
Resolution ‘On order of carrying out payments in BRB’ No.6.12).
1 March 2000 For direction of foreign exchange to the state oil company 
“Belneftekhim” for purchasing oil additional 10 per cent-surrender requirement was 
introduced for the period of 1 March 2000 -  30 April 2000. Prior to this, the authorities 
had already introduced such an ‘oil tax’ for the period from 11 October 1999 to 1 
January 2000 (TACIS 2000b).
25 April 2000 The NBB announced that maximum amount of deposits allocated 
by each individual in commercial banks due to be reimbursed at the expense of the 
Guarantee Fund was to be reduced from USD 2000 to USD 1000 (NBB Resolution 
No.9.8). However, there were 7 banks (all categorised as system-forming) where 
deposits of individuals were fully guaranteed by the state. This Resolution made them 
more attractive for individuals. Therefore, the NBB attempted to concentrate greater 
savings nominated in foreign currency in the ‘core’ banks for the latter to be able to 
serve the needs of real sector.
18 May 2000 The NBB amended the order on conduct of operations with 
foreign currency in Belarus, according to which accounts registered as type “T” (for 
international trade transactions) could be open only for representative offices and 
branch offices of non-residents registered on the territory of Belarus (NBB Resolution 
No. 11.4).
1 June 2000 Due to the inability of the NBB to fully satisfy all the demands for 
foreign exchange, the NBB orally prohibited commercial banks from purchasing foreign 
exchange for their own needs at the additional session of BCSE. Banks were only 
permitted to buy foreign exchange upon the request of their clients.
1 September 2000 Authorised banks were banned to transfer money to non­
residents’ accounts registered as type “T” excluding those, specified in NBB Resolution 
No. 11.4 of 18 May 2000 (see above).
13 October 2000 IMF concluded the Article IV consultation with Belarus (IMF 
2000 (October).
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Appendix C Chronology of Interest Rates Controls and 
Changes in the Level of the Refinancing Rate
Date of introduction Restraint/level of the rate Source1
1. Margin controls
From 1 March to 26 
April 1995
No more than 1 per cent p.m. on 
interbank loans
NBB Protocol No.5 
(20 February 1995)
From 21 April to 20 
May 1995
No more than 3 per cent p.m. on 
loans denominated in BRB and 




(20 April 20 1995)
From 6 December 
1996











From 20 December 
1994
20/32 per cent - on demand/time 




From 21 February to 
April 20 1995
10/25 per cent p.m. -  on 





From 21 April to 20 
May 1995
20 per cent p.m. -  on time rouble 
deposits of individuals and legal 
entities; 8 per cent p.m. -  on 
demand rouble deposits of 
individuals
NBB letter No.21-95 
(20 April 1995)
From 21 June 1995 10 per cent p.m. -  on rouble time 
deposits of individuals and legal
NBB letter No.35-95 
(19 June 1995)
1 National Bank o f Belarus (Konsul’tant Plyus: Belarus [CD-Rom] 2002).
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entities; 3 per cent p.m. -  on rouble 
emand deposits of individuals
From 21 July 1995 7 per cent p.m. -  on rouble time 
deposits of individuals; 3 per cent 
p.m. -  on rouble demand deposits of 
individuals
NBB letter No.37-95 
(19 July 1995)
From 2 June 1997 4 per cent p.m. -  on rouble time 
deposits of individuals; 1 per cent 





From 20 August 1997 38-45 per cent p.a. -  on rouble time 




From 7 May 1998 Minimum deposit rate is cancelled NBB telegram 
No.02-19/218 
(6 May 1998)
3. Lombard/Overnight interest rate ceilings
From September 
1997
40 per cent p.a. (under 14 days) and 





From October 1997 38 per cent p.a. (under 14 days) and 





From December 1997 42 per cent p.a. (under 14 days) and 





From 16 January 
1998
50 per cent p.a. (under 14 days) and 





From 24 February 
1998
55 per cent p.a. (under 14 days) and 





From 8 April 1998 50 per cent p.a. (under 14 days) and NBB telegram
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From 1 August 1998 42 per cent p.a. (under 14 days) and 





From 1 December 
1998
52 per cent p.a. (under 14 days) and 





From 20 January 
1999
64 per cent p.a. (under 14 days) and 





From 2 March 1999 90 per cent p.a. (under 14 days) and 





From 1 April 1999 150 per cent p.a. (under 14 days) and 





From 10 June 1999 120 per cent p.a. (under 14 days) and 





From 7 February 
2000
180 per cent p.a. (under 14 days) and 





From 25 April 2000 160 per cent p.a. (under 14 days) and 





From 31 October 
2000
170 per cent p.a. (under 14 days) and 
180 per cent p.a. (15-30 days) - on 
Lombard loans





From 16 March 2001 160 per cent p.a. (under 14 days) and 
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Lombard loans (16 March 2001)
From 13 April 2001 165 per cent p.a. (under 14 days) and 





From 25 May 2001 155 per cent p.a. (under 14 days) and 
165 per cent p.a. (15-30 days) - on 
Lombard loans





From 10 June 2001 130 per cent p.a. (under 14 days) and 





From 11 September 
2001
110 per cent p.a. (under 14 days) and 
120 per cent p.a. (15-30 days) - on 
Lombard loans





From 20 December 
1994
40 per cent p.a. NBB
From 21 April to 20 
June 1995
25 per cent p.a.
From 21 June 1995 8 per cent p.a.
From 25 February 
1997
42 per cent p.a.
From 20 August 1997 38 per cent p.a.
From 20 September 
1997
36 per cent p.a.
From 1 December 
1997
40 per cent p.a.
From 19 February 
1998
50 per cent p.a.
From 1 April 1998 44 per cent p.a.
From 7 May 1998 40 per cent p.a.
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From 1 August 1998 38 per cent p.a.
From 1 December 
1998
48 per cent p.a.
From 20 January 
1999
60 per cent p.a.
From 3 March 1999 82 per cent p.a.
From 1 April 1999 90 per cent p.a.
From 25 November 
1999
110 per cent p.a.
From 14 December, 
1999
120 per cent p.a.
From 10 January 
2000
130 per cent p.a.
From 25 January 
2000
150 per cent p.a.
From February 21st, 
2000
175 per cent p.a.
From 15 March 2000 150 per cent p.a.
From 28 March 2000 130 per cent p.a.
From 20 April 2000 110 per cent p.a.
From 22 May 2000 100 per cent p.a.
From 22 June 2000 90 per cent p.a.
From 14 September 
2000
85 per cent p.a.
From 1 December 
2000
80 per cent p.a.
From 21 February 
2001
75 per cent p.a.
From 21 March 2001 70 per cent p.a.
From 21 April 2001 68 per cent p.a.
From 21 May 2001 64 per cent p.a.
From 4 June 2001 60 per cent p.a.
From 21 June 2001 55 per cent p.a.
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From 9 July 2001 50 per cent p.a.
From 21 September 48 per cent p.a.
2001


































- A l l
(.05)
.69 .499 Serial Correlation: 
X 1 (12)= 14.6 [.265] 
Functional Form: 
* 2 (1)=1.46 [.228] 
Normality:
* 2 (1)=1.95 [-377] 
Heteroscedasticity: 

















Table DA: Summary o f the results o f estimating model (6A1) with FR1) by Two-Stage Least Squares methodology1
1 Authors’ calculations on the data provided by the National Bank of the Republic of Belarus (National Bank of Belarus 2000a (January), 2000b (January), 2001, 
2002, 2003); the NBB data given to the author by the Head of Foreign Exchange Analysis and Forecasting Division of the NB during our meeting in March 2003; 



































.65 .148 Serial Correlation: 
x 1 (12)= 22.7 [.03] 
Functional Form: 
z 2(n -2 .5 6  [.110] 
Normality:
X 1 (1)= 04 [.978] 
Heteroscedasticity: 

















Table D.2 Summary o f  the results o f  estimating model (6.11) with FRI2  by Two-Stage Least Squares methodology2
2 Authors’ calculations on the data provided by the National Bank of the Republic of Belarus (National Bank of Belarus 2000a (January), 2000b (Janua 
2002, 2003); the NBB data given to the author by the Head of Foreign Exchange Analysis and Forecasting Division of the NB during our meeting in Mi 







Appendix E Testing for the Presence of a Unit Root in Series
In the present work the following tests were performed to test for stationarity: 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (1979), Perron (1989), Baneijee et al (1992) and Zivot and 
Andrews (1992). The last three are unit root tests that allow for a structural change in 
the series.
The series is said to be stationary if it tends to return to its mean and fluctuate 
around it within a relatively constant range (see Gujarati 1998).
While performing Augmented Dickey-Fuller’s (ADF) test1 the following three 
equations can be used to test for the presence of a unit root in series (see Enders 1995):
p
Ay, = yy,-■ + X  PAy,-M +u, (E.i)
i=2
P
Ay, = a 0 +  xv,_, + X  P A y ,-M  + u, (E-2)
1=2
p
Ay, =«o + yy,-, + X  PiAy,_ ,+1 + a j  + u , (E.3)
i=2
All three regressions differ from each other only by the presence/absence of 
deterministic elements, namely an intercept (drift term) and a linear time trend. If the 
series does not exhibit any trend and has a nonzero mean, only a constant should be 
included in the regression (see regression (E.2)), while if  the series seems to be 
fluctuating around a zero mean, neither a constant nor a trend should be included in the 
regression. In this case the regression is a pure random walk model (E.I).
The null hypothesis states that the series contains a unit root (y  = 0). If the 
computed absolute value of the t (tau) statistic exceeds the ADF absolute critical value, 
then we can reject the null hypothesis that the given time series contains a unit root or in 
other words that is nonstationary. Dickey and Fuller computed critical values for each 
of three regressions depending on whether deterministic terms are included in the 
regression. The critical values tend to increase with adding deterministic terms into the 
regression. Correspondingly, t (random walk regression), t (with an intercept term
included in the regression), r r (with an intercept and a trend included in the regression) 
statistics should be used to test the null hypothesis of a unit root. Along with a set of
1 Dickey-Fuller test is used when the series is AR(1) process, while Augmented Dickey-Fuller is used 
when the series is correlated at higher order lags.
209
Julia A. Korosteleva (2006) Appendix E
tau-statistics Dickey and Fuller used three additional F-statistics ( ^ j ,^ 2,^ 3) to test joint 
hypothesis on the coefficients. To test the null hypothesis a 0 = y = 0 regression (E.2) 
should be estimated and <px statistic should be used. If cpx is greater than the critical 
value provided by Dickey and Fuller than the null hypothesis can be rejected, that 
means that one or more of these parameters are not equal to 0. In the same way while 
estimating regression (E.3) the null hypothesis a 0 = y = a l = 0 is tested using
<p2 statistic and the null hypothesis y  = a x = 0 is tested using <p3 statistic. In turn, all 
three statistics (pl t<p2, 03 are computed in the same way as an ordinary F statistic, that is:
RSSrestricted -  RSSunrestricted
r
RSSunrestricted
( T - k )
where RSS restricted and RSS unrestricted are correspondingly the sums of the 
squared residuals in restricted and unrestricted models 
r is the number of restrictions 
T is the number of usable observations
k is the number of parameters estimated in the unrestricted model
Along with r  and (p statistics it is also possible to check the significance of the
intercept and time trend comparing computed tau-statistics, namely x^  , t pr and r a/Y, for
the correspondent null hypotheses a 0 = 0 given /  = 0, a x = 0  given y  = 0 and
a 0 = 0 given/ = 0 with the critical values provided by Dickey and Fuller. All test
statistics used in performing ADF test are summarised in table E.I.
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for 95 per cent 
and 99 per cent 
confidence 
intervals*
p 7 = 0 T -3.45 and-4.04
Ay, = + yy,-i + X  PAy,~M + +u ,
i=2 a 0 = 0 given y  = 0
X
Tat 3.11 and 3.78













<Pl 6.49 and 8.73
<P2 4.88 and 6.5
P
A y ,  = a 0  + yy,-i + X  PA y,.M + u ,  (E.2)
OII -2.89 and-3.51
/ = 2 a 0 = 0given7 = 0 2.54 and 3.22
oIIiioS <Px 4.71 and 6.70
*y,=yy,-i m + u ,(e .i)
i = 2
oII T -1.95 and-2.60
2
Table E.I: Summary o f the Dickey-Fuller tests
Thus, a general ADF procedure involves computation of all test statistics mentioned 
above, starting from testing the null hypothesis that the data are generated by (E.I) 
against the alternative one that the data are generated by (E.2), then testing the null 
hypothesis that the data is generated by (E.3) versus (E.I), and finally by (E.2) versus 
(E.3).
Perron (1989) considers three different models under the null hypothesis: the 
first is the ‘crash’ model which allows for a change in the level of the series (E.5); the 
second allows for a change in the rate of growth (E.6); and the third permits both a 
change in the level and a change in the slope of the deterministic trend (E.7).
y , =M + y  t—\ + D(TB), + e, . (E.5)
y , =M  1 + yi-i + (Ml -  Ml )DU, +e, ,  (E.6)
y t = Ml + y,-1 + D(TB), + (ji2 -  /i, )DU, + e , , (E.7)
where D {TB)=\ if t=Tb + 1, 0 otherwise;
2 The table is adapted from Enders (1995). Asterisk denotes critical values for a sample size of 100.
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D U t =1 if  t > Tb, 0 otherwise;
H is the drift parameter and p  is the linear time trend;
Tb denotes the time of break
The alternative models take the following form:
y t =Mi + f t  + {Mi ~ Mi )D Ut + et (E.5)*
y t = M + ft* + ( f t  ~ f t  )DTt + et , (E.6)*
y t = Mi + f t 1 + (Mi ~ Mi )DUt + ( f t  -  Px )DTt + et , (E.7)*
where DTt—t - Tb, and DTt=t if t> Tb and 0 otherwise.
The null hypothesis of a unit root in model (E.5) is characterised by a dummy
variable which takes the value one at the time of the break. Under the alternative
hypothesis of a ‘trend-stationary’ system model (E.5)* allows for a one-time change in 
the intercept of the trend function. Under the null hypothesis model (E.6) specifies that 
the drift parameter changes from //, to ju2 at the time of the break, whereas under the 
alternative hypothesis (E.6)* a change in the slope of the trend function at the time of 
the break is allowed. Finally, model (E.7) allows for both effects to take place 
simultaneously (see Perron 1989, p. 1364).
Unlike Perron, Baneijee et al. (1992) treat the break date as unknown a priori. 
Their methodology is based on estimating the following regression
k
Ay ,=  a 0+ a ,t+  a 2y,_,+ £ a 3Ay,_f +u, (E.8)
i
The set of ADF t statistics (recursive, rolling and sequential statistics) is 
computed on the following basis.
The recursive minimum ADF t statistic is computed using sub-samples t=T,...,k, 
for k=k0,...,T, where k 0is a start-up values and T is the size of the full sample. Each
following sub-sample increases by one observation until eventually the full sample is 
covered. The above model is estimated for each sub-sample and then the minimum 
value of z  statistic is chosen and compared to the critical values originated by Baneijee 
et al. (1992). The computation of rolling statistics is done in a similar way with a 
difference that sub-samples are a constant fraction of the full sample (T). Baneijee et al. 
(1992) use k equal to one-third of the sample size, namely 0.3T. Thus, the first sub­
sample covers 1 to k. The second starts from 2 and finishes at k+1 and so on. For the 
computation of a sequential t statistic a dummy variable that assigns the shift either in 
trend or in mean model is introduced into regression (E.8). The estimated regressions
212
Julia A. Korosteleva (2006) Appendix E
are similar to model (E.5) and model (E.6) of Perron (1989) under the null hypothesis of 
a unit root. The break point is to be found between 0.15 and (T- 0.15T), given 0.15 is a 
trimming value according to Baneijee et al. The lowest t statistic across all sub-samples 
is chosen and compared to the critical values provided in Baneijee et al. (1992). Along 
with the t statistic the F statistic is calculated to test the null hypothesis of a joint 
significance of the coefficient of the introduced dummy variable and a 2 (see (E.8)). The 
largest value of the F statistic is then compared with Baneijee’s et al. critical value (for 
more details see Baneijee et al. 1992, Harris 1995).
The Zivot-Andrews procedure involves estimating the same three regressions 
proposed by Perron (1989). In comparison with Perron’s (1989) findings, Zivot and 
Andrews (1992, p. 251) provide less evidence against the unit-root hypothesis while 
reanalysing the data series considered by Perron (1989). Unlike Perron, Zivot and 
Andrews do not take the break fraction to be exogenous, but treat the structural break as 
endogenous. The t-min statistics are calculated in a fashion similar to Baneijee’s et al. 
sequential statistics with a break fraction defined as X = T b / T ,  ranging from j=2/T to 
j=(T-l)/T. The break year is the year corresponding to the minimum statistic. For more 
descriptions of the test see Zivot and Andrews (1992).
213
Appendix F Checking the Reliability of the Monthly GDP Series 
Compiled by the Ministry of Statistics and Analysis of Belarus1
The monthly GDP series, used in the present work, is provided by the Ministry of 
Statistics and Analysis (MSA) of Belarus. The data are compiled according to the 
System of National Accounts implemented in 1993. The aggregate GDP data is 
collected from the production accounts that leads to some statistical discrepancy 
between the aggregate GDP and its value obtained from expenditure flows.
It is not common for any economies around the world to produce GDP series on 
a monthly basis, since it involves a laborious compiling process. Belarus might be the 
only country that produces GDP on a monthly basis. That is why it is reasonable to 
check how reliable is the official monthly GDP data. Here, we intend to check the 
reliability of the monthly GDP data due to the Belarusian official statistics by 
comparing the quarterly GDP data derived by summation of the monthly GDP compiled 
by the MSA and those published in the International Financial Statistics (IFS) by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). The data published in the latter source are regarded 
as a worldwide yardstick.
The further analysis is two-fold.
First of all, there is need to look at correlation matrix of real GDP published by 
the IMF and real GDP compiled by the Ministry of Statistics and Analysis.
The following variables are used in the present analysis:
1. GDPRimf -  the quarterly Gross Domestic Product Volume (IMF) in prices of 
1995, chained, millions of BRB2.
2. GDPRmsa -  the reconstructed quarterly Gross Domestic Product Volume 
(MSA) in prices of 1995, chained, millions of BRB3.
1 I am indebted to Sergei Perapechka, an MA Student in Economics (2002-2003), University of Sussex, 
who shared his ideas about checking the reliability of the monthly GDP series with me. Although, the 
principles used in the present analysis are the same, the obtained results are relatively different from those 
obtained by Perapechka, S. that can be explained by the different samples used in both analyses and due 
to some discrepancies in the GDP data of the official statistics.
2 International Financial Statistics [online]. Available from: http://ifs.apdi.net/imf/logon.aspx [Accessed 
November 2003]; line 99b.p in the IFS.
3 Institute of Privatisation and Management [online]. Available from: 
http^/ipm.by/index.pUtopicid^mside [Accessed September 2003].
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The previous conclusion is also supported by the results of simple regression 







Table F.2.1: Summary o f the estimated regression o f GDPRimf on GDPRmsa6
Hypothesis tested Chi ( z 2) statistic
A1=0 Z 2( 1)= .56991 [.450]
A2=l X 2 (1)= .49250[.483]
A1=0 U A2=l Z 2(2)= .67136[.715]
—     i _
Table F.2.2: Summary o f the Wald test results
As one can see from tables F.2.1 and F2.2 the estimated coefficient of GDPRmsa is 
statistically not different from 1. Although the diagnostic tests show the presence of 
serial correlation in residuals, it is not surprising in this case because both variables, on 
the one hand GDPRimf, and on the other GDPRmsa are highly autocorrelated. The null 
hypotheses of A2=l is supported by the results of the Wald test. The results of the latter 
also show that constant in both regressions is statistically not different from 0 and the 
null hypothesis under the both restrictions imposed is also accepted.
Following these results one can conclude that the quarterly GDP series obtained 
by summation of the monthly GDP data released by the Ministry of Statistics and 
Analysis is not statistically different from those published by the IMF. It implies that the 
official monthly GDP series is reliable and can be used in the present study.
6 Authors’ calculations on the data obtained from the International Financial Statistics [online]. Available 
from: http://ifs.apdi.net/imfrlogon.aspx [Accessed November 2003] and the Institute of Privatisation and 
Management [online]. Available from: http://ipm.by/index.pl?topicid=inside [Accessed September 2003]. 
T-statistics are in parentheses
7 Ibid. Regression estimated: GDPRimf = A l + A2GDPRmsa; p-values are in square brackets.
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Appendix G The Methodology of Deriving the Maximum and 
Actual Rates of Seigniorage and Inflation Tax in Belarus in 
1995-2002
Deriving the Actual Revenue from Seigniorage and Inflation Tax
First of all there is need to distinguish between seigniorage computed as the end-of- 
period and as a period average.
The revenue from seigniorage based on the end-of-period data (see table G.l) 
was computed as a change in the absolute value of monetary base (MB) at the end of the 
period divided by the price index at the end of the period and divided by the real GDP 
in this period of time (see formula (7.1) in chapter 7). For example, the revenue from 
seigniorage as a per cent of GDP in 1995 was computed in the following way:






tax was obtained from formula (7.3):
dt P dt
where IT is equal to the difference between seigniorage and change in real cash 
balances. From the above formula one can see that the revenue from inflation tax is 
inclusive into the revenue from seigniorage. Inflation tax is greater than seigniorage 
when real cash balances decrease1.
The revenue from seigniorage based on the period average data (see table G.l) 
was computed in a similar way as the revenue from seigniorage based on the end-of- 
period data with the only difference that for the computation of the former there were 
used the period average values of nominal monetary base and inflation rate. In turn the 
period average value of nominal monetary base and CPI are computed as arithmetic 
averages. For example, for 1995 the nominal value of monetary base is equal to 
( M B  D ecenberm s  + M B  Dea m bt r m t  V 2> while the consumer price index is equal to the sum 
of all monthly price indices in 1995 divided by 12.
1 It is also possible to check the reliability of the result based on formula (G.2) by computing inflation tax 












Jan  1997=1, 
end of period
MB real, 

















as a % of GDP
Inflation Tax, 









1994 1417.3 - 0.184 7689.55 - - - - -
1995 6483.1 3950.2 0.634 10219.66 0.4949 7981.1 221166 3.61 - 2.47 -
1996 11372.5 8927.8 0.883 12885.04 0.7556 11816.09 227358.
7
2.44 2.9 1.26 1.21
1997 22336.6 16855 1.442 15486.12 1.238 13611.37 253277.
5
3.00 2.53 1.97 1.82
1998 45151.3 33744 4.064 11110.9 2.145 15733.66 274552.
9
2.04 2.87 3.63 2.1
1999 137281.6 91983 14.276 9616.4 8.45 10890.84 283887.
6
2.27 2.43 2.8 4.13
2000 309205.7 223244 29.689 10414.9 22.71 9829.595 300353.
1
1.93 1.92 1.66 2.27
2001 680305.0 513684 43.449 15657.48 36.65 14014.93 312367.
3
2.73 2.54 1.06 1.2
2002 953278.0 816792 58.6 16267.42 52.33 15609.57 326967.
7
1.42 1.77 1.24 1.28
Table G.l: The actual revenue from seigniorage and inflation tax in Belarus in 1995-20022
2 Authors’ calculations on the data provided by the National Bank of the Republic of Belarus (National Bank of Belarus 2000a (January), 2000b (January), 2001, 2002, 
2003); Institute of Privatisation and Management [online]. Available from: http://ipm.bv/index.pl?topicid=inside [Accessed September 2003]. Although all the computations 
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Deriving the Maximum Revenue from Seigniorage
By setting the monetary base in December 1994 as a departing value the computations 
of the monetary base in the following years are done by multiplying the value of the 
monetary base at the beginning of each period by the steady-state monetary growth rate 
that is in our case the revenue-maximizing monetary growth rate. For example, to 
calculate an absolute value of the monetary base in December 1995 (stock of MB at the 
end of the year), one should multiply 1417.4 (a departing value) by 4.2388 
(323.88/100+1) to get BRB 6008 million. All the calculations are based on monthly 
dataset.
Price index was calculated in a similar way by increasing it by 1.1279 each 
following month and referring to January 1997=100 as a base value.
Finally, the maximum revenue from seigniorage was computed in the same way 
as the actual revenue from seigniorage (see table G.2 for the computations performed).
There is no need to compute the maximum revenue from inflation tax because 
under steady-state conditions the revenue from seigniorage is equal to one from 











as a % of GDP
1994 1417.3 0.049 - -
1995 6007.7 0.209 221166 9.92
1996 25465.7 0.887 227358.7 9.65
1997 107945.2 3.758 253277.5 8.67
1998 457562.5 15.93 274552.9 7.99
1999 1939534.8 67.53 283887.6 7.73
2000 8221380.5 286.23 300353.1 7.31
2001 34849127 1213.29 312367.3 7.03
2002 147719921 5142.95 326967.7 6.71
j
Table G.2: The maximum revenue from seigniorage in Belarus in 1995-2002
3 Authors’ calculations on the data provided by the National Bank of the Republic of Belarus (National 
Bank of Belarus 2000a (January), 2000b (January), 2001, 2002, 2003); Institute of Privatisation and 
Management [online]. Available from: http://ipm.bv/index.pl?topicid:=:inside [Accessed September 2003].
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Second, we regress GDPRimf on GDPRmsa to check whether the GDPRmsa 
coefficients are statistically not different from 1 and the constant o f the regression is 
close to zero. If it holds it will argue for the reliability of the monthly GDP series 












Figure F.l: The quarterly real GDP by IMF and by MSA compared, 1995Q l-200IQ l4
The graphic examination of figure F.l shows that the real GDP variables by IMF and 
MSA have very similar trends.
Table F.l contains correlation coefficients of the variables of interest. One can 




Table F .l: Estimated correlation matrix o f  variables5
4 Authors’ calculations on the data obtained from the International Financial Statistics [online]. Available 
from: http: ifs.apdi.net/imf/Iogon.aspx [Accessed Novem ber 2003] and the Institute o f Privatisation and 
Management [online]. Available from: http: ipm.by index.pl?topicid=inside [Accessed September 2003].
5 Ibid.
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